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Military history is an extremely broad field of study. The amount 
of information which confronts the historian is voluminous. As a re-
sult, military historians, out of self-defense, tend to limit their study 
to a certain period, region, or facet of warfare, such as the use of 
cavalry. This allows for some depth to their studies. It precludes too 
much information and possibly confusion from entering into their written 
efforts. 
The general topic of American military history has fascinated me 
for many years. However, I have yet to limit my investigations to a 
particular period, finding each century or war too interesting to omit. 
I have narrowed my current research to a particular aspect of American 
warfare. Four years of military service as an artillery officer has 
created a sensitivity to the role of artillerymen and cannons in battle. 
In the course of my graduate studies, I have found that military histor-
ians have generally succeeded in avoiding the subject of artillery, 
regardless of era or continent. I can only surmise that the fear of 
becoming mired in a confusing mass of technical terms explains this 
historiographical omission. The story of artillerymen and their cannons, 
especially in American history, has not been adequately told. 
This is particularly true of the vast body of works which deal 
with the frontier army and the Indian wars. An excessive amount of the 
literature on the Indian-fighting army concerns the cavalry. This is 
based on the assumption that the cavalry0 wasthe principle arm employed 
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against the Indian tribes of North America. In realitYt infantry and 
artillery units met the Indian in battle on more than one occasion. The 
infantry story has been told, indirectly, through the biographies of 
field commanders such as Nelson Miles and George Crook. This study ful-
fills a need to document the actions·of artillerymen who fought in the 
West from 1866 to 1890. 
This has not been an easy task. There are no secondary works which 
even remotely address the topic of artillerymen or cannons in the Indian 
wars. Passing reference is made to certain units or cannons, but a de-
tailed analysis does not exist. Personal papers and manuscripts, the 
fundamental resource of a historian, are maddeningly scarce. The official 
records, often incomplete in themselves, have been the major source of 
information. 
The completion of this study is largely due to the assistance of 
many people. The members of my doctoral conunittee, Drs. David Baird, 
George Carney, Douglas Hale, H. James Henderson, and James Smallwood, 
have been extremely patient and understanding toward my efforts on such 
a specialized topic. My principal adviser, Dr. Joe Stout, has provided 
invaluable guidance, not only on the dissertation but in my graduate 
studies in general. Part of the difficulty of this project has been the 
competition for time due to my teaching duties at South Dakota State 
University. Dr. Rodney Bell and Dr. Edward Hogan have been most gracious 
in allowing me time and resources to complete the work. 
Without the assistance of several splendid librarians, the research 
for this study would still be in progress. John and Vicki Phillips of 
the Oklahoma State University library spent many hours helping me in the 
early stages of the research. Mrs. Jan Fite of SDSU's Briggs Library. 
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has processed a vertible mountain of inter-library load requests. Her 
efforts are certainly appreciated. 
I owe the greatest debt to my family. My wife and children have 
sacrificed a great deal of time and activity for the sake of this dis-
sertation. Between teaching duties and research, my presence at home 
has been occasional at time. Without the support of my wife, Jan, this 
work and my graduate program would have been doomed to failure a long 
time ago. 
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At the close of the Civil War, many officers of the Regular Army 
looked to their experiences in that contest in order to extract funda-
mental maxims concerning military operations. They then incorporated 
these precepts into the tactical doctrine of the army. However, these 
theorists overlooked a reality concerning the actions of the army in 
the nation's history. Wars in which organized, massed armies fought on 
this continent, such as the Civil War, were few in number and compara-
tively short in duration. 
If they had ranked the wars of the United States according to num-
ber and duration, the 100 years of intermittent Indian wars would have 
surpassed all other conflicts to that time. Although more spectacular, 
the conflict between the North and the South, or between the United States 
and Great Britain, was only an interruption in the century-long struggle 
between the Indian and the white man. In addition, the Civil War vete-
rans failed to understand that in the future, the army was more likely 
to face the American Indian than a foreign army. Because of this myopic 
view of American military history, the tactical philosophy of the army 
was concerned with conflict between well-trained, massed, national armies. 
If the total experience of the army had been examined, a more oper-
ative system of maneuver and logistics would have resulted. Historically, 
armed forces have achieved success only when they have possessed a 
i 
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tactical system and appropriate resources for a particular mission and 
environment. The British colonists ultimately realized that European 
tactics did not work in America. The heavily wooded environment pre-
cluded mass formations of troops, and the Indians did not fight like 
French Regulars. British.and American forces in the Old Northwest in 
1812 were defeated more of ten by logistical problems than by the other 
side. However, the proscribed system of combat adopted by the army af-
ter 1865 did not reflect the nation's diverse historical background. 
The army's thoughts were shaped exclusively by the experiences of 
Antietam, Vicksburg, and Cold Harbor. 
The mission of the army in the West and the environment in which 
the army operated rendered the Civil War-system of warfare ineffective. 
Chasing outlaws and Indians was not the same aa laying seige to Peters-
burg or facing the Confederate line at Shiloh. For a few soldiers, fron-
tier duty prior to the war offered some frame of reference to the western 
landscape and its native inhabitants. However, those without such ex-
posure could only hope that the price they had to pay for this knowledge 
was not too high. The parade fields of West Point and the battlefields 
of northern Virginia were no preparation for the plains of Kansas, the 
deserts of Arizona, or the mountains of Montana. Lacking a workable 
methodology, the frontier army floundered in a trial and error approach 
to operations in the west. 
The absence of a practical scheme for fighting Indians was clearly 
evident in the roles which artillery played in the Indian wars from 1866 
to 1890. Occasionally, expeditions took light artillery units with them 
in pursuit of hostile Indians. In other campaigns, artillery weapons 
and units were absent. During the Indian wars of the Pacific Northwest, 
artillerymen fought, but as infantrymen or cavalrymen. There were in-
stances in the same campaign in which some columns had artillery while 
others did not. This inconsistency could only have been possible if 
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the conduct of operations was organized according to the whims or phi-
losophy of individual commanders. A tactical doctrine concerning con-
flict with an irregular enemy, such as the Indian, would have provided 
general, consistent guidelines on ·the use of artillery units and cannons. 
Through the analysis of the artillery in the Indian wars, it will 
be shown that a coherent and consistent tactical doctrine for Indian 
fighting did not exist. The prejudices and inclinations of commanders, 
along with fundamental resource requirements, explained the assorted 
artillery experiences in the west. Furthermore, the study will show 
that an Indian fighting doctrine should have included artillery. The 
intelligent application of cannons could have altered the outcome of 
certain important battles. In several instances, the presence of the 
guns provided the critical measure which brought success. 
The army's problems in the West can only be partially explained by 
its failure to adapt its tactics to the fighting techniques of the 
American Indian. The physical and cultural landscape of the West con-
tributed to the difficulties of policing the frontier. Military opera-
tions, more than any other human endeavor, have been affected by the 
environment in which they have taken place. The vast, complex milieu 
of the West demanded that any tactical doctrine be flexible and that 
the logistical system be regionally tailored. The army had great dif-
ficulty meeting those demands. 
CHAPTER II 
THE ARMY IN THE WEST: A PROBLEM OF 
SPACE, RESOURCE, AND TIME 
A ribbon of blue moved down the streets of Washington, D.C.,on May 
23, 1865. This was the grand review for the Union army, celebrating the 
end of the terrible struggle between the North and the South. Although 
the columns of soldiers numbered almost two hundred thousand, these men 
represented only part of the more than two million men who had conquered 
the Confederate armies and destroyed the Confederacy. Most of these 
troopers were citizen soldiers, who soon would return to farms, shops, 
and families. For these men, the struggle for life on a battlefield was 
a thing of the past. The only association they would have with the army 
in the future would be in the periodic unit reunions held years later. 
Battle became either a memory or something they read of in the pages of 
their newspapers. However, a small portion of that procession of soldiers 
were men whose lives and destinies were intertwined with the profession 
of arms. 
For the regulars, the future held the option of reconstruction duty 
in the South or hard duty in the West. There would be little glory in 
these assignments. A small portion of the army would be sent to the 
coastal fortifications. The shores and borders of the country had to be 
defended, although the threat of invasion was non-existent. The mainte-
nance of buildings and equipment was the real purpose of these soldiers, 
4 
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not defense. Some regular units returned to the South to supervise Con-
gressional reconstruction. Their task was to establish law and order and 
to supervise the emancipation of former slaves. The remaining units jour-
neyed to the frontier. Pacifying the wilderness had been the true mission 
of the army for the last one hundred years, the various national wars 
being only interruptions of the daily routine. Providing protection for. 
a growing frontier population and controlling the various wild tribes of 
the region was the largest and most difficult of the army's three labors. 
For reasons of space, resource, and time, the frontier regulars experien-
ced failure as often as success in the vast expanse west of the ninety-
f if th meridian. 1 
Within the context of the spatial profile of the West, the first 
imposing reality was the sheer size of the region. That portion of the 
United States west of the ninety-fifth meridian contained more than two 
million square miles. It was a region eleven times larger than continen-
tal France. 2 Prior to the coming of the railroad and telegraph, ten days 
were needed for news from the East to reach the West coast via pony ex-
press. Although the telegraph did reduce this to a matter of seconds, 
the wires of the Western Union Telegraph Company could not carry human 
beings and their assorted worldly possessions. The simple magnitude of 
the West dictated that the army readjust the tactical philosophy and the 
logistical systems which had served it in the comparatively limited thea-
ters of the Civil War. The frontier regulars would learn, as Napoleon 
had, that vast expanses could defeat an army as thoroughly as an enemy 
force. 
The American West was as diverse as it was large. No continuity 
existed in the topography, climate, biotic environment, or cultural milieu 
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of the American West. The physiographical landscape included mountains, 
interior plains, coastal lowlands, interior plateaus, and basins (Figure 
1). Virtually every type of landform existed in the West. Climatic var-
iations were also a part of the region. January temperatures ranged 
from the sixties in the desert southwest to the sub-zero teens in the 
northern rockies and northern plains (Figure 2). During summer, the 
mountains remained comparatively cool, while the plains and desert pla-
teaus became virtual ovens (Figure 3). Rainfall amounts ranged from a 
few inches to more than 150 inches per year (Figure 4). 
The topographic and,more important, the climatic extremes, even in 
a single area affected the soldier's physical condition, his morale, and 
therefore his effectiveness. General William T. Sherman often told the 
story of an Arizona soldier who died and went to hell. One night he re-
turned to his barracks at Fort Yuma. His old comrades asked him why he 
had come back. The late trooper replied that it was cold where he was 
and he had returned for his blankets. 3 During the Nez Perce campaign, 
troops from Arizona were sent to the northern rockies. The change in 
climate required a period of adjustment before the troops were capable 
of the same exertions as the troops stationed in the Pacific Northwest. 
The climatic and topographic diversity had a correstponding affect 
on the biotic milieu. The region of the Great Plains was dominated by 
grasses of various heights and densities. Timber in this province was 
generally confined to the banks of the streams and rivers which crossed 
the plains from west to east. Cone-bearing trees covered the mountains 
with pockets of broadleaf hardwoods found in isolated locations. Dwarf 
shrubs,such as sagebrush, were the dominant vegative types in the arid 
lands of the southwest and the interior basin. Cacti and mesquite could 
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also be found in these regions. 4 
The vegetative landscape affected frontier garrisons in a logistical 
sense. Some posts had an abundant supply of hay for animals, but they 
had to be supplied with timber forbuildings or firewood. Other garrisons 
had to form forage details to go to distant meadows and cut hay. Grain, 
the staple of all army livestock, was transported to most garrisons be-
cause farms were too distant or few in number. For many of the soldiers 
who were born and raised in the humid, wooded East, the physical and 
biotic landscape of the West was alien. 
The cultural profile which the easterners found was equally diverse 
and alien. For at least thirty thousand years, the trans-Mississippi 
West contained the most important of life forms-- man. Migrating from 
central Asia via the Bering land bridge, the American Indian could be 
found anywhere on the North American continent by the first century A.D. 
(Figure 5). The duration of .settlement and the region in which they lived 
influenced cultural differentiation. Unfortunately, the white man failed 
to appreciate the fact that western Indian cultures were as varied as 
the physical landscape they occupied. The Plains were the home of nomadic 
hunters, such as the Sioux, Cheyenne, and Comanche. Hunting and gather-
ing, on a more sedentary basis, characterized the live:i.ihoods of the 
tribes of the inter-mountain regions and the desert southwest. There 
were noticeable exceptions to these two generalities. The Mandan of the 
northern plains, Wichita and Caddo of the southern plains, and Pueblo of 
the southwest were agriculturalists. In the Pacific Northwest, fishing 
provided the bulk of the needs of the inhabitants. The Indians of that 
region supplemented their diets with gathered plants and game. Language, 
religion, inter and intra-family relationships, and social structure as 
1890 
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well as livelihood, varied between tribes and geographic regions. 5 War-
fare was an integral part of most tribal cultures, although the method 
of waging war differed. Mounted battle characterized those Indians who 
had incorporated the horse into their way of life. Even this was sub-
ject to variation. The Comanche and Sioux fought from horseback. The 
Apache rode to the battle but generally fought on foot. For many Indian 
men, war was the principal means of achieving wealth and distinction. 
The philosophy and techniques of war were engrained by centuries of 
. "b 1 . 6 1nter-tr1 a wars. For the army, this particular facet of Indian cul-
tural dissimiliarity meant that what worked well against one tribe in 
battle might not work against another tribe. 
Although the native populations of the West wer~ differentiated 
culturally, they did possess one. commonality .. Generally the Indian was 
not an agent of major geographic change. Topographic and vegetative 
modification came with the arrival of the Spanish, French, English, 
and finally the Americans. The latter group altered the physical and 
cultural environments of the West as much as the former groups, perhaps 
more. The American settler was both the reason for the presence of the 
army on the frontier and the major source of its headaches. 
Before the Civil War, most of the Americans who ventured into the 
region west of the Mississippi were bound for the Pacific coast. In 
time, however, settlements began in the non-coastal areas of the West. 
Systematic, regulated expansion which characterized the growth of New 
England settlements could not be found in the West after 1866. 7 The 
eruption of settlements in frontier territories certainly did not con-
form to the symmetrical, orderly plan Thomas Jefferson envisioned. 
Unfettered by precedent, law, or even logic, the pioneer settled in any 
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region which supported the simplest of life forms. The banks of rivers, 
creeks, and streams, regardless of the volume of water flow, were favorite 
cabin sites. Transportation routes, such as wagon roads and later rail-
roads, also had their share of bordering soddies, dugouts, and clapboard 
houses. However, driven by the compulsion of "breathing room," many re-
sided far from either of these primary zones of habitation. Distances 
between individual residences was often five miles or more, and thirty 
to forty miles separated embryonic towns. 
Consequently, there was no true "line of settlement" (Figures 6 and 7). 
The western landscape was littered with an erratically located series of 
individual farms and ranches. This demographic pattern defied all army 
efforts to protect it. There was always a large number of ranches, farms, 
road houses, mines, and trading posts too far from the nearest garrison 
to benefit from the security of its soldiers. For many of these scattered 
clusters of pioneer humanity, the question was not if they would be at-
tacked by Indians or robbed by outlaws, but when, and would they survive. 
The army also had to patrol the vaguely defined limits of the Indian 
reservations to prevent the illegal acquisition of Indian land. 
To complete these tasks, the army had to possess an operational 
philosophy and logistical system tailored to the complex physical and 
cultural landscape of the West. Only a large, well-equipped, mobile 
army could hope to protect the frontier population from the Indians and 
protect the Indians from the frontier population. Unfortunately,that 
type of military force vanished with the last volleys of the Civil War. 
The post-war army was severely handicapped by a lack of fundamental 
resources. Historically, the primary base of any army has been its 
soldiers. At the end of the War of the Rebellion, the Union army mustered 
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8 approximately two million men. Within a year of General Robert E. Lee's 
surrender at Appomatox, the Army of the United States was reduced to 
slightly more than fifty-seven thousand men. 9 Congressional reorganiza-
tion of the army further reduced that number. In the period from 1870 
to 1890, the average strength of the regular army seldom exceeded twenty-
six thousand officers and men. 10 The lack of manpower alone was suffi-
cient to keep the army from fulfilling its obligations in reconstruction 
and frontier defense. 
The inadequacy of numbers was most pronounced in the West. In 1873, 
Lieutenant General Philip Sheridan had eight cavalry regiments and eigh-
teen infantry regiments assigned to his Military Division of the Missouri. 11 
Extending from Canada to Mexico and from the Mississippi to the Rockies, 
Sheridan's command encompassed almost 1.5 million square miles. Propor-
tionally, ea,ch of Sheridan's troopers was responsible for more than one 
hundred square miles of territory. 12 As the frontier army was generally 
employed by cavalry troop or infantry company instead of individually, 
the ratio was considerably different. Each troop or company had more 
than fifty-four hundred miles of extremely varied terrain to patrol. 
The spatial distribution of this meager force further aggravated the 
problem of maintaining peace. Sheridan considered his mission to include 
giving protection to the general line of the frontier, protecting com-
. 13 
mercial lines of travel, and providing the nuclei for settlement. This 
required the dispersal of his regulars to more than seventy posts. Al-
though other division commanders did not share Sheridan's particular 
definition of their task~ they, too, scattered their garrisons (Figure 8). 
Each of these garrisons required some manpower to perform certain house-
keeping chores, such as cooking, maintenance of facilities, forage details, 
1878 
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fuel details, and sentry duty. Consequently, only a portion of each gar-
rison was available for patrolling the area surrounding each fort, or 
pursuing outlaws or Indians. For example, if only fifteen men were de-
tailed at each post for housekeeping duty, the force available to respond 
to emergencies within Sheridan's division would be reduced by more than 
a thousand men. 
Many officers felt that the large number of one or two units posts 
seriously affected morale, discipline, and therefore effectiveness. 
Brigadier General John Pope advocated the concentration of units at se-
lected posts for the normally quiet winter months and deployment to dis-
d . h . 14 perse temporary camps in t e more active summer. However, any talk 
of abandoning posts normally met a congressional brick wall. An attempt 
to abandon Fort Ripley, Minnesota, was blocked by the Indian Bureau. 15 
Talk of closing Fort Harker, Kansas, brought a petition by the Kansas 
legislature attesting to that post's importance in protecting the state's 
frontier. As late as 1878, Secretary of War George W. Mccrary observed, 
"Whenever we attempt to vacate posts for reasons purely military, members 
of Congress often ask for delay or non-action. 1116 
It was conceivable that even the small frontier army could have 
pacified the West had it possessed the proper resources and adequate 
mobility. Unfortunately, both were in short supply. One legacy of the 
war was a stockpile of arms and equipment suitable for that conflict. 
A Congress bent on military thrift balked at appropriations for new ma-
terial when warehouses were still full of Civil War accouterments. Units 
drew Civil War-era uniforms until the early 1880s. 17 For the troops op-
erating in the desert Southwest, the dark blue woolen uniforms could be 
as deadly as the Apaches. In a similiar fashion, garrisons were often 
20 
supplied with processed food left over from the war. The garrison menu 
generally consisted of hash, hard tack, salt pork, and coffee. Vege-
tables were a luxury the soldiers had to purchase themselves or raise in 
unit garden plots. The field rations were not quite as monotonous as 
those in post for the simple reason that the hash was deleted from the 
bill of fare. 18 Doubtless the low quality of garrison food was partially 
responsible for the soldiers' intemperate indulgence in alcohol. Fron-
tier whiskey was known for its ability to kill bacteria or ultimately 
any other life form. 
The principal shortcoming of the trooper was his weapon. Again sur-
plus wartime equipment made Congress reluctant to spend money on new 
weapons. Therefore, the army could not take advantage of advances in 
weapons technology made in the United States and Europe. The existence 
of thousands of muzzle-loading muskets impeded the adoption of a breech-
loading rifle until 1873. The new weapon was extremely accurate, but it 
was still a single-shot instrument. The soldier's adversary, be he out-
law or Indian, often did business with a repeating rifle, either a Henry 
or a Winchester. 
The army was partially culpable for the absence of a repeating rifle 
in the ranks until 1893. The design, test, and adoption of weapons was 
the sole prerogative of the Ordnance Department. However, that branch 
was not under the control of the commanding general or any other line 
officer. Consequently, those who primarily used their weapons in combat 
had no say in the specifications or adoption of rifles or even cannons. 
The Ordnance Department was extremely reluctant to test a repeating rifle 
against the Springfield rifle, a product of their own design. They jus-
tified this by saying that the Springfield had more penetration at six 
21 
h d d d h f h . 'fl 19 un re yar s t an any o t e repeating ri es. This was indeed ironic 
as the average soldier was a miserably poor marksman and had difficulty 
hitting a target at two hundred yards. 
·weapons, whether rifles, sabres, or cannons, traditionally have been 
considered the fundamental resource of the combat soldier. But the wea-
pan is of little value if the soldier is not proficient in its use. 
Marksmanship training, like other army activities, was seriously impeded 
by congressional frugality. Rifle instruction for the individual trooper 
began in 1869. However, the soldier was limited to ten rounds per month 
f 1 . 20 or actua practice. The result of such limited practice was poor 
marksmanship. An anonymous writer described such ability in an average 
recruit caustically named Private Blob. 
When Blob goes out to target practice he devotes himself solely 
to getting his gun off, no matter at what or when. He always 
shuts both eyes, opens his mouth, and pulls away. He will al-
ways do so to all eternity. Explanations, suggestions, and even 
the guardhouse, are utterly lost upon him. However capacious 
his brain, but one idea swells and fills it to the exclusion of 
all else, and that is to furiously, blindly tug at the trigger 
until that awful roar comes and goes and is got rid of. The 
safety of the company about him, or the spectators on either 
side, of the watch opposite at the target, are entirely minor 
considerations: and as for the target itself, Blob ignores that 
altogether.21 
For the frontier army, the armed trooper was certainly a questionable 
resource in battle. 
Transportation resources, both for combat and for logistical support, 
were also seriously limited. Under normal circumstances the frontier 
trooper either walked to battle or rode on a government horse. The moun-
ted soldiers, the cavalry, were generally considered to be the most mobile. 
However, their mobility was limited by the dependence of their animals 
on grain. 22 Indian ponies thrived on prairie grass and cottonwood leaves. 
22 
Without grain, cavalry mounts stood little chance of catching the fleet 
tribes of the plains and Pacific Northwest. 23 The aridity of the South-
west was equally harsh on army and Indian mounts. This might explain 
why the southwestern tribes never acquired the vast horse herds as the 
other tribes did. 
The inability to move large amounts of freight made the support of 
far flung posts and expeditions a logistical nightmare. The most effi-
cient means of hauling bulk cargo after the Civil War was the railroad. 
However, tracks for the iron horse were scarce in the decades after 1865~ 
(Figure 9), Even with the completion of four transcontinental railroads 
by the 1880s, many garrisons were still many miles from a railhead. The 
flow of traffic over these lines was primarily east and west. Many years 
would pass before north-south feeder lines brought rails to the isolated 
garrisons. Moving posts to the existing tracks meant that the popula-
tions between the tracks lost protection. Steamboats provided some lo-
gistical support on the northern plains and the Pacific Northwest. How-
ever, the seasonal flow of the rivers made traffic on those waterways 
equally inconsistent. Therefore the frontier army was primarily suppor-
ted by wagon. 
Provisioning the western army by wagon was a time consuming and 
costly enterprise. Seldom did units have sufficient organic transport · 
to haul provisions to their posts or on campaigns. The only recourse was 
to hire expensive civilian teamsters. Such wagoneers were often undepend-
able, undisciplined, and unfit for the rigors which might be encountered 
on the trail. The Quartermaster General of the Army reported in 1871 
that the average cost of wagon transport was $1.08 per one hundred pounds 
per one hundred miles. 24 In that same year, the army transported 1,934 
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people and 19,441 tons of supplies by wagon at a cost of $1,036,803. 
By comparison, the service moved 35,387 people, 5,298 animals, and 30,959 
25 tons of freight by rail at a cost of $1,671,517. The frontier garri-
sons were responsible for much of the wagon transport cost while the 
eastern posts generated most of the rail expense. During major Indian 
campaigns, the wagon transport cost would skyrocket in comparison to 
that of rail movement. 
Within the context of resources, communications, especially in the 
vast expanses of the American West, were as essential as supplies or 
transportation. In the West even bad news did not travel fast. Sheridan 
complained that it took twenty-four hours for his Chicago headquarters 
to communicate with Fort Totten in the Dakotas. The nearest telegraph 
terminal in the Dakotas to Totten was in Pembina. A courier was needed 
d . h b h . d h . 26 to transport ispatc es etween t at point an t e garrison. Routine 
communications from the interior of Oregon or Arizona could take five to 
six weeks to reach Washington. Hostilities with Indian tribes further 
obstructed communications by interrupting the courier traffic. 
The logical solution to the problem of information flow was the 
telegraph. However, telegraph lines were as scarce as railroad tracks 
(Figure 10). The construction of telegraph lines could be expensive 
with a single strand of wire costing $125 per mile. A double strand 
cost $40 more. In regions where timber was scarce, the cost could easily 
27 double. A miserly Congress seldom appropriated sufficient funds to 
link widely scattered garrisons with telegraphic communications. The 
major disadvantage of such laggard communications was that it affected 
the army's responsiveness. In short, inadequate and delayed information 
cost the army time. 
1878 
Distribution of Telegraph Lines 
Scale 
0 100 200 a 300 -0 200 400 





I K dometer~ 
600 
26 
It took time for critical intelligence to reach posts and commanding 
headquarters. It took time to marshal supplies and units for a major 
expedition. Even a simple pursuit of Indian marauders would succeed or 
fail primarily on the intervalwhich separated the time of the incident= 
and the time when the nearest garrison learned of the event. If that 
interval were too long, the Indians would be long gone before a patrol 
could get to the scent and begin the chase. In dealing with the Indians 
of the Great Plains, time equated to distance. A Comanche or Cheyenne 
war party could cover fifty or sixty miles in a single day. Every hour 
which separated the army's response from the initial attack made punish-
ment or capture problematic at best. 
Almost every resource and problem facing the frontier army had some 
element of chronology. Space affected time both in terms of transit and 
communications. The distances which separated garrisons prevented prompt 
interaction. The stockpiling of supplies, especially at remote field 
depots was a lenghty process as it required many wagon loads to build 
military stores. The rate of march for cavalry or infantry units, a 
time-distance phenomenon was much slower than that for the Indians. Move-
ment was also time consuming as wagon trains of ten had to accompany march 
columns to carry the needed grain for the expedition's horses. 
Considerations of space, resource, and time required the army to 
develop tactics and logistical systems unique to the West. Since a single 
column could rarely catch marauding bands, frontier commanders opted for 
multiple columns. Designated columns would follow the Indians' trail 
while others attempted to intercept the roving bands. Winter campaigning 
was also adopted because the harsh weather normally decreased the mobility 
of the nomadic tribes. However, these adaptations were not enough. The 
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topographic, cultural, and resource environment of the West demanded more 
than a different technique for finding the enemy. The composition and 
equipment of a marching column had to be modified not only to find the 
enemy, but also to defeat him in battle. 
It was no small source of irritation to frontier commanders that 
they could do little to change the milieu in which they labored. The 
rate of railroad construction was decided by the rail companies and the 
economy. The various financial panics of the late nineteenth century 
halted construction in the West. Telegraphic communications, new supplies, 
and improved equipment depended on Congress. That body was skeptical of 
spending money on any item not justified by dire necessity. Even if 
funds were available, new hardware was develop.ed or procured by army 
departments totally out of touch with the reality in which the items would 
be used. 
Maintaining peace on the frontier was an extremely difficult assign-
ment for the army. The western landscape was as diverse physically and 
culturally as it was vast in dimension. Great distances between army 
posts complicated supply and communication. Widely scattered settlements 
defied army efforts to protect them. The diverse Indian cultures called 
for a diplomacy or war unique to each distinctive lifestyle and region. 
The army, burdened by inadequate, outdated resources, could not fulfill 
its primary mission of keeping peace between the Indian and the white 
man. When it did neet the Indian in battle, the army was fettered by a 
tactical doctrine applicable to a different type of warfare and a distant 
milieu. 
With the end of Reconstruction, some congressmen urged the transfer 
of all units to the West. This would provide additional manpower for 
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skeleton western posts. Certain important individuals felt otherwise. 
In a letter to Sheridan, Sherman wrote that he, Secretary of War Mccrary, 
and President Rutherford B. Hayes had agreed that: 
last sununer's experience (labor riots on the east and west 
coast) demonstrated the absolute necessity of keeping the 
force, mostly artillery, where it is, nominally guarding the 
Lake, Atlantic and Gulf coasts but really for use in case of 
an organized resistence to the Revenue Laws and labor mobs. 28 
In spite of Sherman's statements, the eastern and coastal garrisons 
were the only 9ccessiblemanpower resource during periods of Indian hos-
tilities. The manpower siphoned off to man coastal fortifications could 
effectively augment the scattered garrisons during Indian outbreaks. 
Coastal troops could garrison frontier forts and thereby release troops 
for duty with expedition forces. 29 They could also directly participate 
in the campaigns. On many occasions, troops from the East, Gulf, and West 
coasts performed these two important functions. Often these supporting 
units were artillery. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE ARTILLERY OF THE UNITED STATES 
AFTER THE CIVIL WAR 
Since the time of Henry Knox and the seige of Boston during the 
American Revolution, the armed forces of the United States have had an 
artillery service. The war between the North and the South was no ex-
ception. A portion of the soldiers marching through Washington, D.C., 
during that grand review were cannoneers. Cannons had been the deciding 
factor separating victory from defeat on many of the war's battlefields. 
Always in support of infantry and cavalry, Union and Confederate guns 
proved devastating in such battles as Gettysburg and Cold Harbor. But 
the glory and fame gained in those battles did not last long when the 
nation turned its attention to more peaceful pursuits. For the artil-
lery, more than the infantry or cavalry, the end of the war meant a 
change of habit. 
During the four years of the war, all but four of the Regular 
Army batteries served as light artillery. That is they were armed with 
light, mobile, cannons pulled by horses. The cannoneers either were 
mounted on horses or rode on the gun carriages and caissons when called 
into service.l There was little opportunity for that type of duty after 
the war ended. Most of the regular batteries returned to the coastal 
fortifications they had occupied prior to Fort Sumter, although a few 




In the two and one-,fialf decades which followed the Civil War, a 
\ 
handful of artillery units were called upon to fight in the Indian wars. 
This constituted a radical departure both from the routine of post-war 
garrison life and from the type of war most officers and men knew. The 
tactical doctrine and day-to-day affairs of the various batteries made 
Indian fighting a most difficult and deadly affair. Only by appreciating 
the post-war condition of the artillery service and its customary routine. 
can the significance of its frontier service be seen. 
On many occasions, the charges of St.Barbara, the patron saint of 
artillerymen, have faced battle as infantrymen and cavalrymen.2 However, 
the proper tool of war for the artilleryman was the cannon, not the mus-
ket or sabre. A confusing, expensive, mass of these "tools" was one 
legacy of the Civil War. An almost random procurement system and the ea-
gerness of war arms manufacturers to sell their products resulted in a 
plethora of calibers and types. In February, 1863, the artillery of 
General William Rosecrans consisted of thirty-two 6-pounder smooth-bores, 
twenty-four 12-pounder howitzers, eight 12-pounder light Napoleons, twenty-
one James rifles, thirty-four 10-pounder Parrotts, two 12-pounder Wiard 
steel guns, two 6-pounder Wiard steel guns, two 16-pounder Parrotts, and 
four 3-inch rifle ordnance guns.3 
Within the impressive but illogical mass of Civil War ordnance, the 
two most favorite weapons were the Napoleon gun and the 3-inch Ordnance 
rifle. In 1856, the United States adopted a light gun-howitzer designed 
by Emperor Louis Napoleon of France. The 12-pounder field gun in use at 
that time was light-weight, but it did have enough power in the eyes of 
artillerymen. The 12-pounder howitzer had more than enough punch, but it 
was too heavy to accompany rapidly moving columns of troops. The Napoleon 
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gun combined the best traits from these two weapons. Although it was a 
smooth-bore weapon, the bronze Napoleon was a favorite of both Union and 
Confederate batteries. With cannister or spherical case-shot, it was 
particularly lethal against the bayonet charges so connnon in the war.4 
The 3-inch Ordnance rifle was significant to the field artillery for 
two reasons. It was the first, massed produced, light artillery weapon 
to incorporate cast iron as a gun metal. Prior to 1850, cast iron was 
not one of the more favorite metals to gun makers. Normally the guns 
were cast into a mold and later bored out to the appropriate diameter. 
While in the mold the metal tended to cool from the outside while the 
core was still quite molten. The contracting outer portion created tre-
mendous strain on the center. After boring, it was not uncommon for 
cracks to form on the inside of the gun. Such cracks made the gun struc-
trally weak and prone to explode after a comparatively short number of 
rounds. 
An Ordnance officer, Thomas J. Rodman, devised a method whereby the 
gun cooled from the inside. The outer portion of the gun was packed with 
hot coals while a water jacket cooled the inside. Therefore, molten iron 
solidified on already rigid material, making the gun extremely strong. 
The Rodman gun possessed all the strength of earlier cast iron weapons 
yet was not as brittle, flawed, and subject to explode. In one test, an 
old-model cast iron gun was fired 772 times before being declared unsafe. 
The Rodman gun endured 5,515 rounds without any damage to the gun.5 
The 3-inch rifle was also important becaused it was a rifled gun 
and not a smooth-bore like most of the cannons of that time. It had been 
recognized for some time that rifled guns were more accurate than smooth-
bore weapons. The 24-pounder shell had as much as thirty yards of 
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lateral deviation at 1200 yards. The spin imparted onto a projectile in 
a rifled cannon prevented this drift. The problem was how to make the 
projectile spin. Some cannonballs had lugs which fit into grooves in 
the bore of the gun. However,constant firing often fouled these grooves 
and the shell could not be loaded from the muzzle. The Rodman gun used 
a projectile with an expanding ring of soft metal. This metal gripped 
the rifling of the gun and caused the shell to turn, without wearing the 
grooves themselves. 6 Some officers felt that the more accurate rifled 
guns should replace the more erratic smooth-bores, even the Napoleon. 7 
The Napoleon gun and the. 3-inch Ordnance rifle were the principal 
weapons of the armies of Ulysses Grant, Robert E. Lee, William T. Sherman, 
and Joe Johnson. Consequentl~ these cannons constituted the largest 
. portion of the field artillery arsenal. However, only a small number of 
these weapons were in the hands of troops after the war. Of the 1,115 
Napoleons owned by the army, only 81 were with troop units. The rest 
were consigned to storage in armories or arsenals. Only 61 of the 813 
Ordnance rifles were with units. Of more than 3,900 field artillery ri-
fles and howitzers available to the army, only 447 were assigned to units 
or active garrisons. 8 There certainly was no shortage of mobile artil-
lery weapons for the drastically reduced peacetime army. 
The Civil War legacy of surplus artillery had a detrimental affect 
on post-war weapons development. Congress was logically reluctant to 
spend money for the test and development of new guns when hundreds were 
still in storage. As early as 1868, a board of army officers recommended 
the testing of breech-loading, rifled guns.9 But the board's recommen-
dations had little effect on a Congress bent on military thrift. Eleven 
years after European armies illustrated the potency of rifled breech-
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loading guns in the Franco-Prussian war, the Chief of Ordnance observed: 
The large amount of artillery and its supplies left from the 
war, and the small appropriations available for such purposes, 
had deterred the department from entering until now upon the 
increased expenditures attendant on the introduction of new 
material. The adoption of steel breech-loading guns in all 
the armies of Europe calls for experimental actions on our 
part.10 
In spite of the obvious superiority of such guns, the Chief of Ordnance 
could only suggest "experimental action." 
Between 1865 and 1890, the bulk of weapons development concerned 
guns for the coastal forts. A single muzzle-loading, steel gun, purchas-
ed for the purposes of experimentation, cost $121,172.51. In the period 
from 1866 to 1886, the Ordnance Department spent more than $320,000 on 
guns, such as these, which either burst or were declared unservicable in 
trials.11 In that same time period, less than ten percent of the Ordnance 
budget went toward new field artillery material. As a result, the army 
did not adopt a completely new field artillery weapon to replace the 
Napoleon and Ordnance guns until 1885. It took the Ordnance Department 
another seven years to equip all the light batteries with the new cannon.12 
In addition to a stockpile of obsolete cannons, the Civil War be-
queathed to the artillery branch a somewhat myopic tactical doctrine. 
The war created a belief among many officers, artillery included, that 
cannons were only useful against large, massed, enemy formations. The 
manner in which gunners fired on enemy troops bears this out. A premium 
was placed on flat trajectory fire. The hope was to send a projectile 
toward the enemy in such a way that the round was never more than a few 
feet off the ground. Solid shot could rip through several lines of 
troops if fired in this manner. Those shells detonated by a time fuze 
also had to stay relatively close to the ground.13 
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In addition to the method of fire, the material used indicated that 
artillery was considered appropriate only agains~ large numbers of enemy 
soldiers. With the exception of solid-shot, artillery ammunition was 
designed to produce multiple fragments or bullets. The measure of a 
shell's effeciency was how many fragments it produced within an area ap-
proximately the size of a battalion of infantry.14 In addition, the re-
tention of smooth-bore cannon demonstrated the strength of .the Civil War 
tactical mentality. Because of their inaccuracy, smooth-bore guns were 
only effective against massed, enemy formations. 
Throughout the 1870s and 1880s, the thought that the artillery was 
limited to conventional wars persisted. In discussing cavalry arms, 
Colonel Wesley Merritt maintained that the sabre, like artillery, was not 
useful in the Indian wars but should not be deleted from the army's list 
of weapons. 15 Some artillery officers also believed that the normal con-
dition of artillery battle required an enemy with disciplined troops.16 
One corrnnentator suggested that light batteries were as useful in the 
Indian service as a ship-of-the-line on wheels. He went on to say that 
frontier service was "foreign to the object and unsuitable to the char-
acter of artillery duties. 11 17 
A large part of this attitude toward western duty can be attributed 
to frustration. The batteries which went west to the Light Artillery 
School at Fort Riley, Kansas, spent more time patrolling western Kansas 
than they did practicing artillery tactics. Acting as infantry or caval-
ry, the batteries augmented the scant resources available to the depart-
ment commander. The area corrnnander, General John Pope, was reluctant to 
pull them away from school instruction, but he urgently needed the man-
power.18 Hard duty in a role for which they had no training or experience 
caused much bitterness. One officer wrote that one 
pleasant diversion was to make infantry of them; and one com-
pany was thus thoroughly undone- by being thrown along the 
KP railroad in squads of four up, and varying the monotony 
of living in a dug-out, by acting as mail escorts between inf-
antry posts (coming rather nearer their legitimate duty then, 
as they did have wheels under them- army wagons).19 
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This frontier service therefore reinforced the contention that artillery 
was proper in wars between civilized nations only. Massed formations of 
infantry or cavalry were the appropriate targets for cannons, not a wild 
band of half-clothed Indians. 
Ironically, the schooling and routine of the coastal garrisons pro-
vided little more opportunity to function as cannoneers and gunners. 
The primary source of artillery instruction after the Civil War was the 
Artillery School at Fortress Monroe, Virginia. Established in 1868, the 
school was designed to instruct junior officers in mathematics, ordnance 
and gunnery, military engineering, survey, military, constitutional, and 
international law.20 Students endured a daily fare of recitation and 
blackboard demonstrations. It was hoped that this would instill in the 
young officer a theoretical and practical appreciation of artillery af-
fairs. The principal focus of the school was heavy coast artillery.21 
The school received valuable support from many of the army's high-
est ranking officers. Although General Sherman did not have much faith 
in schools for officers after they were commissioned, he considered the 
Artillery School to be an exception. Artillery was "a branch of military 
art which requires more study and more time than usual for cavalry or 
infantry. 11 22 General Winfield S. Hancock considered artillery one of 
the most important and progressive branches of military service. As com-
mander of the division in which the school was located, Hancock was in a 
38 
position to give strong support to artillery instruction. In addition to 
Fort Monroe, Hancock and other officers believed that a need existed for 
a light artillery schoo1.23 
Such a school had been founded by General John Schofield in 1869. 
A former artillery officer, Schofield established the school at the sug-
gestion of Colonel Henry Hunt, the former Chief of Artillery of the Army 
of the Potomac. Unfortunately, as has been seen, the need for troops on 
the frontier resulted in a total disruption of instruction for the light 
batteries. When Schofield left the Department of the Missouri for another 
command, the school was dissolved.24 
The failure of the Light Artillery School was due in large part to 
a lack of support. The commander of the Military Division of the Missouri, 
General Philip Sheridan, was a cavalry officer. Sheridan's attitude to-
ward the artillery in the west was reflected by the fact that no batter-
ies, acting as artillery, were incorporated into any Indian expedition in 
his command. More important, Sherman had little faith in a school for 
light artillery. He believed that the light batteries should be station-
ed with their respective regiments, not separately posted to the plains. 
The regimental connnander could rotate his junior officers through the 
battery and therefore increase the number of officers experienced in the 
field artillery.25 
With the disappearance of the school at Fort Riley, Fort Monroe once 
again became the only school for artillery. The two-year experiement 
with light artillery instruction on the plains was adjudged a failure by 
most observers.26 This reinforced the primacy of coastal artillery over 
field artillery and reiterated the belief that artillery was a tool of 
civilized warfare. 
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After a thorough but tedious education at the Artillery School, 
junior officers normally joined one of the five regiments. This meant 
that the young lieutenant was destined to duty either on the East, Gulf, 
or West coast. During the decades of the 1870s, 1880s, and 1890s, two 
regiments were responsible for the eastern coast north of Virginia. A-
nother two regiments protected the southeastern Atlantic and the Gulf 
coast. Normally only one regiment maintained the posts along the Pacific 
shores. The day-to-day routine for the scattered batteries could easily 
discourage even the most enthusiastic young officer. 
The newly arrived officer soon found that artillery matters were 
minor facets of his regiment's or battery's daily affairs. The normal 
drill routine was in infantry tactics, not artillery tactics. However, 
at many posts, even drill was a minor consideration. Maintenance of the 
garrison grounds and facilities consumed the majority of the time. One 
officer described the lot of a light battery assigned to a post where 
there was no space for horse drill. Their lot was little more than dull, 
and where locally the hills they have had to level, the dales 
they have had to fill, and the manuring and compositing and 
sub-soiling they have had to do for the aesthetical landscape 
eye of that, has reduced the light artillery soldiers duties 
practically to those of a navvy and a groom, enliven it may 
be daily by the exhilarating monotony of standing gun drill.27 
Often the only relief from the tedium of infantry or gun drill was stable 
duty. 
Occasionally, the units would actually fire the weapons they had to 
maintain. Practice firing was restricted because the anununition was ex-
pensive. A single 15-inch shot cost the army $63.78. 28 Compounding the 
problem of expense was the requirement to fire the oldest portion of the 
ammunition available. For this reason accidents were conunon. 
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Major C.M. Morgan reported that when one of his 10-inch Rodman guns was 
fired the recoil completely upset the chassis. The gun, carriage, and 
chassis turned a complete somersault, went through the window of a stair-
way tower, and finally lodged against the brickwork of that tower. A 
second gun went through the same gyrations when fired and ended up on the 
parade ground fifty feet below the gun emplacement. 29 
Consequently, the young artillery officer found that practice within 
his prof essio.n could be a source of danger as well as boredom. His prin-
cipal ordnance was often obsolete and mounted on carriages long out of 
date. His tool sets were often incomplete and equally antequated. Many 
an officer was thankful if his unit could return to its barracks after a 
1 h d · 11 . th h. b k d . . . . t h. 30 ong, s arp, ri wi not ing ro en an no inJuries o is men. 
Professionalism and the enthusia$m necessary to acquire it were hard to 
maintain within the walls of isolated garrisons. 
Professional advancement was often as belated as technical compe-
tence. Promotion within the army up to the rank of major was within the 
regiment. A captain could not be promoted to major unless a vacancy was 
created within his regiment. Vacancies were generated by promotion to 
higher rank, transfer, retirement, or death. When a vacancy existed, 
the senior officer of those eligible normally received the appointment. 
At the end of the war, many of the vacancies existing within the artil-
lery regiments were filled by transfers from infantry and cavalry 
regiments. This closed off promotion for the junior officers for some 
time.31 The interval between promotions was exceptionally long for those 
commissioned after the Civil War. An officer conunissioned in 1861 nor-
mally made captain in ten years. If he was commissioned in 1864, he 
could expect to wait nineteen years for his captaincy. If he entered 
the service in 1870, it would be thirty-two years before he pinned on 
his captain's bars.32 
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There were non-professional and non-military factors which contri-
buted to the low morale of the artillery regiments. Foremost among these 
was the unhealthy location of many of the garrisons. The southern posts 
were particularly susceptible to such diseases as yellow fever. In the 
sunnner of 1875, the First Artillery Regiment reported sixty-five cases 
and seven deaths due to an outbreak of the fever.33 It was the third 
year in a row that yellow fever had swept the batteries of the First. In 
August of that year the Army and Navy Journal reported that the disease 
appeared to have abated, due to the lack of victims.34 
The regiments which served on the seacoasts were not permanently 
confined to the unhealthy environment of the coastal plain. Neither were 
their activities limited to purely military affairs. Batteries and regi-
ments often performed services more properly the responsibility of sheriffs, 
constables, and federal agents. In 1870, the commander of the Division 
of the South reported that Federal troops had assisted civilian officers 
on 200 occasions within the year.35 
A recurring duty for artillerymen was finding illicit distilleries. 
Battery F, Second Artillery was especially proficient as revenuers. 
From September, 1875, to May, 1876, the battery either destroyed or con-
fiscated for government sale, 136 large tubs of beer and mash, 34 complete 
distilleries, artd 21-copper stills. In the same period, the unit arres-
ted 43 distillers. During February of the following year, tiheunit smashed 
or confiscated 105 gallons of whiskey, 154 brewing tubs, and 10,660 
gallons of beer. 36 The destruction of even moonshine whiskey undoubtedly 
caused as much regret among the cannoneers as it did the moonshiners. 
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Such work was not without its hazards. In the same month, a detach-
ment from Battery F was ambushed near Morganton, North Carolina. A sharp 
~kirmish ensued, and one of the battery's privates was seriously wounded. 
Casualities among the ambushers were unknown. 37 Such incidents, more 
common than would be expected, seldom found their way into the lists of 
engagements fought by the army. Many officers and men found the work 
distastful for the simple reason that it placed them in direct confron-
tation with their fellow countrymen. However, there were occasions in 
which confrontation between the regiments and civilians were far more 
serious. 
In 1870, artillery units were particularly active in supporting 
civilian officials in New York City. On November 2, more than one thou-
sand men from artillery, engineer, and infantry units assembled at the 
Brooklyn Navy Yard to assist Internal Revenue agents in collecting duties. 
Five days later, 13 batteries, 10 companies of infantry, and 200 engineers 
stood ready to prevent rioting during city elections. In January, seven 
batteries of the First and three infantry companies again assisted reve-
nue agents in assessing duties on foreign imports.38 
During the labor riots of 1877, artillery units formed a large part 
of the federal forces attempting to keep the rail lines open. Batteries 
from every regiment in the east took part in riot control. Some units, 
such as Light Battery C, of the Third Artillery, were quite effective in 
maintaining order. The reason for Battery C's effectiveness was due in 
part to the fact that the unit took its four 3-inch Ordnance rifles with 
it when it reported for riot duty.39 When the strikes spread to the West 
coast, the division connnander there recalled three batteries from the 
Nez Perce expedition to handle the mobs in San Francisco. 40 
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More than any other incident, the strikes of 1877 demonstrated that 
army units, especially artillery batteries, in the east were as active 
as those in the west. For the most part, the units in the east were 
being maintained not to defend against a foreign attack, but to assist 
authorities in preserving law and order. The presence of units and their 
mission was a fact realized by many. The New York Herald pointed out 
that a significant shift of forces had been made in 1876 and 1877. In 
one part of the Northeast, the,;number of regualr army units was increased 
from eight units to more than thirty. In the mid-Atlantic states, pri-
marily Pennsylvania and Maryland, army forces had been increased by one 
artillery regiment, two infantry regiments, and an additional eleven 
infantry companies,41 Eastern batteries and companies became, in essence, 
lawmen in blue. 
The decades of the 1870s and 1880s were difficult years for the 
artillery of the American Army. Laden with antiquated weapons, batteries 
were not capable of supporting infantry or cavalry columns against any 
organized power. The tactical doctrine of the branch was based on the 
Civil War and the conflicts which raged between European states. War 
with an unconventional foe, such as the American Indian, was a topic 
worth little time or consideration. Light artillery units, the only 
batteries capable of serving against the mobile Indian populations, as 
artillery, suffered from want of appropriate weapons, doctrine, and 
schooling. The Artillery School at Fortress Monroe and the weapons de-
signed by the Ordnance Department projected coastal artillery as the only 
viable application of the service. 
Service in the artillery was liberally laced with monotony, disease, 
and often danger. Batteries were frequently assigned the most 
44 
disagreeable of military duties, quelling civil disturbances. Breaking 
strikes and destroying stills placed the batteries in a position of facing 
the very people whose shoreline the artillery was bound to protect. On 
occasion, coastal garrisons were sent west to an environment alien to 
the populated regions of the East. They were set against a foe imper-
fectly understood even by the units with frontier experience. They were 
employed as cavalry and infantry; roles for which they had some practice 
but little experience. Therefore, in addition to revenuers, customs 
agents, reconstructionists, and strike breakers, artillery became Indian-
fighters. 
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CHAPTER IV 
WAR WITH THE PLAINS 
INDIANS 
The end of the Civil War ushered in a new era of westward expansion. 
Former soldiers and their families sought a new life in the West rather 
than try to recreate the lives they enjoyed before the war. In time, 
lumbering wagons once again plied the Oregon and Santa Fe Trails. The 
railroads, too, began, their movement west as surveying parties and con-
struction crews marked and altered the landscape. As a result of this 
new wave of white men, conflict between the races intensified. At first, 
the immigrants sought only safe passage through Indian lands. Later, other 
westering groups came to settle and to till the soil. The Indians, no-
madic tribes such as the Comanche, Cheyenne, Arapaho, and Sioux, contested 
the white man's passage and fought bitterly against those who wanted to 
turn their land upside down. Burned-out wagons, abandoned farms, and a 
landscape littered with bodies, became commonplace. 
The army, charged with maintaining peace, mounted three significant 
expeditions after the Civil War either to pacify, control, or destroy the 
plains tribes. Countless battles were fought during these campaigns. A 
detailed narrative of these encounters lies beyond the scope and purpose 
of this study. The analysis of six major engagements will prove that 
there was no doctrine for fighting Indians. Each commander developed his 
own strategy and tactics. A basic scheme for locating warring tribes was 
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developed on the plains, but battle tactics remained the prerogative of 
each field commander. This will be shown through the comparison of en-
gagements where artillery was present and those where it was absent. The 
comparison will also show that artillery was effective against the Plains 
Indians and should have been included in any tactical doctrine dealing 
with Indian warfare. 
Artillery units generally did not take part in the campaigns on the 
plains. Light batteries from Fort Riley, Kansas, did patrol the 
frontier for a short time, but they gained little for their efforts other 
than worn out horses and sore bodies. Therefore, the analysis of the 
artillery with the army on the plains will be limited to the use of can-
nons by cavalry and infantry units. It is logical to assume, however, 
that the utility of cannon would have been greater if the guns would have 
been served by trained artillerymen. 
In 1867, General Hancock led an impressive column of infantry, cav-
alry, and artillery onto the plains. His purpose was to separate the 
hostile factions of the Sioux and Cheyenne from those who wanted peace 
with the white man.l Unfortunately, Hancock's presence tended to drive 
undecided factions into the hostile camp and therefore increased the 
tempo of war in western Kansas and Nebraska. A partial reason for this 
failure was the type of command Hancock led onto the prairies. His army, 
complete with engineers and a pontoon bridge, was more appropriate for 
Virginia than for western Kansas. Lacking any appreciation of the plain's 
environment or the nature of the Plains Indians, Hancock formed his com-
mand in compliance with the accepted army tactical philosophy. His plod-
ding column therefore had little affect on the Indians other than as an 
irritant. 
so 
Hancock's actions also infuriated a portion of the eastern establish-
ment who thought that the sword was not the only answer to the lance. 
One of the prominent members of this group was Nathaniel Taylor, Commis-
sioner of Indian Affairs. After Hancock's soldiers had returned to their 
posts; Taylor was able to convince Congress that a peace commission was 
more likely to stop the bloodshed on the frontier than any number of sol-
diers. Congress agreed, and such a connnission was formed. In the fall 
of 1867, seven commissioners met with the southern tribes at a place 
called Medicine Lodge in southern Kansas. The subsequent Treaty of Medi-
cine Lodge set aside land for the tribes and at the same time cleared 
the way for white movement across the plains. Although the treaty re-
moved a major obstacle to the construction of the railroad through Kansas, 
Congress failed to provide the promised food and implements, and the 
tribes returned to the plains. Within a year, both sides fnught each 
other in battle. 
The task of punishing the marauding tribes and returning them to the 
reservation fell to Major General Philip H. Sheridan. Disregarding the 
advice from seasoned frontiersmen, Sheridan decided to wage a winter cam-
paign. Two columns, one from Fort Bascom, New Mexico, and one from Fort 
Lyons, Colorado, were to move into the Texas Panhandle. Their presence 
would pry the Indians from their haunts and drive them toward the reser-
vations in western Indian Territory. A third column, operating from a 
supply point south of Fort Dodge, Kansas, would be waiting for the Indians 
in the eastern Texas Panhandle. Sheridan wanted to punish the recalci-
trant bands as well as force them onto the reservations. By mid-November 
all three columns were on the move.2 
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Of the two most important engagements of this campaign, the first 
involved the eastern column. In the early morning hours of November 23, 
1868, the Seventh Cavalry rode out of a supply camp located in the north-
west corner of Indian Territory. Led by Lieutenant Colonel George Custer, 
the Seventh was· the column which Sheridan hoped would intercept the hos-· 
tile bands before they could reach their respective agencies. The chances 
of this happening were good as there were indications that some bands had 
already reached the Antelope Hills region. For the Seventh, this was 
their second effort against the Indians. Earlier that fall, they had 
conducted a fruitless march along the Beaver and Wolf Creeks south of 
Fort Dodge. Frustrated by a lack of success the first time out, the sol-
diers and their officers were spoiling for a fight. 3 
Custer led his troopers south from the depot which had been appro-
priately named Camp Supply. The bitter winter winds and a twelve-inch 
snow fall made movement difficult at best. Anxious to find the Indians, 
the young colonel divided his command in hopes of covering more ground. 
His gamble paid off. Major Joel Elliot and his squadron found an Indian 
trail. By midnight, the reunited Seventh had followed the trail to a 
village on the Washita Creek. With the first light of dawn, the regimen-
tal band struck up with "Garry Owen" Custer's favorite tune, and the 
Seventh charged the camp. 
Four different columns converged on what turned out to be a Cheyenne 
village under Chief Black Kettle. A squadron of four troops under Major 
Elliot struck from the downstream side. Two squadrons of two troops each 
attacked the village's flanks. Custer led four more troops and a group 
of sharpshooters into the village from the upstream side. Although 
Elliot's force had stumbled onto a few Indian sentries who had fled, the 
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Seventh's attack was a complete surprise. 4 
Custer's battle plan worked extremely well. The Indians who fled 
his assault ran into Elliot's blocking force. Those who managed to es-
cape did so only after the fight became a disorderly struggle at close 
quarters. By the end of the day, the village and its contents had been 
set to the torch. In addition, more than eight hundred Indian ponies were 
shot to prevent their recapture by the Indians. Black Kettle and a hun-
dred of his followers died in the battle. However,there was a ~hance 
that a similiar fate might befall the troopers. 
Unknown to Custer, other villages of the Kiowa, Arapaho, and Cheyenne 
filled the Washita valley south of Black Kettle's camp. When the firing 
began in the morning, warriors from these villages gathered their weapons 
and rode to the sound of the guns. By afternoon, Custer's command came 
under increasing pressure from a growing number of braves. Custer had no 
artillery,and his men were running low on ammunition for their carbines. 
The destruction of the Seventh, in retaliation for the destruction of the 
Cheyenne village, was a distinct possibility. 
In the late afternoon, Custer began to reassemble his regiment. He 
then formed them into a column and began marching in the direction of 
the other Indian villages. Believing their camps to be the next battle-
field, the circling Indian warriors departed hastily to defend their fam-
alies and possessions. When darkness came, Custer counter-marched his 
command and moved to Camp Supply as quickly as his exhausted horses and 
wounded men would allow. The Seventh reached Camp Supply without being 
attacked by any of the bands from the Washita.5 
The Washita battle was a major tactical and strategic success for 
the army. The Seventh's casualities although severe, twenty-one killed 
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and fourteen wounded, were considerably less than the Indian losses. In 
addition, Custer had destroyed tons of provisions which the Indians needed 
to survive the harsh winter months. Sheridan's strategy of attacking his 
adversary during inclement weather was vindicated. However, had Custer 
injudiciously marched on the other villages, the army might have regis-
tered a major loss instead of a victory. 
While Custer's troopers recuperated from their ordeal, another column 
was moving toward Indian Territory. The~ to~ would confirm the idea of 
winter campaigning. Earlier in November, Major A.W. Evans had led his 
New Mexico column out of Fort Bascom. This contingent consisted of six 
troops of the Third Cavalry, Company I of the Thirty-Seventh Infantry, and 
a detachment of men from Company F of the same regiment. The men from 
Company F were detailed to man the four mountain howitzers Evans had 
gathered from other New Mexico garrisons. Seventy-two civilians, acting 
as guides, teamsters, and packers, accompanied the soldiers. 6 
Following Kit Carson's Adobe Walls' Trail, the soldiers trudged along 
the Canadian River. Buffeted by cold winds and a howling snow storm, 
Evans' troopers made slow, painful progress. Finally the half-frozen men 
and animals halted at the point where Monument Creek meets the Canadian 
River in the Texas Panhandle. Here Evans began construction of a supply 
depot. This base would support Evans' cavalry as it scouted the 
Canadian River Vally and the eastern rim of the Llano Estacada, the 
Staked Plains. 
By the middle of December, Evans was able to leave the depot on his 
first sortie. With 200 cavalrymen, 137 infantrymen, and four tons of 
provisions, the major began to search for hostile Indians. Three days 
east of his base camp, Evans found an Indian trail. Turning south along 
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the North Fork of the Red River, the troopers followed the trail for an-
other seven days. By Christmas Eve, Evans was on the verge of giving up 
and turning north toward the Antelope Hills where he and his cold-numbed 
men hoped to find the enemy. 
On Christmas Day, the soldiers began breaking camp after a miserable, 
waterless, night. But before fanning his column, the major ordered his 
advance troop to chase off a few Indians who had been following his trail. 
Thinking that Captain E.W. Tarlton's troop was sufficient to dispose of 
the pesky Indians, Evans ordered his other units onto the trail. However, 
a short time later Evans learned to his surprise that Tarlton was being 
pressed by a large number of warriors.7 
After leaving Evans, Tarlton and his thirty-four men charged the 
watching Indians, who promptly turned and fled. The cavalrymen scrambled 
after them. The chase took the troopers into one of the canyons of the 
stream. There, a large number of mounted warriors descended on the star-
tled troops. The Indian observers had obviously been bait, and Tarlton's 
men, in pursuing them, had fallen into a trap. Attacked with lances and 
rifles, Tarlton immediately formed his men into a defensive position. 
Although pressed on all sides by a superior force, the captain and his 
men were able to hold their ground. After turning back a charge, Tarlton 
dispatched a courier to Evans with an urgent request for assistance. 
When apprised of the plight of Tarlton's unit by the excited courier, 
Evans detached Captain Deane Monahan's troop and ordered it to reinforce 
the beseiged cavalrymen. A short time later, Second Lieutenant 
J.K. Sullivan followed Monahan with two of the mountain howitzers. 
Tarlton had stated that he could use artillery to advantage, and Evans 
sent half of his battery for that reason. Fearing that even these 
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reinforcements might not be enough, the major counter-marched the rest 
of his column. His jaded horses, weak from lack of grain, barred any 
quick dash to Tarlton's rescue. 
When Monahan's troop arrived Tarlton attacked. With less than 
one hundred cavalrymen, he charged his adversaries. Unlike the soldiers, 
the Indians refused to stand their ground. They bolted the battlefield 
and raced down the canyon in the direction of the creek. Their flight 
was further encouraged when Sullivan's guns unlimbered in the rear of 
Tarlton's combined force and began firing. 
Punctuated by an occasional cannon shell, the race across the stream 
continued for several miles. In time an Indian village came into sight. 
Sullivan at once ordered his gunners forward and began to fire on the 
camp. The explosion of one of the first two shells put an abrupt end to 
efforts by some Indians to gather their possessions. The force of the 
cavalry advance and the exploding shells forced a complete abandonment 
of the camp and its contents. 
Tarlton did not stop at the Indian encampment, but continued past 
the village until he reached a wooded ridge overlooking the area. In 
spite of the urgings of some of his subordinates, he decided to halt his 
troops and wait for Evans to bring up the rest of the column. A major 
prize, the village, had been seized, and the cavalry captain was not 
willing to gamble his men in a effort to achieve anything more. 
With Tarlton's forward movement stopped, Evans and the other units 
were able to catch up. Their progress had been painfully slow. The 
most the cavalrymen could urge out of their horses was a trot. Yet 
Evans did arrive in time to prevent one group of warriors from gaining 
Tarlton's rear and cutting his connnand off from the main body of soldiers. 
With his command united once again, Evans withdrew from the ridge and 
returned to the abandoned camp. 
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Fortified by the four cannons, the soldiers spent the night in the 
indian village. By 11:00 p.m., the troopers had burned everything they 
could not use themselves. At dawn the tired men were once again .in the 
saddle. On December 30, four scouts from Fort Cobb overtook the strag-
gling column. After receiving some supplies, including forage for his 
emaciated mounts, Evans turned toward Monument Creek and his supply 
base. Eighteen days after the battle of Soldier's Creek, the weary sol-
diers arrived at the small cantonment.8 
Evans' Christmas Day fight further upheld the tactic of winter cam-
paigning. Indeed, the Washita and Soldier's Creek established a model 
for subsequent plains expeditions. In the future, commanders would seek 
to attack the Indians while their mobility was sapped by the plains' 
winter. Multiple columns would take the field. Some would act as beaters, 
while others would seek the Indiads Achilles heel, his village. The 
Red River war of 1874-1875 and the army's initial actions in the Sioux 
war of 1876-1877 show the consistency of this strategy. However, this 
was a method for finding the Indian. The manner in which the soldiers 
fought after locating a hostile band remained the sole responsibility 
of the unit commander. This fact and the comparative value of artillery 
was shown in the Battles of the Washita and Soldier's Creek. 
Any comparison of the two battles must first establish the relative 
sizes of the opposing forces. Custer's Seventh Cavalry had approximate-
ly 800 men when he left Camp Supply. Of this number, more than 700 took 
part in the fight on the Washita. Evans' column was less than half the 
size of Custer's command. In his report of the battle, Evans maintained 
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that the bulk of the fighting was done by the two troops of cavalry and 
the artillery platoon under Tarlton. This feisty little band did not 
exceed 100 men.9 
The size of the Indian forces at the Washita and Soldier's Creek 
is more difficult to establish. Black Kettle's camp contained fifty-one 
lodges. This would translate to between 250 and 300 warriors. The pre-
sence of other villages along the Washita might have raised the total 
number of warriors to 1,000.· ·The Comanche camp which Tarlton struck, 
along with a·nearby Kiowa camp, probably contained sixty lodges or 300 
to 360 braves.10 
At the opening of the Washita fight, Custer's troopers probably 
outnumbered the Indian defenders by two to one. During the course of the 
day, the arrival of other Indian reinforcements changed this ratio. At 
the peak of fighting, the opposing forces were nearly equal with a slight 
advantage to the Indians. By comparison, Tarlton was outnumbered through-
out most of his fight. Evans' timely arrival not only saved the captain 
from entrapment, but also evened the odds considerably. As Custer, 
Evans expected that the forces opposing him would receive heavy reinfor-
cements from other villages. Still, throughout the night and into the 
morning, the two adversaries on Soldier's Creek were probably of equal 
size. 
The major distinction between the Battle of the Washita and Evans' 
Soldier's Creek fight was that Evans was able to remain on the field, or 
more appropriately in the captured village. Custer, after a feint to-
ward the other villages withdrew from the Washita. Fear for the safety 
of his wagons, the need to replenish his ammunition, the desire to give 
aid to his wounded, and the growing number of warriors confronting him, 
:., 
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forced the young colonel to leave the village. At least these were the 
reasons Custer gave in his subsequent writings.11 However, there were 
major inconsistencies between Custer's actions and his words.12 Despite 
Custer's rationalization, the fact was that Custer lacked the military 
strength to remain on the battlefield. His casualities and shortage of 
ammunition coupled with the large number of Indians demanded his with-
drawl. 
Evans was not forced to.terminate his operations. His troopers not 
only captured the Indian village, but also spent the night in it. Al-
though the Comanche fired into the camp during the night they did not 
press an attack to regain it. When morning came, Evans left the razed 
village without opposition from its original occupants. The fact that 
the New Mexico column suffered only one casuality further attested to 
the Indians reluctance to challenge seriously the actions of Evans' sol-
diers. 
Evans better showing on Soldier's Creek can not be attributed to 
the difference between his opposition and the Indians facing Custer. 
The Nakoni Comanche were every bit as formidable in battle as the 
Southern Cheyenne and Arapaho on the Washita Creek. The difference in 
the two battles also can not be attributed to the condition of Evans 
troopers compared to the Seventh Cavalry. The Seventh and its animals 
were in better shape physically than Evans' column. Custer's command 
had been in the field only four days before it struck the Cheyenne camp. 
Evans' men had been in the saddle ten days before they stumbled onto the 
Comanche camp. Custer fought at the Washita with a homogenous command, 
while Evans' column was a composite of infantry and cavalry. Custer's 
soldiers had undergone considerable training before marching out in 
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search of the enemy. The New Mexico units joined Evans' expedition 
directly from scouts in New Mexico without any time for resting or refit-
ting. Finally,Custer had the luxury of planning his attack, while Evans 
had to accept battle without prior reconnaisance or a chance to brief his 
subordinate commanders. 
Evan's greater success could be attributed to a better skill in 
Indian fighting. It could also be attributed to the presence of cannons 
with his column. The presence and actions of the four mountain howitzers 
certainly could explain why Evans' troopers were able to destroy the 
enemy camp at their leisure, with only one casuality. Two guns partici-
pated in Tarlton's initial assault on the village. The shells from these 
guns reached the panic-stricken villagers well ahead of the cavalrymen. 
The guns deterred any serious counter-attack as any concentration of .In-
dians would immediately become the likely redipient of a few cannon shells. 
The guns were extremely valuable when Evans went over to the defensive 
at the end of the day. Any Indian foolish enough to venture closer than 
400 yards ran the risk of being riddled with canister. Kept at such a 
distance, Indian riflemen stood little chance of inflicting serious 
casualities on the soldiers. 
Since artillery.was so useful, why were cannons absent from the ranks 
of the Seventh Cavalry? There was nothing along the Seventh's line of 
march to prevent the passage of wheeled artillery. Supply wagons accom-
panied Custer, and cannon certainly could have been taken where wagons 
went. Indeed, the topography of Custer's route and the Washita battle-
field was very similiar to the trail Evans made to Soldier's Creek. 
Moreover, cannons were available to Custer. At least one gun was at 
Camp Supply, and there were others at Fort Dodge, Custer's original 
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starting point. In addition, Light Battery B, Fourth Artillery, a unit 
which had accompanied Hancock a year earlier, was still in Kansas. It 
certainly could have been included in the list of fighting units assigned 
to the eastern column. The only logical reason for the absence of can-
non with the Seventh Cavalry troopers was the personal idiosyncracies of 
the cornmander~Custer. 
In his fighting on the plains, Custer normally rejected any addi-
tions to his regiment, in the terms of units, such as an artillery bat-
tery. In a similiar vein, Custer placed little value on cannon or even 
gatling guns. He forbade his men from even practicing with gatling guns 
in the days before the Medicine Lodge talks because he felt that such 
practice would have been a waste of time and annnunition.13 Seven years 
later, Custer refused the offer of a gatling gun battery for fear they 
might "humiliate" his efforts against the Sidux.14 Custer, like many 
other cavalry officers, depreciated the value of infantry and artillery. 
He did not take cannons with him because he felt that the Seventh was 
equal to any enemy force it might encounter. Lacking a fundamental doc-
trine for fighting Indians, the major unit connnander had the prerogative 
of assembling and deploying his resources in the manner he desired. 
Custer exercised that privilege. 
The successes of Custer and Evans brought a temporary peace to the 
southern plains. The fear of an unexpected attack from the pony soldiers 
convinced the tribes to return to their reservations. Unfortunately, 
another campaign on the windswept panhandle landscape was needed before 
the nomadic tribes finally acquiesced to the direction and control of 
the white man. Although different units fought the next campaign, the 
nature of their battles was not radically different from Sheridan's 
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first winter campaign. Some units used artillery while others relied on 
carbines and pistols in battle. The nature of war on the southern plains 
was very similiar to the contest between the Indian and the white man on 
the northern plains. 
* * * 
When its work was done at Medicine Lodge, the Peace Commission of 
1867 moved north to treat with the Sioux nation. Since the early 1860s, 
the government had wanted to build a wagon road on the Bozeman Trail, 
connecting the Platte River and Montana. The road would faci1itate the 
movement of supplies to the Montana gold miners. The Sioux strenuously 
objected to the road through their prime hunting ground. When the army 
built three forts to protect settlers on the Bozeman, the Sioux went to 
war. 15 Sioux and Cheyenne warriors were successful in paralyzing traffic 
heading for Montana or going west to Oregon or California. The garrisons 
of the three hastily constructed posts existed in a virtual state of 
siege. In April, 1868, at Fort Laramie, Wyoming, the commissioners were 
able to conclude a treaty with the Sioux and northern Cheyenne. 
The treaty redefined the Sioux domain west of the Missouri River. 
The United States acknowledged the tribe's ownership of the western half 
of what is today South Dakota. In addition, they were given hunting 
rights in the Big Horn Mountain region of Montana. The army agreed to 
abandon its three posts and stopped construction of the road. The Sioux 
agreed to keep to the reservation, except when hunting, and not to ob- , 
struct the building of railroads. 
Ad defined by the treaty, the Sioux's land included the Black Hills. 
For many years rumors circulated that the hills contained gold. As a 
result, miners flocked to the Dakotas trying to find the yellow ore 
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before a Sioux war party found them. The army repeatedly hauled prospec-
tive millionaires off the Sioux lands only to have twice as many take 
their places. A surveying expedition, led by the dauntless Custer in 
1874, confirmed, officially, the presence of gold in the Black Hills. 
After that no force on earth would have been able to stop the wave of 
humanity which surged toward western Dakota. Government efforts to pur-
chase the hills failed and hundreds of warriors left the reservation to 
prepare for war. An order by the Indian Department to return to their 
agencies was ignored by the Indians. The government finally placed the 
matter in the hands of the War Department. 
In addressing the Sioux outbreak, General Sheridan initially foresaw 
a winter campaign. Multiple columns operating in cold weather had the 
best chance of corralling the elusive Sioux. 16 Unfortunately, neither 
General Alfred Terry, commanding the Department of the Dakotas, nor 
General George Crook, commanding the Department of the Platte, could 
gather the necessary forces and supplies in time for a winter expedition. 
Once again, inadequate resources, in terms of supplies and transportation, 
impeded the army's efforts to fulfill its mission in the West. Crook 
did manage to take the field in early March. All of his scurrying for 
supplies and troops was to little avail. Crook's soldiers, operating 
under Colonel J.J. Reynolds, did attack Crazy Horse's Sioux camp on the 
Powder River in Montana. Reynolds did little damage to the camp or its 
defenders. Frustrated at this ineffectual sortie, Crook returned to 
Fort Fetterman, Wyoming, and prepared for another venture into the Sioux 
domain. 17 His preparations consumed almost two months. 
At midday on May 29, 1876, a long line of blue-coated soldiers 
marched out of Fetterman. Five troops of the Second Cavalry, ten troops 
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of the Third Cavalry, and five companies drawn from the Fourth and Ninth 
Infantry Regiments comprised Crook's second effort against the hostile 
Indians. By June 2, the column reached the ruins of Fort Reno, one of 
the three posts abandoned due to the treaty of 1868. Seven days later, 
·on the Tongue River, a small band of Sioux fired into Crook's camp as a 
way of welcoming the soldiers to the area. Slightly ruffled, the troops 
pushed on. With the acquisition of a large group of Crow and Shoshone 
scouts, Crook was ready to search in earnest for the elusive enemy. 
At the junction of the Big and Little Goose Creek, Crook circled 
and fortified the wagons which had carried much of his supplies. His 
previous experiences in Arizona, chasing Apaches, had taught him that a 
column supplied from pack mules moved much faster than one encumbered by 
wagons. To enhance his mobility further, the infantry were obliged to 
ride the spare mules, much to the disgust of both man and beast. By 
daylight on June 16, Crook's small army was again on the move. The column 
marched northwest from the wagon-fort on Goose Creek and entered the area 
of Rosebud Creek. On the following morning, Crook found what he had been 
looking for. More accurately, the Sioux found Crook. 
The Battle of the Rosebud began with Crook's forces on both sides 
of the creek. Four troops of the Third Cavalry and four troops of the 
Second Cavalry were on the right bank. The balance of the Third and the 
infantry were on the left bank. Crook ordered his battalion commanders 
to clear the hills which dominated the valley and his position. Instead 
of meeting the line of charging soldiers, the Sioux withdrew to an ad-
jacent line of ridges. Some of Crook's subordinates continued their 
advance to the second line of ridges. Their adversaries simply fell back 
to yet another crest. In a short time, Crook's eleven hundred soldiers 
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were scattered all over the country bordering the Rosebud. 18 
Where troops were supported by the Crow and Shoshone auxiliaries, 
Crook's position was not in jeopardy. Unfortunately, there were not 
enough friendly Indians to go around. Colonel William Royal•s battalion, 
fighting over the roughest part of the battlefield, was hard pressed by 
the Sioux and Cheyenne braves. Royall's lot worsened when Captain 
Guy Henry, a well-liked and respected veteran, fell seriously wounded. 
With Henry out of action, some of the troops lost heart and began to fall 
back. The disabled Henry narrowly averted capture and certain death 
through· the timely arrival of the dependable Crow and Shoshone.19 The 
intensity of fighting was greatest around Royall's men. Most of the 
casualities sustained that day were among those men. Crook's principal 
' 
objective was the Indians' village, and he knew that he could not reach 
it by fighting such a disjointed battle. Consequently he tried to con-
solidate his command. This proved extremely difficult, especially for 
Royall's men. They had to yield valuable high ground and withdraw across 
broken, exposed terrain. When the enemy regained the vacated ridge, 
they poured a withering fire into the ranks of the cavalrymen. 
Dispite his problems, Crook decided to strike out with two battalions 
toward the expected location of the village. Captains Anson Mills and 
Henry Noyes broke their battalions from the Rosebud fight and marched 
through a canyon toward the village. Mills was extremely uncomfortable 
about the venture as the canyon was a perfect place for an ambush. Tim-
ber lined the steep sides and any forced trapped within the canyon stood 
little chance of escaping~ To the relief of many, Crook recalled this 
force and directed it to rejoin the main body. Marching by a circuitous 
route, Mills' troopers were able to strike the rear of the enemy's ranks 
opposite Royall's shattered command. Undoubtedly, the arrival of the 
two battalions prevented a portion of Crook's line from collapsing. 20 
This flanking movement.was the last major operation of the day. 
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The Sioux withdrew, leaving Crook's soldiers in possession of the battle-
field. 21 With his legions somehwat disorganized and with a considerable 
number of casualities, Crook refused to chase the withdrawing warriors. 
The rest of the day was spent gathering the wounded and burying the dead. 
The following day, the column trudged back to Goose Creek and the wagon 
train. 
Upon reaching his camp, Crook dispatched his wagons, loaded with the 
wounded, to Fort Fetterman. He also sent a message to Sheridan asking 
for more supplies, more infantry,and more cavalry.Crook had tried to fight 
the Sioux as he had fought the Apache. His failure to recognize that the 
two were different and therefore required different tactics almost cost 
him his command. The Rosebud fight had impressed upon him the power of 
a united Sioux nation and its Cheyenne allies. After the battle, Crook 
was overly cautious. Until properly reinforced, he would not sally forth 
again to meet the enemy. For more than a month, Crook sat and waited. 21 
There were two other columns looking for the Indian army of Sitting 
Bull and Crazy Horse. Colonel John Gibbon was in the field by early May 
with a cavalry/infantry command drawn from the Montana garrisons. 
General Terry's men began their march from Fort Abraham Lincoln, Dakota 
Territory, shortly after Gibbon's command left central Montana. Sheridan 
fully expedted Crook, Gibbon, and Terry, operating in concert, to bring 
the Sioux to bay. However, Crook's actions constituted a solo perfor-
mance which was not coordinated with Gibbon or Terry. 
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By comparison, Terry planned to cooperate with Gibbon in order to 
conquer his fleeing opponents. Terry's plan envisioned catching the 
Indians between Gibbon's soldiers and the Seventh Cavalry under Custer. 
Custer would march down the Rosebud, where the Indians were thought to 
be, while Gibbon's Montana column marched up the same creek. The Seventh 
would strike the main blow and the Montana troops would prevent any es-
cape. Both connnands were to be in position by June 26. 
On June 22, Custer left Terry's column for the Rosebud. 22 In three 
days of marching, Custer reached the divide separating the Rosebud and 
the Little Big Horn River. His scouts told him that a Sioux village was 
located in the valley of the Little Big Horn. As Gibbon was not due for 
another twenty-four hours, Custer's first inclination was to wait. How-
ever, he believed that he had been seen by Sioux scouts. The village 
might flee before Gibbon was in position to prevent an escape. Without 
waiting or determining the exact size and location of the village, Custer 
decided to attack. 
At noon on June 25, Custer split his command into three major groups. 
Captain Fredrick Benteen and three troops were to veer to the south of 
the village. Major Marcus Reno with another three troops was to march 
directly on the camp. Custer with five troops intended to flank the 
village and cut off any retreat. A variation of thi.s plan had worked 
well at the Washita. This time, however, the result was disaster. 
The village was in fact several villages, comprised primarily of 
Sioux and Cheyenne. The Seventh actually struck a force thau outnumber-
ed it five or six to one. Lacking troop strength, Reno could not make 
progress on a direct line and had to retreat. His shattered and panic-
stricken men received timely and critical support when Benteen brought 
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his squadron into Reno's small perimeter. Custer's force, 215 men, were 
overwhelmed by the two to three thousand warriors who streamed from the 
village. A similiar fate would have befallen Reno's men had not the 
. 23 
approach of Gibbon's ·column prompted the Indians to leave. 
News of the Custer debacle shocked a nation congratulating itself 
on its one-hundredth birthday. More importantly, it made Crook, Terry, 
and even Sheridan overly cautious. They took no further action until 
all of the various columns were strong enough to meet even the giant 
warrior army of the Sioux and Cheyenne. 
Between August and October, infantry and cavalry units converged on 
the Dakotas. Sheridan "stripped every post from the line of Manitoba 
to Texas ..• " to furnish enough men to his field commanders. 24 Some of 
the arriving units converged on Fort Fetterman where Crook was assembling 
his third effort against the Indians. Others, such as the Fifth Infantry, 
began constructing forts in the heart of Sioux country. Once completed, 
these forts would serve as depots from which units could conduct the 
winter campaign Sheridan had initially planned. The only significant 
encounter during this period was Crook's attack on American Horse's camp 
at Slim Buttes in August. The battle inflicted some casualities on the 
Sioux, but the effort turned Crook's soldiers into rag-tag scarecrows 
who were reduced to eating their horses. 
Almost six months elapsed between the Battle of the Rosebud and the 
beginning of Crook's third expedition against the Sioux. When the 
Powder River expedition left Fort Fetterman in mid-November, its total 
strength approached two thousand. This number included more than 350 
Indians from eight different tribes. To insure adequate supplies, Crook 
took along 400 pack mules and 168 wagons. The destination of this 
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impressive array of soldiers was the valley of the Rosebud, where Crazy 
Horse was reported to be located. The soldiers' purpose was to conquer 
the Sioux and avenge the losses on the Little Big Horn. A few days out 
of Fort Fetterman, however, Crook learned that the Sioux had a camp in 
the Big Horn Mountains. 
Crook sent a cavalry brigade, under Colonel Ranald Mackenzie to 
. t. t 25 1nves 1ga e. After a numbing night march through drifted snow, 
Mackenzie and his men found the camp. After a hasty briefing, Mackenzie 
ordered his men to advance. While some troopers swept through the tipis, 
others managed to capture the camp' herd of more than 500 ponies. The 
camp turned out to be Dull Knife's Cheyenne village and not Crazy Horse's. 
Caught by surprise, The Cheyenne warriors and families abandoned their 
lodges in a mad rush for safety. Much of the fighting within the village 
was hand to hand. A large number of warriors did manage to reach rifle 
pits where they could cover the flight of the women and children. 
With the Indian riflemen in well-fortified positions, the battle 
lapsed into long range sniping. Mackenzie knew that any effort to over-
whelm the Indian positions would succeed only atgreat cost. Consequent-
ly, he sent a dispatch to Crook asking that the infantry be sent to him. 
The longer-range infantry rifles would be much better in an attack on 
the enemy than the cavalry's carbines. Crook immediately ordered the 
infantry to Mackenzie's assistance. Unfortunately, the same snow and 
rough terrain which slowed Mackenzie's cavalry made movement difficult 
for the foot troops. By the time the reinforcemenmarrived, the Cheyenne 
defenders had managed to retreat. 
Mackenzie reported twenty-five Indians killed in the camp. His own 
casualities were seven killed and twenty-five wounded. 26 The losses of 
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the Indians, however, extended beyond those who fell during the battle. 
In their mad flight from the village, the Cheyenne had forsaken food and 
shelter. The freezing Montana night took a dreadful toll, especially 
among the young. 27 By the time the survivors reached Crazy Horse's camp, 
·Crook's initial target, most were suffering from s·tarvation and exposure. 
By December, Dull Knife's followers began straggling into the reserva-
tions. The winter and Mackenzie's troope1Shad bled them of the desire 
to fight. 
Even while Crook's third expedition was in the assembly stage, the 
cantonment on Tongue River, one of the new post in the Sioux domain, was 
taking form. The soldiers of Colonel Nelson Miles' Fifth Infantry labor-
ed furiously to build adequate shelter before the winter descended on 
them. Other soldiers, principally Lieutenant Colonel E.S. Otis' Twenty-
Second Infantry, escorted supply trains to Miles' encampment. These 
trains were a prime target for Sitting Bull's warriors. On three sepa-
rate occasions Sioux war parties attacked the supply train, trying to 
prevent the stockpiling of provisions for the winter. These raids promp-
ted Miles to march out of his half-finished post and seek a confronta-
tion with the fighting men of Sitting Bull. 28 
The two opponents finally came together at the head of Cedar Creek 
on October 21, 1876. Negotiations, instead of gunfire, marked the first 
days's activities. Sitting Bull insisted that the soldiers and all other 
white men must leave the country. He rejected any possibility of going 
to the reservation as Miles demanded. In a short talk on the second 
day, the two intractable positions were reaffirmed. Finally, both leaders 
withdrew to their respective sides and a battle erupted a few minutes 
later. 29 
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Miles' connnand consisted of 394 infantrymen and one piece of artil-
lery. Sitting Bull deployed almost a thousand warriors. Initially, the 
Indians fired the dry prairie grass and pressed the soldiers on all sides. 
Miles 'formed his command into a hollow square and opened fire with his 
cannon. The long-range rifle fire kept the Indians from closing to a 
charge while the 3-inch Ordnance rifle spread havoc among concentrations 
of Indians. Captain Simon Snyder, who directed the gun, later noted in 
his diary, "I had charge of the artillery; which did excellent service, 
as it appeared to completely demoralize the enemy and kept them at a 
respectable distance. 1130 Miles also observed that the Indians could not 
stand artillery.31 
With the Indians unable to penetrate his defenses, Miles decided to 
attack. His sudden advance stampeded the Indians. For the next two 
days, Miles' infantry pursued the hostiles. Although the soldiers in-
flicted few casualities in the forty-mile chase, they did force the In-
dians to abandon large quantities of food and equipment. Finally, part of 
the exhausted Sioux surrender~d and promised to return to their reserva-
tions. Taking five chiefs to ensure the compliance of the tribes to 
their promise, Miles returned to his cantonment. 32 
Miles' half-frozen men were not able to savor the warmth of their 
camp very long. The energetic colonel paused only long enough to collect 
fresh supplies before again setting out in search of the enemy. Through-
out November, his men marched across the frozen snow-covered landscape 
of Montana. Unfortunately, blowing snow often obliterated any trail the 
elusive Indians might have left. Invariably, the soldiers had to return 
to their huts on Tongue River to replenish their provisions and thaw 
their frozen bodies. 
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After a brief respite, the troops were back in the field by the 
first week in December. Miles' force on this occasion numbered 436 men 
and two pieces of artillery. The guns, a 12-pounder Napoleon and a 
3-inch Ordnance rifle, were disguised as wagons, replete with bows and 
canvas. Throughout this expedition, the weather was as much an adversary 
as the Indians. Snyder noted on December 23, that the mercury in their 
thermometer had frozen. 33 The soldiers' sufferings and perseverance 
were rewarded on January 8, when they clashed with the Oglala bands under 
Crazy Horse. 
The battle between Miles' infantry and the Sioux took place in a 
valley within the Wolf Mountains. The Indians generally commanded the 
high ground which bordered the valleywherethe troops were. Early in 
the battle, the Indians tried to charge the troops by riding directly 
down the valley. However, Miles, commanding his troops from a small 
rise, directed the cannons against this effort. The two guns, now stripp-
ed of their deceptive canvas, opened fire. This initial charge was 
stopped by the combined fire of the smooth-bore Napoleon and the 
rifled gun. 
The struggle then changed focus as both sides maneuvered for a 
strategic point on the battlefield. A certain stretch of high ground, 
held by the Sioux,dominated Miles' command. If the soldiers could wrest 
this particular piece of terrain from the enemy, the entire Indian attack 
would collapse, Under supporting fire from the Napoleon and the Ordnance 
rifle, the infantry assaulted the ridge. Burdened by heav1 coats and 
deep snow, the men made slow progress. As the troopers neared their 
objective, the gunners shifted their cannons to other targets to avoid 
hitting their comrades. The infantry finally struggled to the crest of 
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of the ridge. Without the supporting fire from the cannons, it is doubt-
ful that the troops would have been able to take the key ridge. 
This success coupled with the untimely death of a prominent chief 
broke the Indians' desire to fight. As the warriors fled, cannon shells 
pursued them and also sought out any hidden pockets of resistance. Miles 
intentions to pursue were snuffed out by a sudden, blinding, snowstorm. 
Reluctant!); he called off the battle. His ·troopers ·tramped back to a 
d h d f h i T R. 34 temporary camp an t en move out or t e r ongue iver post. 
The fighting in the Wolf Mountains was a minor skirmish in terms of 
casualities. However, it was significant for other reasons. Heretofore, 
the warriors led by Crazy Horse had been victorious in battle. They had 
stopped Crook on the Rosebud, annihilated Custer's battalion, and mauled 
the rest of the Seventh under Reno. Miles, with less than half of their 
numbers had confronted them in battle and ulttmately chased them from 
the battleground. The battle also showed to the Sioux that the winter. 
months brought no respite from the pursuing columns of the blue-coated 
soldiers. By the middle of May, 1877, many of the hostiles had given up 
and were moving toward their agencies. 
By the end of spring, the Sioux war was over. Although most of the 
bands had re.turned to the reservation, some fled north to Canada to avoid 
punishment. Consequently, there were infrequent skirmishes between the 
soldiers and these bands whenever they ventured south of the border to 
hunt buffalo. In time, even these hold-outs turned themselves in to the 
Indian agents and officers who controlled the Sioux reservations. 
Sitting Bull was the last of the major chiefs to return. On July 19, 1881, 
he yielded to the army at Fort Buford, Dakota Territory. 
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The results of the various expeditions in the Sioux war ranged from 
unqualified success to absolute disaster. Miles'victories on Cedar Creek 
and in the Wolf Mountains and Mackenzie's qualified success against 
Dull Knife's camp can be listed in the victory column. The Custer de-
bacle w.as a defeat for the army almost unequalled in its history. Crook's 
battle on the Rosebud must also be considered a defeat. Crook's advance 
on the Indians' village was effectively checked. More important, he re-
tired from the field for more than a month. His absence on the Rosebud 
contributed significantly to the disaster on the Little Big Horn eight 
days later.35 
The overriding question remains why Miles and, to a lesser extent, 
Mackenzie succeeded while Crook and Custer failed. As with Soldier's 
Creek and the Washita, the answer can be found only after an analysis 
of the battlefield topography, the relative positions of the troops, the 
size of the opposing forces, and the tactics employed. 
The topography of the Rosebud, Little Big Horn, Dull Knife's camp, 
and Wolf Mountain can not explain why one group failed and another was 
victorious. Hills of varying slope separated by valleys carved by streams 
describe the general topography of southern Montana. The four battle-
fields in question generally had the same physical profile. The eleva-
tion extremes in the Wolf Mountains were somewhat greater than the other 
locations, but not to a significant degree. Nothing in the physical 
nature of the battlefields can explain defeat or victory. 
The locations of the opposing forces on the ground offer little 
more of an explanation. Custer and Mackenzie attacked villages located 
in valleys from positions on higher ground. Mackenzie succeeded to a 
degree; Custer certainly did not. Crook and Miles were attacked while 
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in valleys and were forced to secure higher ground to defend themselves. 
Miles continued to press his opponents, while Crook withdrew. The dis-
position of the various groups does not answer the basic question. 
The relative strengths of the opposing sides does explain why 
Mackenzie achieved a measure of success against Dull Knife's Cheyenne. 
Custer was outnumbered at least four to one. Crook and Miles faced war-
rior forces which were twice as large as their own connnands. However, 
Mackenzie probably outnumbered the Cheyenne defenders on the Powder River. 
Mackenzie's cavalry column exceeded one thousand horsemen while the de-
fending Indians probably numbered only four hundred. Although the sol-
diers' superiority in numbers allowed them the initial advantage, it did 
not allow them to complete the capture of the Indian band. Mackenzie 
lacked the proper resources to make a clean sweep of the battlefield. 
The size of Mackenzie's force explained his victory, but it did not ex-
plain why Miles could beat an enemy which outnumbered him and controlled, 
at least initially, connnanding ground. 
One element in Miles' favor might have been the Sioux attitude toward 
infantry. Generally the plains Indians held the cavalry in contempt. 
Cavalrymen seldom possessed the ability to fight from horseback. They 
normally had to dismount to attain any accuracy with their carbines. 
Even on foot, the cavalryman, due to the short range of his weapon, was 
not considered a major threat. However, the infantry long rifles could 
kill an Indian long before he could reach the soldier. The rifles were 
inherently more accurate because they possessed a greater sight radius 
than the carbines. The Sioux generally chose to face the cavalry rather 
than their comrades who fought on foot. 
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Miles' use of artillery might also explain why he achieved consis-
tent success while his fellow commanders did not. At Cedar Creek, the 
3-inch rifle kept the warriors of Sitting Bull from closing with the 
infantry. The Indians stood no chance of overwhelming the foot soldiers 
as they had Custer's cavalrymen. At Wolf Mountain, the Napoleon and 
Rodman cannons stopped the Indians initial charge and swept the high 
ground of Indian concentrations. With the cannons providing a large mea-
sure of the defensive fire, Miles could mass a part of his small force 
for the attack on the critical part of the Indians' defenses. Artillery 
was an integral part of Miles' tactical philosophy of Indian fighting. 
Although artillery accompanied all of Miles' movements against the 
Sioux, the young colonel was not particularly enamored with the particu-
lar guns he used in his first battles. He considered the Napoleon and 
the Rodman to be substandard. His major objection to these guns and to 
the gatling gun was that they were too heavy to haul across the broken 
ground of the West. The gatling gun had an additional defect in that 
its bullets were so light that it was difficult to spot their impact at 
twelve or fifteen hundred yards.36 Miles knew that lighter, more accu-
rate,~annons existed. The French and British had light steel guns which 
could easily keep up with the most mobile cavalry formations. Miles 
constant harassment finally forced the Ordnance Department to send him 
two light Hotchkiss mountain guns.37 He used one of these guns against 
the Nez Perce/later in 1877.38 
Cannons were absent from the ranks of Custer's Seventh and Crook's 
units because these commanders discounted the value of artillery against 
Indians. Custer, as has been seen, felt that his regiment was equal to 
any enemy force it might encounter. He declined Terry's offer of four 
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gatling guns for fear they would slow him down. 38 However, nothing along 
Custer's line of march would have prevented gatling guns from accompany-
ing the Seventh.39 Crook officially stated his belief that artillery 
was useless against Indians. He even discounted any morale effect the 
presence of cannons would have on the enemy.40 The only instance in 
which Crook ever admitted that artillery would have been useful was when 
his soldiers physically could not reach the Indians.41 
The presence or absence of artillery reflected each commander's per-
sonal approach to Indian fighting. Each commander relied either on past 
experiences with the Indian, an understanding of how other units had 
gained success, or his own philosophy about combat in general. Experience 
could be the weakest foundation for tactical decisions. If any of the 
many facets which comprised a battle changed, the tactical lessons from 
that battle had to be adjusted. Both Crook and Custer fought in 1876 as 
they had before. The nature of the enemy they faced at the Rosebud and 
the Little Big Horn was very different from anything they had faced in :_ 
the past. 
Crook, a superb commander in Arizona, was put off-balance by the 
large numbers of Indians surrounding him on the Rosebud. His past deal-
ings with the Apache and the J>aiute were skirmishes between comparatively 
small units and a handful of Indians. He was not ready for a pitch battle 
such as was forced upon him by the Sioux and the Cheyenne. Custer, al-
thoughcourageous and bold, was reckless. He attacked the Sioux villages 
without gauging their size. In this he was at least consistent. His 
attack at the Little Big Horn was a carbon copy of his assault on the 
Cheyenne camp on the Washita. If Crook and Custer should have ad~pted 
their tactics to the new threat, artillery might have been in their command, 
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One adaptation would have been the inclusion of artillery. Cannons 
could have significantly altered the Battles of the Rosebud and the Little 
Big Horn. At the Rosebud, the accurate fire from two or three guns would 
have relieved much of the pressure put on Royall's squadron. During the 
battle, the squadron conmanders had the tendency to pursue the Indians 
from ridge to ridge. Had this continued, Crazy Horse's braves could have 
defeated Crook's forces in detail as he later did Custer's. Cannons 
would have eliminated the need to chase the Indians about the battlefield. 
With an average range of twelve hundred yards, even the small mountain 
howitzer could have inflicted casualities on distant ridges. The cavalry 
then would not have had to place themselves in danger of being ambushed. 
In the same manner, artillery could have altered the outcome on the 
Little Big Horn. Two good gun crews would have allowed Custer to with-
draw from the village and avoid the fate which befell him and more than 
two hundred of his men. Canister fire would have inflicted grevious 
casualities on massed formations such as those which swept over the 
Seventh. Custer might not have won the battle, but he and many more of 
his men might have survived. 
* * * 
These six major battles show the army's inconsistent approach to 
battle on the plains. Although the army opted to fight the Indian in 
the winter, the tactics used by the various connnanders differed in each 
engagement. Battles were fought according to individual commanders per-
ceptions about Indian warfare. The absence or presence of artillery 
vividly illustrates this approach to battle on the plains. Lacking 
a set of tactical guidelines, success or failure hinged on the personali-
ty of each particular connnander. 
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These battles have also shown that artillery was effective when used 
against the Indian on the plains. Cannon could have changed the course 
of the Sioux war by significantly altering two major battles. As it was, 
cannons allowed some units either to meet larger Indian forces in battle 
and emerge victorious or to remain on the battlefield in spite of the 
enemy which encircled them. It was said of the Colt revolver that it 
made all men, large and small, equal. The force of cannon fire brought 
the smaller army columns of Evans and Miles to a par with the massed 
Indian forces which faced them. 
Light, mobile, artillery was valued by Evans and Miles in their 
plains battles. That type of weapon was essential for a war of pursuit 
and maneuver. A different type of engagement and environment necessitated 
~n adjustment in artillery. There were campaigns which resembled a war 
of position. On these occasions soldiers and Indians struggled and died 
for a piece of ground that neither side particularly wanted. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE MODOC WAR: THE SIEGE 
OF THE STRONGHOLD 
The Modoc war of 1872-1873 was a major exception to the story of 
the anny chasing fleeing Indian tribes across hill and dell. This con-
frontation between the white man and the American Indian could more 
accurately be described as seige warfare. Although there was a pursuit 
phase to the campaign, most of the actual fighting resembled Vicksburg 
or Petersburg more than the Washita or Soldier's Creek. This campaign 
is of special importance as artillery units and weapons played prominent 
and varied roles in the struggle for the lava beds of northern California. 
The variety of tasks performed by the artillery units would not have 
existed had the army possessed the resources and doctrine necessary for 
the frontier. 
The Modoc Indians were part of an extremely diverse California In-
dian population. Of the Penutian language stock, they were predominantly 
hunters and gatherers. 1 The arrival of the Europeans had a significant 
impact on the Modocs, as it did other tribes. Diseases which the Spanish 
brought from the old world devastated the tribe. The survivors quickly 
found themselves subservient to the whites and a target for Christian 
conversion.2 When the power of Spain and its successor, Mexico, waned, 




Relations between the Americans and the Modoc, like Spanish and 
Mexican-Modoc relations, were not particularly amicable. Prior to the 
Civil War, white wagon trains bound for California's goldfields often 
fell prey to Modoc attackers. Immigrant trains moving south from the 
rapidly filling Oregon territory also were likely victims. The primary 
objects which the Indians sought were horses. Captured children were 
also valuable as they could be traded for horses. 3 Retaliation by white 
settlements for such attacks was swift and often severe. In 1852, for 
example, a young Indian fighter/hater named Een Wright succeeded in re-
ducing the Modoc population by half as punishment for the massacre of an 
Oregon wagon train. 
The Civil War induced a new tension between the whites and the Modocs. 
When the war broke out, pro~Union men, scouring the countryside for Con-
federate sympathizers, often clashed with renegade Indians. Incidental 
skirmishing between whites, both Union and Confederate, and the Indians 
was a weekly occurrence. An unusually severe winter and the resulting 
starvation among the Indian bands did nothing to lessen the hostility be-
tween the two races. By 1864, the Modocs had suffered enough with their 
numbers reduced to a mere handful, they sought a treaty with the govern-
4 ment. In return for fifteen years of annuities and the promise of shops, 
schools, and mills, the Modocs agreed to settle on a portion of the 
Klamath Indian reservation. The Senate ratified the treaty in 1866, but 
it took the Executive branch almost four years to sign the document. 5 
The selection of the Klamath agency as the permanent home of the 
Modocs was unwise. Much of the discontent which resulted in the outbreak 
in 1872 began here. The larger Klamath tribe made the Modocs' existence 
miserable. In return for the "privilege" of residing on the Klamath's 
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agency, the Modocs were forced to pay tribute. Financial abuse was cou-
pled with personal abuse and the Modocs became second-class citizens even 
on reservation grounds. The resident Indian agent proved either unwill-
ing or unable to protect the smaller tribe from their Indian antagonists. 
The government was equally unwilling to furnish the Modocs with a reser-
vation of their own.5 The lack of funds and the absence of the promised 
schools and shops prompted one band of Modocs to leave the reservation 
in 1872. 
Led by a sub-chief named Kientpoos, or as the whites called him, 
Captain Jack, these disgruntled Indians returned to their old hunting 
STounds in the Lost River region of northern California. The arrival of 
Jack's band upset the settlers who had started farms and ranches on the 
•acated Modoc land. A clamor for the Indians' removal soon arose. When 
repeated requests for the Indians to return to the reservation failed, 
the agent, Thomas B. Odeneal, asked for military assistance.6 
On November 29, 1872, Captain James A. Jackson and thirty-eight men 
,of Troop B, First Cavalry, arrived at Jack's camp on Lost River. Jackson 
' 
~first tried to convince the chief and his followers to return to the 
t\a•ncy peacefully. On the opposit~ bank of the river, a group of local 
~; 
:'i1ttzens was attempting the same task with a second Indian camp. When 
~~ 
;~suasion failed, Jackson ordered the warriors to lay down their weapons. 
Charley, one of Captain Jack's more hot-headed followers, refused 
. Yield his rifle. An attempt to disarm him ignited a volley of rifle 
A general battle at almost point-blank range erupted in Jack's 
and quickly spread across the river. The brief but bloody exchange 
ed With both sides withdrawing. Several Indians were killed or wound-
lncluding women and children. Jackson had one man killed and seven 
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wounded. The cavalry retired to a nearby ranch to care for their wounded, 
and the Modocs made their way to the lava beds south of Tule Lake. 7 
To Jesse Applegate, a local rancher, the Modoc refuge, later dubbed 
the Stronghold, was "hell with the fire gone out. 11 8 At first impression 
the lava beds were a comparatively level sagebrush plain. Further exam-
ination revealed that the plains were criss-crossed with lava ridges, 
pockmarked with sinkholes, and studded with sharp volcanic rock. A sur-
vey in 1933 counted 224 caves, 16·· lava craters, and 75 mud craters. 
The Stronghold was a land of no value except as a battlefield. The 
terrain of the lava beds decidedly favored the combatant on the defensive. 
Movement by horse was impossible. Individuals on foot could advance over 
the rocky ground, but only at a snail's pace. Such movement made them 
sitting ducks for their adversaries rifles. For the defenders, conceal-
ment and protection from enemy fire was excellent. An attacker would pay 
a very high price for any measure of victory on that barren field. 
Jackson's abortive attempt at arresting Jack's band had stampeded the 
Indians to this veritable rock fortress. 
The fight between the First Cavalry and the Modocs on Lost River 
brought the lumbering mechanism of the army into action. The process of 
gathering troops began on December 2. · The first unit to reinforce 
Jackson at Crawley's ranch was Captain Reuben F. Bernard's Troop G, First 
Cavalry. By December 11, Captain David Perry's F troop of the same regi-
ment had arrived also. Major John Green of the First reached the ranch 
the same day and as sum e.d command of the three cavalry uni ts. Maj or 
Edward Mason joined the cavalry with Companies B and C, Twenty-First In-
Fantry, on December 21. Lieutenant Colonel Frank Wheaton, the district 
conunander, assumed command of the forces at the ranch the same day. 
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Lacking adequate transportation resources, it had taken three weeks for 
the army to assemble this small force in northern California.10 
Although the necessary forces were now at the scene, Wheaton did 
not immediately attack the Modoc position. After a long, hard look at 
the Stronghold, Wheaton realized that he needed artillery. His Civil 
War experience as a division commander· led him to believe that cannons 
could save many lives by eliminating a great deal of skirmishing. 11 
The idea of using cannons seemed somewhat absurd to some of the troops 
who had recently seen action in Arizona. 
These troopers knew that once the Indians ·had been located, the 
soldiers could simply go in and whip them;2These men failed to recognize 
that the Modocs were not Apaches. The Modocs did not range over several 
thousand miles of mountains and deserts as the Apache did. As important, 
the Stronghold was not like the terrain of Arizona. Although the Modoc 
warriors numbered less than one hundred, the lava fortress they defended 
more than compensated for their small numbers. Lugging artillery around 
Arizona might have been a waste of time, but cannons were needed for the 
Stronghold. 
Despite the objections from some of his subordinates, Wheaton stood 
fast and waited for the battery of mountain howitzers. On January 16, 
the cannons arrived, escorted by Jesse Applegate and a militia group. 
Lieutenant William H. Miller was selected to command the guns. Several 
cavalrymen were detailed to form the gun crews, which Miller put through 
a short but rigorous period of drill. The resulting efficiency was 
heartening to Wheaton and encouraging to the volunteers who had joined 
his command. 13 With his troops and supporting artillery at hand, Wheaton 
was ready. January 17, was selected as the day of the attack. 
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According to Wheaton's plan, the soldiers would attack Jack's posi-
tion from two directions. Major Edward Mason's battalion of the Twenty-
First Infantry, a group of Oregon volunteers, Captain Perry with 150 
cavalrymen, and Miller's cannons were to advance on the Stronghold from 
the west. Captain Bernard and two troops of the First Cavalry, suppor-
ted by a group of Klamath Indians, were ordered to mov.e in from the east. 
Wheaton hoped that the two groups would join their southern flanks, cut-
ting( off any retreat to the south. He doubted that the Indians would 
venture onto the lake which bordered the Stronghold on the north. After 
joining south of the Stronghold, the two forces would then sweep across 
the Stronghold. The attack was to be launched after Miller's guns fired 
three shells. 14 
Unfortunately, the three cannon blasts from Miller's battery were 
about the only part of the operation that went according to plan. In 
moving into position prior to the attack, Perry's command was fired on 
by Modoc outposts on a bluff to the southwest of the Stronghold. The 
element of surprise, as far as the western forces were concerned, was 
lost. Bernard's conn:nand, moving through a dense fog, overshot the~r 
attack position and moved much closer to the Modocs than had been planned. 
Part of Bernard's contingent surprised an Indian sentry and a short, 
crisp firefight followed.15 The element of surprise by the eastern wing 
had vanished also. The Indians, therefore, had almost a full day's no-
tice of the troop positions and the direction of attack. 
Wheaton's luck did not appreciably change on the day of the attack. 
The troops awoke on the morning of the seventeenth to find the battle-
field completely obscured by a dense fog. In the dim dawn light, Mason's 
soldiers took six hours to cover the first of the three miles to the 
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Stronghold. Although the Modocs probably could not see the troops in 
the fog, their knowledge of the terrain allowed them to guess the general 
attack route. They began firing well before the soldiers came within 
effective rifle range. Any casualities the Indian bullets inflicted were 
more accidental than deliberate. However, the firing did have an affect 
on the advancing troops. Moving over unfamiliar ground, with wretched 
visibility, hampered by uncomfortably close bullets, the troops began to 
waver. 
Bernard was having no greater success on the eastern side of the 
Stronghold. Visibility likewise hampered his attempts to move his men 
forward. The night that his soldiers had spent among the lava boulders 
had sapped any enthusiasm they had had about fighting Indians. The 
Klamath Indians were of no help and could not be found for apart of the 
battle. Periodic casualities made it even more difficult for Bernard to 
pry his men away from protective cover and move them toward an enemy they 
could not see. 
By the mid-afternoon the fog had lifted. However, Wheaton's predi-
cament did not correspondingly improve. The Modoc rifle pits were still 
not visible, but the soldiers were. Casualities began to mount among the 
soldiers and officers. When Perry was wounded, he men practically refused 
to advance any further. Even though a junction of sorts had been made 
on the lake or northern flank, there was still a lot of ground to cover. 
Frustrated at his luck and the performance of his men, Wheaton decided to 
call off the attack. 16 The first battle for the Stronghold had been a 
dismal failure. 
In general, the attack failed for several reasons. Troops moved, 
both on the day preceeding the attack, and on the day of the attack, with 
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extreme timidity. Bernard, Mason, and Green had tremendous difficulty 
in getting their men to advance. The fog turned every obscure object 
into a lurking, de9dly Indian. The whiz of bullets or the sharp stacatto 
report of richochetting shots intensified the troopers apprehensions. 
The volunteers, who had accompanied the western force, quickly lost the 
cocky enthusiasm they had prior to the battle. They were among the first 
to counsel a re-examination of the problem from a safer distance. 
By constrast, the Modocs managed their defenses exceptionally well. 
Having the advantage of interior lines of movement and communications, 
they could easily shift their few warriors to threatened points. Rock 
fortifications afforded them excellent protection from the soldiers few 
random shots. They were probably most vulnerable to the cannons, but the 
guns did not play the role that had been hoped for. 
Most accounts, both eyewitness and historical, maintain that the fog 
effectively neutralized the mountain howitzers. 17 The three rounds fired 
to signal the attack, and possibly a few more were all that the cannons 
contributed to the battle. Wheaton silenced his cannons because he was 
afraid that they might do more damage to the friendly forces than the 
enemy. Some participants maintained that cannon shells actually landed 
in the rear of Bernard's eastern forces.18 
Undoubtedly, the fog completely eliminated the howitzers as a tool 
of war on that morning. In the nineteenth century, cannons were still 
aimed by actually sighting the tube on the target. If the target could 
not be seen, the guns were useless. The supposition that shells landed 
in the rear of Bernard's attacking soldiers is more subject to question. 
If the shells fell behind Bernard's line, it was only due to a 
radical quirk of ballistics. All accounts agreed that Miller began firing 
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from 6:30 to 7:00 in the morning. At this time, the forces were the 
greatest distance apart. There was a consensus that the cannons fired 
for only a short time before Wheaton silenced them. Therefore, the two 
groups could not have advanced a significant distance before the guns 
stopped firing. Mason's position was at least two and one-half miles 
west of the Stronghold. Bernard was no closer, in the morning, than a 
mile from Jack's warriors. For the shells to pass over the Stronghold 
and Bernard's troops, they would have had to cover more than three miles. 
The maximum effective range of the mountain howitzer was slightly more 
than one thousand yards. 19 To achieve the maximum possible range for the 
cannon, the gun tube would have to be elevated to approximately forty-
five degrees. This could be done by burying the trail of the gun or 
cutting it off. There was no reference to Miller's digging holes in which 
to lower the trail. Subsequent photographs of the cannons show that the 
carriage trail was still attached to the g~ns.20 
One other point raises doubts that the shells from Miller'~ guns 
landed behind Bernard's troopers. The fuzes for the 12-pounder howitzer 
had a time range of from one to five seconds. The maximum fuze setting 
for the cannon's shells in most manuals was three and one-half seconds.21. 
Even with a five second fuze, the shell would have exploded long before 
it passed over Bernard's lines three miles away. There is no reason to 
believe that Miller used an unorthodox fuze setting or altered the eleva-
tion of the gun. 
Rattled, exhausted, and more than a little frightened, Bernard's men 
undoubtedly heard the reverberations of the exploding shells. Their minds 
then 1nterpreted the sounds in the most threatening way, that is falling 
behind them. Being unfamiliar with artillery, they did not realize that 
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it was physically impossible for the cannon's shells to be falling be-
. 
hind them. In the first battle for the Stronghold, the cannons were in-
effective for the same reason the soldiers were. The gunners had to see 
the enemy to hit him. 
·Wheaton and his officers insisted that the ineffectiveness of the 
cannons was due to the weather, not the guns or the gunners. In this, 
he was probably trying to protect Miller and his men from any undue 
criticism. In his report to Brigadier General E.R.S. Canby, the comman-
der of the Department of the Columbia, Wheaton maintained that he could 
defeat the Modocs if he had more men and "a free use of mortar batter-
ies. 11 22 Even Bernard, who initially had been skeptical about the artil-
lery, agreed. However, he suggested that the howitzers might be more 
effectively used from the east side of the St~onghold.23 
After the battle, Wheaton fully comprehended the difficulties of 
prying the Indians from their lava fortress. He needed fresh replace-
ments for his injured and shaken soldiers. He also needed artillery 
which could arch or lob a shell into the Modocs' rifle pits and caves. 
Unfortunately, Wheaton was never able to use the understanding he had 
gained. Canby, disgusted at the reverse suffered by his field commander, 
replaced him with Colonel Alvan C. Gillem. In addition to Canby's ac-
tions, Washington interceded to prevent any second attack on the Indian 
bastion. The decision was made to form a peace commission, which hope-
fully would be able to talk Jack and his people out of the lava beds 
without further loss of life. 
The idea of a peace commission originated with a group of Oregonians. 
However, Secretary of the Interior Columbus Delano was responsible for 
its creation. He believed that such a commission could resolve the Modoc 
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war. With the approval of President Ulysses S. Grant, Delano began to 
organize the group. The task of the commissioners would be to investi-
gate the causes of the outbreak, stop its spread, and, if possible, relocate 
the Modocs on their own reservation. Interpersonal squabbles among like-
ly candidates and the Modocs' general distrust of white men made the 
selection process difficult at best. 24 After two months of discussions 
and maneuvering, the commission was formed. It was composed of Reverend 
Eleaser Thomas, a Methodist clergyman from Petaluma, California, Alfred 
Meacham, who had been the agent to the Modocs in 1869, and Brigadier 
General E.R.S. Canby. 
The army had not been completely inactive during the period when 
the commission was being created. When Canby learned of Wheaton's re-
pulse at the lava beds, he immediately ordered a company of infantry and 
a battery of artillery from his Department of the Columbia to proceed to 
northern California. Two artillery batteries and two infantry companies 
from Major GenEral John Schofield's Department of California were also 
dispatched to the troubled area. 25 Once again, inadequate transportation 
interposed to make the army's job difficult. 
For Captain Marcus P. Miller's Battery E, Fourth Artillery, the 
trip to the lava beds was almost as physically demanding as the subse-
quent campaign. Miller's battery left Fort Stevens, Oregon, on January 
21, 1873. It moved by rail to Roseburg, Oregon, and then walked the re-
maining 140 miles to reinforce Gillem's connnand. On the march the men 
either floundered in the mud, or slept in the snow. The few wagons that 
accompanied them bogged down in the mud, on the average, once a mile. 
The troops were constantly unloading the wagons, pushing them out of the 
mud, and then reloading the supplies and equipment into them. For the 
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battery, only recently arrived from the east coast, the trek was an un-
pleasant introduction into Indian warfare.26 
Other units found the trip to the lava beds equally difficult. 
Lieutenant Thomas Wright's Company E, Twelfth Infantry fought snow drifts 
pix feet deep to join Gillem's forces. 27 Captain Charles B. Throckmorton, 
commanding Battery M, Fourth Artillery, described the country he was tra-
versing as the wildest he had seen. ·He wrote his mother, "I am sure 
West Virginia is civilization in comparison. 11 28 In spite of the hard-
ships, the troops were generally anxious to get to the scent of action 
and fight the Modocs. 
In addition to the troops from his department, Schofield sent four 
Coehorn mortars to the camp that Gillem had established west of the 
Stronghold. By the time the peace commission began its negotiations 
with the Indians, the strength and armament of the army in the lava beds 
had been increased considerably. The artillery, represented by batteries 
A, E, K, and M, furnished 8 of the 31 officers and 226 of the 609 enlist-
d r h d"t" 29 e men or t e expe i ion. Even though these new units had reinforced 
the cordon of soldiers surrounding the Indians, the emphasis was still 
on a peaceful settlement. 
For the men who comprised the peace commission, efforts to resolve 
the Modocs' problems without further fighting were taxing and often un-
productive. It was considered a major accomplishment whenever the Modocs 
agreed even to talk to one of the commissioners. A partial reason for 
this was that some of the Modocs did not want a settlement. Those who 
had committed depredations following the Lost River fight feared the 
white man's justice. Even those who sought peace were always aware of 
the soldier's presence, and some suspected a conspiracy to wipe them out. 
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After many minor conferences and an equal number of disappointments, the 
Modocs agreed to meet with all the commissioners. A conference on neu-
tral ground was scheduled for April 11, Good Friday. The commissioners, 
now numbering four with the addition of L.S. Dyar, and the interpreters, 
Frank Riddle and his wife Toby, were to come unarmed. 
At about ten o'clock that morning Canby, Meacham, Thomas, Dyar, and 
the Riddles set out for a council tent which had been erected at the 
meeting place. Riddle and his wife had learned from some of Jack's fol-
lowers that the Modoc chief planned to kill the commissioners. When 
apprised of this information, Canby and Thomas discounted it. Meacham 
and Dyar did not. However, for these men personal pride compelled them 
• 30 to go to the meeting dispite convictions that they would never return. 
Many of the officers in Gillem's•camp were also apprehensive about a -
possible Modoc conspiracy. 
At 11:00 that morning, the. signal station near the camp received a 
report that Major Mason's camp on the east side of the Stronghold had 
been attacked. Captain Throckmorton, as well as other officers who were 
watching the council area, immediately rejoined his unit. Five minutes 
later, the signal station reported that the commissioners were being 
fired upon. Gillem order Miller, the senior captain in the camp, to 
take a force and rescue the commissioners. By the time Miller's group 
had covered the mile distance to the meeting area, the Indians had fled. 
Behind, they left the dead, stripped bodies of Canby and Thomas. Meacham 
was seriously wounded. Dyar and Riddle had fled the council area when 
the Modocs opened fire. Riddle's wife, a Modoc herself, remained at the 
council tent but was spared by the conspirators. Her presence probably 
kept Meacham from being killed as Canby and Thomas had been. 
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Upon reaching the tent, Miller directed some of his men to tend to 
the bodies and render all possible medical aid to Meacham. He then push-
ed part of his men a short distance beyond the meeting area. However, a 
message of recall was soon issued. Miller knew that he was exceeding his 
orders in pursuing the Indians and·that an actual attack on the enemy 
required preparation. Returning to the council tent, the soldiers impro-
:vised litters and transported the dead and wounded back to camp. 32 
In murdering the commissioners, the Modocs effectively closed any 
avenue for a peaceful resolution to their problems. Even pro-Indian fac-
tions in the east conceded that the Indians should be punished for their 
treachery. Punishment was a mild term compared with what the army wanted 
to do to the villanous murders of Canby. The general was respected and 
liked by most of his peers and subordinates. The bitterness directed at 
the Modocs was therefore intense and wide spread. Initially Sherman ad-
vised Schofield to leave no one alive in the Modoc camp, but he later 
amended that drastic order. In Gillem's camp, officers and men were cal-
ling for the severest retaliation. However, they did not m::>dify their 
ideas as Sherman had. 33 Three days after the murders of Canby and Thomas, 
Gillem was ready to dispense justice on those fortified in the Stronghold. 
Gillem's plan for taking the Stronghold was a carbon copy of 
Wheaton's tactics of the previous January. Mason with three companies 
of the Twenty-First Infantry, two troops of the First Cavalry, the moun-
tain howitzers, and a force of Warm Springs Indians would advance from 
the east. Major John Green would attack from the west with three bat-
teries of artillery, two companies of the Twelfth Infantry, and Perry's 
troop of the First Cavalry. Captain Evan Thomas' Battery A, Fourth Ar-
tillery, would remain in camp with the Coehorn mortars packed for quick 
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movement. Ultimately the two forces would form a junction south of the 
lava fortress, leaving the lake to the north as the only avenue of es-
cape.34 Gillem's attacking force was twice as large as Wheaton's had 
been. In addition, it contained the mortars what Wheaton felt were neces-
sary to blast the tenacious defenders from their refuge. 
Before morning, Mason advanced as close as possible to the Strong-
hold. He posted the infantry battalion on his right, with its right 
flank resting on the lake. The two troops of cavalry, fighting on foot, 
occupied the center of the line. The Warm Springs Indians, numbering 
about seventy, were on the exposed left flank. Mason placed the howit-
zers behind the infantry. Second Lieutenant Edward S. Chapin commanded 
the gun crews, which came from Thomas' Battery A. Mason's night ad-
vance was intended to get close to the Modocs without needessly sacri-
ficing his men.35 The extreme caution and concern he exhibited in this 
initial movement characterized his actions in the following days. 
As Mason's soldiers were cautiously moving into position, Perry's 
troopers were quietly securing a high point on the shore of Tule Lake 
called Hovey Point. Green had ordered Perry to this part of the lake's 
shore to prevent the Modocs from slipping around the northern flank of 
his advancing units. At the same time, Green placed Captain Miller in 
charge of the foot units. In the course of the following battle, Green 
a cavalry officer, spent most of his time with Perry's unit, while Miller 
directed the efforts of three artillery batteries and two infantry com-
panies. 
When the various units filed out of Gillem's camp on the morning of 
April 15, Miller's own Battery E, under First Lieutenant Peter Leary, 
led the way. Miller probably wanted his advanced unit, the one most 
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likely to hit the Modocs first, to be one upon which he could depend. 
Under Miller's control, the column moved from Gillem's camp to Perry's 
position on Hovey Point. From there Miller wheeled it ninety degrees to 
the south and at the same time began forming it for battle. When the 
units completed their flanking movement, Miller's line of battle was 
Battery E on the exposed right flank, Throckmorton's Battery M, Battery 
K, under Lieutenant George Harris, Company G, commanded by Lieutenant 
C.P. Eagan, and finally Lieutenant Thomas Wright's Company E. Perry's 
cavalrymen were on the extreme left at Hovey Point. 36 
Battery E was the first unit to draw fire from Modoc rifles. In 
fact, the defenders opened up on the western forces before Miller could 
deploy them into a modified skirmish order. Initially, Miller tried to 
advance his right flank, but the artillerymen were met by a stiff fire 
which forced them to pull back. He then shifted his right down the bluff 
he occupied and was able to advance about one hundred yards without sub-
jecting his soldiers to a hail of bullets. With most of his units firmly 
engaged, Green ordered the foot soldiers to advance on the Indians' posi-
tions. This effort gained a few hundred yards before being checked by a 
cross-fire from northern and southern positions in the Stronghold. 37 
While the foot troops were.playing hide and seek with Modoc bullets, 
the cavalry at Hovey Point sat munching hardtack and watching the show. 
They could see individual soldiers jump up, run a few feet, and fling 
themselves to the ground before one of Captain Jack's riflemen put them 
down permanently. It was not until mid-afternoon that Green ordered the 
cavalrymen forward to secure the left flank of Miller's advancing line. 
In the early afternoon, Green once again ordered Miller to charge 
with his infantry and artillery. Miller accordingly directed his men 
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forward to the first ridge held by the enemy riflemen. The entire line 
responded. Eagan rushed forward with his company. Wright, waving his 
hat, cheered on his men. Leary literally led his men into the forward 
Modoc rifle pits. A reporter for the New York Herald call the attack 
"the most brillant event of the day. 1138 Gillem, similiarly impressed, 
called it "a beautiful charge. 11 39 
With the infantry in good forward positions, Thomas brought his bat-
tery forward. The battery, its pack animals loaded with the mortars, 
arrived at Perry's position about 4:30 in the afternoon. Under sporadic 
sniper fire, the men hurriedly emplaced the 160 pound mortars. 40 The 
first round fired was more of a threat to the soldiers than to the Indians. 
Instead of arching high into the sky and landing on the enemy's position, 
it fell a scant fifteen feet in front of Perry's troops. Perry shouted 
to his unnerved men to lie flat. When the sputtering shell exploded 
seconds later, there were fortunately no casualities. 41 The artillery-
men reloaded and with the third shell ranged the Indian defenses. Just 
before dark, Thomas repositioned his weapons and began a nightlong bom-
bardment of the Stronghold. To conserve anununition, the firing was 
limited to one shell every fifteen minutes.42 
For Green's western forces, it had been a long, demanding, dangerous 
day. This was not the case with the eastern troops under Major Mason. 
Gillem's plan, as Wheaton's had, called for Mason to extend his line from 
the lake to a point south of the Stronghold. In the course of the battle, 
Mason's left was to connect with Green's right. Mason, however, had ex-
tended his line only one-half mile. He later qlaimed that his positions 
were within four hundred yards of the Modoc camp. Gillem, after the bat-
tle, checked this and found the distance to be more like seven hundred 
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yards in stead of four hundred. 43 Irrespective of the distance, Mason's 
command was in no position to flank the Stronghold. 
While Green's soldiers were scrambling across open ground under 
Modoc fire, Mason directed Chapin to open fire with his howitzers. The 
young officer ordered his men into action. The gunner's efforts were to 
. 44 
no avail as the guns were too far away to do any good. With a three 
·second fuze, the maximum effective range of Chapin' s guns was approxi-
mately 800 yards. If Mason's lines were 700 or 800 yards from the enemy's 
lines, as Gillem contended, then the shells were only reaching the outer 
edge of the rocky fortress.45As Chapin's cannonade was not reaching the 
Modoc defenses, Mason was certainly farther from the Indians than the 
400 yards he claimed. 
This brief cannon fire was generally the extent of Mason's partici-
pation in the first day's fighting. Later in response to criticism that 
he had not done his utmost in advancing, he replied that "it was no partoof 
my plan to unnecessarily expose anyone.•~6In fac~ his troops were so well 
protected that the Modocs could not see them. As Mason did not signi-
ficantly advance his men the first day, and as his cannons were too far 
away to be effective, his net contribution to any progress made that day 
was zero. 
The following morning, Gillem resumed his efforts to t~ke the Strong-
hold. That day's main objective was to link Miller's Battery E with 
Mason's Warm Springs Indians. Thomas' mortars and Chapin's howitzers, 
which had been relocated during the night, opened fire to support the 
attempted union. When the mortar shells began arching toward the Modocs, 
Green directed Miller to reach out with his unit and try to make contact 
with the other half of the expedition. 
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Taking personal command of his battery for the dangerous venture, 
Miller led his men across the rock-strewn ground. Every rock became a 
potential if temporary shelter for the men from the galling enemy fire. 
The open· spaces between the rocks were the killing zones where life could 
summ~rily be snuffed out by an adversary seldom seen. Slowly, Miller's men 
made their way across the southern flank of the Stronghold. The soldiers 
did not advance in open skirmish line as they would have had this been 
the Civil War. Instead, Miller divided his troopers into groups. While 
one group provided some sort of covering fire, the other group rushed 
madly forward to a point of comparative safety. The groups then rever-
sed roles and the rear group went sprinting forward while their comrades 
blazed away with their muskets. In this manner, the artillerymen cover-
bl d . . h f l' . 47 ed a considera e istance wit ew casua ities. 
The frenzied rush made by the artillerymen was in vein. As he had 
the day before, Mason made no serious effort to make contact with the 
soldiers of the western contingent. Indeed, Mason was more concerned 
with trying to affect a junction with Green on the northern or lake flank 
of the Stronghold instead of the southern side. Mason's failure to ful-
fill his part of Gillem's game plan almost cost the struggling battery 
heavy casualities. 
In trying to connect with the Warm Springs Indians, Miller had to 
extend the distance between Battery E and the rest of his foot soldiers. 
In the noise and confusion of battle, the other units closed their lines 
thus increasing the distance between them and Battery E. Miller, seeing 
his flanks totally unprotected, ordered his men to close to the left. A 
portion of the battery did not hear the order amidst the cracking of the 
rifles and as a result were cut off by the Modocs. 
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Seeing their predicamen4 Miller dodged a storm of bullets which 
had already killed one soldier and joined the beleagured band. He or-
dered them to fortify their tiny position as well as possible. Miller 
probably planned to remain in the shelter of their make-shift fort until 
the enemy's fare slackened. His plans were quickly changed when the 
Modoc fire increased and a few str.ay mortar shells fell uncomfortably 
close to his position. He ordered his men to make a dash to the safety 
of Throckmorton's battery. His losses in this frantic bid for security 
were comparatively light considering the proximity of the enemy. Three 
of his men were killed and two wounded before the group reached the san-
ctuary of friendly lines. 48 
At the end of the second day of battle, the two wings of the ex-
pedition had not closed off the southern flank of the Stronghold. 
Ironically, the forces had effected a junction of sorts along the lake, 
thus cutting the Modocs off from their fresh water supply. As with the 
first day, the majority of the casualities occurred among the western 
units. The artillery batteries on the right flank of Green's battle 
line suffered most of the casualities. 
As darkness fell on the battlefield, the mortars and howitzers re-
sumed their nighttime bombardment. The effectiveness of this shelling 
became-a point of considerable controversy. Some participants main-
tained that the cannonade was virtually worthless. On one occasion, the 
Indians mockingly pointed their gun into the air and fired, in sarcastic 
reference to the cannons. Private Charles B. Hardin, who was with 
Bernard's troops east of the Stronghold, claimed that the cannon fire 
"did little execution." He suggested that the only beneficial effect the 
cannons had was to take away the Indians' feeling of security. The 
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Modocs simply did not understand the "double shooting" guns. 49 
Some observers, however, said that the guns did significant damage 
to the Stronghold and Jack's defenders. A correspondent for the 
San Francisco Chronicle wrote, "It is a magnificent sight, the flight 
and explosion of the shells, and wild consternation to the Modocs. 11 50 
Rancher Jesse Applegate, a sometimes observer of the army's erratic per-
formance, saw one direct hit on the cave where the Modoc camp was situated. 
After the explosion, the rocks were swarming with wild Indians. A New .. 
York Herald reporter told his readers: 
The shells began to play the devil with the Indians ..• 
after the impact of one shell twenty to thirty Indians ran 
to the top of the rocks yelling and cussing. One of the 
harassed defenders made a speech in tolerably good English, 
calling the soldiers every name in their limited vocabulary.51 
The exploding shells had more than just a moral effect on Jack's 
band. One Indian picked up a mortar shell and tried to pry the fuze out 
with his teeth. The detonation of the shell terminated his attempts, 
his life, and that of a companion standing beside him. Jack had little 
difficulty holding the soldiers at bay for some time. The blue-coated 
whites seemed more and more hesitant to attack his warriors. Even the 
loss of fresh water was not critical as water could be had from the 
ice within many of the lava caves. However, he could not protect his 
people from the cannons. The longer the cannons fired, the more his 
people suffered. During the night of April 16, Jack decided to abandon 
the Stronghold. 
Keeping some men in his camp to harass the soldiers, Jack led his 
remaining warriors and women and children south out of the Stronghold. 
A fusillade of bullets from his rear guard did not hit any soldiers, 
but it did convince at least some of them that the Modocs were still 
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barricaded in their lava bastion. 52 When the soldiers warily moved for-
ward on the morning of April 17, they found the Stronghold abandoned. 
They had taken the formidable fortress, but it was an empty victory 
as their quarry had fled. 
For that small _part of the regular army now encamped in Jack's old 
position, the three day contest for the lava fortress was a bloody but 
futile effort. Major Green's western command had six men killed and 
many more wounded. Mason's soldiers, barricaded and therefore useless, 
had only one casuality. Mason's failure to meet Miller's soldiers in 
the south allowed the Modocs to escape on the night of the second day. 
Thomas' mortars, Chapin's howitzers, and especially the foot bat-
teries of Harris, Throckmorton, and Miller contributed significantly to 
the effort from the western side of the enemys' bastion. The artillery 
units had sustained more than their share of the casualities. Three of 
the six slain were artillerymen. Seven of the thirteen wounded came 
from the four batteries of the Fourth Artillery. 
The foot soldiers under Miller's direction had pressed the Indian 
defenders. Hesitant, afraid, at times even argumentative, they never-
theless crawled and clawed their way to the enemys' rifle positions. 
However, it was the mortars and howitzers which forced Jack to yield 
his fortress. He knew the soldiers would, in time, hesitate, possibly even 
flee, and if not, die when struck by Indian bullets. The cannons, how-
ever, and their killing bullets were impervious to anything he or his 
warriors could do. When the shells did kill, the spectacle brought pure 
terror to those who witnessed it. The mortars and howitzers had chased 
Jack and his band from the Stronghold on the night of April 16. 
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Only one battery, Thomas' A battery, fought according to the accep-
ted doctrine of the time. The reduction of a fortification by shellfire 
was properly the duty of the artillery. The fact that the defenders 
were Indians and not trained professional soldiers was of little impor-
tance. The actions of Miller's units were beyond the accepted doctrine. 
Lacking sufficient manpower, Schofield had converted artillerymen into 
infantrymen. His actions constituted a temporary solution to what was 
hoped would be a temporary problem. Fortunately, the batteries under 
Miller's control performed well in this altered status • 
Jack's flight had ended the siege phase of the Modoc war, although 
Gillem and his troops did not know this. For all the disappointed and 
discouraged regulars knew, the devilish Indians had fled to a new bas-
tion from which they would have to be evicted. That effort would unde-
niably cost many lives. The army had captured the ground but not the 
prey. Jack and his elusive fighters were alive and dangerous. More 
battles would have to be fought and more lives would have to be spent 
before the Modoc war was over. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE MODOC WAR: 
PURSUIT 
The first phase of the Modoc war had been a seige war. The second 
part of the struggle was a war of pursuit. In this respect, the cam-
paign fit the usual pattern of conflicts between the red man and his 
white antagonists. With less than 100 men, the Modocs had performed well 
in the role of defender. The~army's casualities were almost six times 
their own. The warriors of Captain Jack's fugitive band were equally 
adept at the game of cat and mouse which best described the second part 
of the Modoc war. The problem was that it was often difficult to decide 
who was the cat and who was the mouse. 
The first task in search and destroy operations is to find the enemy. 
To achieve this, Colonel Alvin Gillem sent Perry's cavalry troop on a 
circuitous scout of the lava flows south of the Stronghold. While First 
Cavalry troopers cautiously combed the rocks for any sign of Indians, the 
rest of the expedition was distributed between Gillem' s camp and the 
Stronghold. Gillem had no intention of allowing the Modoc leader to re-
enter his old fortress. When Jack had been located, these soldiers 
would once again, reluctantly, march toward the enemy. 
Although the new Modoc camp was hard to find, the enemy warriors 
had no difficulty in finding tempting targets for harassing attacks. One 
group was able to avoid patrols and pickets and fire into Gillem's camp. 
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They apparently were trying to lure the soldiers into attacking them. 
They soon realized that it would take a great deal of prodding to get the 
regulars to advance over the volcanic landscape into their rifles. Be-
coming bolder, a few Modocs attacked a supply train travelling between 
the Stronghold and the main camp. Lieutenant Leary and a handful of men 
held off their attackers until a relief detachment of twenty men from 
Battery A came to their rescue. The Indians continued to pester the 
column despite the reinforcements. A well placed shell from one of Thomas' 
mortars ended their harassment of the supply train. 1 
Ultimately, David McKay, the leader of the Warm Springs Indians re-
ported that he had located the Modoc camp four miles south of the old 
Stronghold.2 With the location of Jack's band now known, Gillem once 
again planned to move against his opponents. As the country was every 
bit as rugged as the old battleground, Gillem wanted to know if there were 
good positions from -which the mortars and howitzers could support a new 
attack. After some consultation with Major Green, a reconaissance of the 
area was ordered.3 Captain Evan Thomas, who had commanded the mortars 
was the logical officer to lead the patrol and make any determination 
concerning artillery positions. Thomas' mission was not to attack the 
Indians. If he made contact with the Modocs, he was to withdraw.4 
On Saturday morning, April 26, Thomas reinforced reconaissance pa-' 
trol left Gillem' s camp. The patrol consisted of Thomas' own Battery A, 
Battery K tmder Lieutenant Harris, and Company E, Twelfth Infantry under 
the command of Lieutenant Thomas Wright. The Warm Springs Indians were 
ordered to leave their camp at the same time and join with Thomas' patrol 
in examining the area south of the Stronghold. Lieutenant Arthur Cranston 
although not a member of any of the units accompanied the patrol. His 
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recent studies at the Artillery School and his service with mortars gave 
him a working knowledge of the weapons and their emplacement~S The party 
totalled sixty-four officers and men. Four civilians accompanied the 
soldiers in the capacities of guides and packers. .• 
The distance from the main camp to the search area, a place called 
• 
the Sand Buttes, was about four miles. Under normal conditions, the march 
~ould be made in about two hours. Not wanting to be caught in a trap, 
Thomas moved his men at a snail's pace. He had no difficulty in keeping 
the pace slow. Every man began sweating once the group left the compara-
tive safety of camp. The Modocs were treacherous devils and the men's 
anxiety grew with every yard placed between them and their camp. 
During the march, Wright's company was deployed as skirmishers. 
The artillery batteries followed in a column of twos. .As the morning 
wore on and the tension mounted, the infantrymen began to cluster to-
gether. 6 Any advantage they might have offered in terms of security 
evaporated. Repeated attempts by Wright and Thomas to get the men to 
spread out failed. Cranston, at the rear of the column with Bernard Semig, 
a civilian physician, had similiar luck in keeping flank security. The 
men tended to close back upon the column and not cover the ridges which 
paralleled the line of march. By noon Thomas' patrol reached its objec-
tive. The men rested and began eating lunch. Thomas struck out to climb 
the butte and signal Gillem's camp. Security was non-existent. 
While Thomas, Harris, and two signal men began climbing the sand 
butte, Wright ordered two other men to a rock outcropping east of the 
sand hill to act as sentries. The two men never made it. As they ap-
proached the rocks, Modoc riflemen opened fire on them from the very 
rocks they were to use as their outpost. Within minutes, Thomas' entire 
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command was tmder fire from the north, east, and south. Knowing he was to 
withdraw if attacked, Thomas ordered Wright to secure a ridge to the west 
and cover their retreat. Cranston volunteered to take five inen and dis-
lodge the Indians in the rouks. to the north. Thomas and the remaining men 
began a slow withdrawl in the direction that Wright had been sent.7 
Wright and seven or eight of his men began moving to the ridg~ 600 
or 700 yards in the distance. At this crucial moment, the bulk of Wright's J 
company panicked and fled toward camp. Casting aside anything that might 
slow their headlong flight, the terrified infantrymen deserted their com-
mander and those comrades who chose to remain and fight. The sight of the 
tmnerved men fleeing in disorder panicked some of the artillerymen, and 
a few joined in the senseless scramble. Ironically, these terrified sol-
diers ran into McKay's Warm Springs Indians who had heard the firing and 
were also heading for the ridge west of the sand buttes. In their hysteria, 
the troopers fired on the Indian allies and checked any efforts on McKay's 
part to join Thomas and his beseiged followers. 
Numbering less than ten men, Wright's tiny band was not strong enough 
to secure the ridge as Thomas ordered. The handful of infantrymen were 
cut down by a small group of Modocs who had shifted their positions to 
check any retreat of the soldiers to the west. Thomas, Harris, and what 
was left of the two batteries finally made it to a hollow at the base of 
the ridge. When Thomas shouted to locate Wright, he received a volley of 
rifle fire in reply. Deciding that any dash for safety would result in 
the piecemeal destruction of his small force, Thomas decided to stand and 
fight. He told his men that "this was as good a place to die as any. 11 8 
Ultimately surrotmded on all sides, the small knot of artillerymen were 
virtually blasted apart. ~ 
' 
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Thomas' command had taken almost five hours to march from the:j:r camp 
to the sand buttes. At about one thirty in the afternoon, the hysterical 
soldiers who had bolted from Wright's company began to straggle into camp. 
They had covered the same distance in slightly more than an hour. At 
first, the accounts of Thomas' plight were discounted by Gillem as in-
cbherent ramblings.lo However, as the firing in the south continued, 
Gillem grew anxious and finally ordered out relief parties from his camp 
and Mason's camp in the Stronghold. 11 
Green led the .group from Gillem' s camp. Along the way he met Miller 
and Throckmorton who were bringing reinforcements from Mason's camp. 
Even though time was of the essence, Green did not push his soldiers any 
faster than Thomas had that morning. By the time the rescuers had arrived 
in the vicinity of Thomas' fight, the firing had stopped and the sun had 
long since set in the west. Amazingly, Green decided to fortify his com-
d d . d 1° h b f . h f • 12 man an await ay ig t e ore making a searc or survivors. For the 
wounded of Thomas' patrol that decision meant a night of hell. Hiding 
in crevices or holes in the rock, the survivors mistook the noise made by 
Green's troops for Modocs searching for new victims. Not answering calls 
from the other soldiers for fear it was an Indian trick, the wounded spent 
a terrifying and painful night among the volcanic rock. 
In the morning, search parties emerged from their small rock forts. 
During the night, a few of Thomas' men, crazed by thirst and pain, wander-
ed into Green's position. They were unable to lead others to their woun-
ded comrades. During the day, most of Thomas' command, or what was left 
of it was found. Cranston and his small band could not be found. Rescue 
did not mean relief for those who were wounded, as the relief column had 
neglected to bring a surgeon with them. Medical aid and stretchers to 
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bear the dead and wounded were not available until darkness once again 
descended on the bloodied ground. By evening, in a freezing rain, the 
soldiers of the relief party were ready to bring out what they could find 
of the ill-fated patrol.13 
For the rescued and the rescuer, the trip back to safety was an 
eleven hour ordeal of cold, pain, and above all fear. The wounded were 
jostled on the stretchers as the bearers stumbled and staggered through 
the awesome darkness. The spectre of the Modocs dogged the steps of the 
soldiers even though the Indians made no attempts to check the soldiers' 
progress. Lieutenant Frazier Boutelle, who with three others carried the 
mortally woc.nded Harris, said that one shot would have resulted in an 
abandonment of the'wounded and a mad flight to the camp. 14 At dawn the 
column staggered into Mason's camp. After a brief rest, they moved on to 
Gillem's camp where a field hospital awaited the wounded. 15 
By nocn on Sunday, April, 28, Gillem was able to measure the extent 
of the disaster which had befallen his reconnaissance patrol. A small 
force of Modocs, probably not more than thirty, had killed twenty-two 
soldiers and wounded nineteen others. Some of the wounded would not sur-
vive their wounds. Harris would linger for sixteen days before finally 
dying. He died only twenty-four hours after his mother arrived in camp. 
She had travelled to the camp from Philadelphia when she learned of her 
son's wounds. Sixty percent of Thomas' command had been killed or wound-
ed in what came to be known as the Thomas~Wright massacre. The Modocs 
later admitted losing one warrior. 
The massacre was a body blow to the Modoc expedition and the army 
in general. More men were killed in this disaster than in all the expe-
dition's other battles combined. It was particularly devastating to the 
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artillery. Batteries A and K ceased to exist as coherent f;f.shting units, 
and for the remainder of the campaign, they would be combined under Cap-
tain Edward Field's leadership. In Thomas, Howe, Cnanston, and Harris, 
the artillery lost four promising officers. Thomas, the son of General 
Lorenzo Thomas, had served with distinction in the Civil War. Lieutenant 
Albion Howe, was also the son of a general. His father, Brevet Major 
General A.P. Howe, was a major in the same regiment as his son. Like 
Thomas, Howe had been brevetted for gallantry in the War of the Rebellion. 
Only a short time earlier, Howe had married the daughter of Brevet Major 
General William F. Barry, the commander of the Artillery School. Both 
Cranston and Harris had joined the army after the war had ended and 
were considered to be excellent junior officers with bright futures.17 
Explanations for the debacle came forth almost as fast as the news 
of the fates of Thomas and his soldiers. In time these explanations were 
condensed into two main themes. The first version placed most of the 
responsibility for the defeat on Thomas. The artillery captain, so the 
story goes, was inexperienced in Indian fighting. He did not take ade-
quate precautions to prevent a surprise by the Modocs. A general lack of 
security in the form of flankers and outposts allowed the Indians to de-
liver the first destructive fire. 18 The shattering volleys the Modocs 
poured into the bewildered troops destroyed any semblance of order and the 
troops scattered pell-mell. 
The troops themselves were considered the second cause of the disas-
terous loss of life on April 26. Many were considered to be undisciplined, 
cowardly, rabble. Colonel Jefferson C. Davis, Canby's replacement, called 
them "cowardly beefeaters." Assuming direct control of operations, Davis 
planned to keep the men with the expedition and make them fight.19 
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The criticisms of the average soldier in the lava beds were general-
ly accurate. He was often an immigrant who could barely speak English, 
or a fugitive from a less than honorable past. He performed best when 
it was in his own interest, especially if his life depended on it. Even 
a large body of good, dedicated men could be rattled by the defection of 
a miserable few. Poor marksm~nship, however, was not altogether the fault 
of the individual soldier. Congress allocated enough money to allow 
twenty rounds of ammunition per soldier per month for target practice. 
Furthermore, the army did not adopt a uniform system of rifle training 
until the 1880s. 2° Captain Edward Field later remarked, "our men rarely 
could see an Indian, and those days, never hit him, except by accident. 11 21 
Repeatedly ordered against an enemy often unseen, with little measurable 
success, the soldiers in the lava beds increasingly balked, and in the 
case of the Thomas-Wright massacre, even ran. 
The criticisms of Thomas have been somewhat overstated as far as 
explaining the massacre of the twenty-sixth. That Thomas was inexperien-
ced in Indian fighting was true, but so were Miller and Throckmorton. 
Those officers had little trouble adjusting their Civil War experience 
to meet the demands of the frontier. Security' from an enemy's attack 
has always been an essential facet of warfare, be the opponent Confederate 
cavalry or Modoc Indians. A veteran of such engagements as Gettysburg, 
Thomas and his officers understood the fundamentals of war. Thomas, 
Wright, Cranston, and others in leadership positions repeatedly tried to 
get their reluctant men to spread out. If experience was the key, then 
Lieutenant Wright, a product of the west and the son of a noted Indian 
fighter, should have been able to neutralize the shortcomings of his fel-
low officers. In fact, Wright had no more success in maintaining security 
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than Thomas or the others. 
Inexperience can not be used to explain any of the setbacks the 
army suffered in northern California in 1873. Majors Green and Mason, 
as well as·Captains Bernard, Jackson, and Perry, were seasoned campaign-
ers. They had tracked, pursued, and skirmished with a wide range of the 
Indian population of the far west and southwest. Despite that experi-
ence, they were no more successful in battle against the Modocs than 
their bretheren fresh from the east coast. As Lieutenant Boutelle aptly 
put it many years later: "Nobody on earth had ever had any such experience 
prior to our first attack with the Indians in the Stronghold. 1122 Exper-
ience gained fighting one group of Indians was not necessarily applicable 
to other Indians. A flexible tactical doctrine for Indian fighting would 
have given every commander a frame of reference. Certainly part of that 
doctrine would have included maintaining a circle of security in camp and 
on the march. 
Unfamiliarity with the idiosyncracies of Indian warfare did not 
bring about the bloodletting which occurred near the sand buttes that 
Saturday afternoon. It certainly was an unfair criticism of Thomas and 
those who led troops under his connnand. That the officers were unable 
to get their men to follow their orders was a valid shortcoming. Their 
loss of control significantly contributed to the death of those twenty-
two men. Harris, Howe, Wright, Cranston, but especially Thomas were cer-
tainly guilty of that charge. However, most of the officers who led 
troops in the Modoc war at one time or another were also culpable in 
that respect. Thomas and the other officers simply failed at the wrong 
time. 
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There was a third facet of that day's events which escaped discus-
sion. That aspect was the questionable performance of Donald McKay's 
Warm Springs scouts. McKay and his men were to leave their camp and 
join Thomas in a reconnaissance of the buttes. In spite of the fact that 
he took almost five hours to cover the distance, Thomas had arrived and 
the battle had begun before the Indian allies arrived. Ironically, the 
first soldiers that the scouts met were those who had deserted under the 
heat of Modoc bullets. 
When McKay described his part in the battle, he focused mainly on 
the activities of his group after the fighting began. He said that 
Thomas' hysterical soldiers fired at anything which remotely resembled 
an Indian. His scouts certainly qualified as targets. The Warm Springs 
Indians tried everything they could think of to let the beseiged soldiers 
know that they were friendly. This included capturing a bugler and mak-
ing him blow every bugle call from reveille to choc call. 23 McKay's 
story of a determined effort on the part of his scouts to aid Thomas' 
band is somewhat suspect. 
It was a known fact that McKay and his Indians were not on the best 
of terms. Several Indians only accepted McKay as their leader when they 
learned that they would not be accepted as volunteers unless they did.24 
In addition, some of the soldiers in the lava beds felt that their Indian 
allies feared the Modocs as much as they did. Sergeant Maurice FitzGerald 
of K troop First Cavalry believed that the Warm Springs Indians abject 
fear of the Modocs rendered them useless in such an emergency as Thomas 
had faced. 25 The final point which raised questions concerning the con-
duct of McKay's scouts was the one of casualities. One-third of Thomas' 
connnand was killed and another third wounded. McKay's fourteen scouts 
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sufferecl only one wounded casuality. 
As with most historical questions, answers concerning the actions 
of the friendly Indians will probably never be found. Nevertheless, 
the questions need to be a;;ked. Why did the Warm Springs Indians take 
so long getting to the sand b11ttes? Why (;iid McKay attempt to break through 
to Thomas' group as be claimed?26 If the Warm Springs Indians were able. 
to capture a bugler, why were they not able to infiltrate to the hollow 
where Thomas' men were in desperate need of help? Why were the scouts 
casualities so light when death and serious injury were so conunon?27 
For whatever reasons, cowardice, lack of control, the absence of 
allies, the Thomas-Wright massacre was a military disaster of the first 
magnitude. It shattered what little of the espirit which remained among 
the soldiers. An atmosphere of demoralization hovered over ·that small 
segment of the frontier army which had suffered so much and had received 
so little in return. When Davis arrived, he could feel the gloom and 
despair which permeated almost every thought and action. 
Undoubtedly, the artillerymen were notinunune from this sense of hope-
lessness. In fact, they might have felt it far more than the infantry 
or cavalry troops. They had been· called from the coastal fortifications 
for a fight for which they had never trained. Now two batteries, A and 
K, were virtually wiped out. They were :deduced to a collection of sur-
vivors stripped of leaderahip and probably purpose. Years of drill at 
such places as New York Harbor, Charlestown, and Tampa Bay had not pre-
pared them for this. They were dying trying to catch a small band of 
Indians and reclaim a hundred square miles of worthless ground. 
Davis knew that he needed time to eradicate the malaise which in-
fected his connnand. Time would help restore some measure of confidence 
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to the shattered army. He also needed fresh troops. New units would 
not only replace those who had fallen to the Modoc rifles, but hopefully 
add a new sense of enthusiasm and drive to the contest. Without these 
two commodities, time and new blood, the Thomas-Wright massacre would 
only be the first in a series of nightmares. 
The news of another military setback at the hands of the Modbcs 
thoroughly disappointed those across the nation who had hoped for a 
quick end to the hostilities. There was a rising chorus of old-timers 
and armchair Napoleons who maintained that the army was unfit for serious 
Indian fighting. The critics advanced many solutions to the problem. 
All were guaranteed to bring a quick and justly violent end to the nui-
sauce of the Modocs. Most solutions centered around the use of "seasoned 
frontier militia," instead of transplanted eastern soldier-boys. Some 
suggestions reflected a rather cynical but accurate assessment of fron-
tier civilization. 
An anonymous contributer to the San Francisco Chronicle offered a 
unique alternative to more skirmishing. He guaranteed that it would end 
the trouble in thirty days. 
If the army will certify to the fact of the discovery of rich 
placer diggings in the lava beds, the miners will clean out 
the last Indian in the time we have named.28 
To eliminate the lava beds as a future refuge, the writer suggested: 
Let the government, then, as a reward, scatter half as many 
twenty dollar pieces as it will cost to carry on an Indian 
war •.• and our miners will tunnel, sluice, and ground wash 
the whole hundred square miles to the utter extermination of 
the last Indian and the last grasshopper.29 
This approach to the Modoc problem certainly would have been unorthodox, 
but it might very well have worked. The army, however, rejected any sug-
gestion that it could not ultimately bring Jack and his small group to 
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justice. 
Even as the nation discussed the shocking news of the massacre, 
Colonel Davis was developing his strategy. Replacing Gillem, and assuming 
personal direction of the campaign, Davis decided to confine most of his 
troops to camp. Soldiers who had been scrambling over rocks dodging 
Modoc bullets were to be relegated to escorting supply trains. The only 
t major sortie which the foot troops were to conduct was a search of the 
massacre site for the missing Cranston and those who went with him. A 
mixed force of infantry and artillery finally found the bodies of the 
young lieutenant and five others about 400 yards nearer to the sand butte 
than those of Thomas and his men.30 This indicated that Cranston and his 
men were killed shortly after leaving Thomas to secure a ridge north of 
the butte. 
Although the bulk of the soldiers were not actively pursuing the 
Modocs, the Indians found time to take the war to the soldiers. A few 
warriors decided to attack one of the numerous supply trains travelling 
between the camps around the lake. They managed to capture the wagons 
from the escort. In this insignificant skirmish, the army's greatest 
loss was the comsumption of several kegs of whiskey destined for the 
main camp.31 For many of the men, isolated from all social entertain-
' ment, this particular bit of Modoc thievery was the unkindest cut of all. 
Apparently nothing was sacred or safe from the enemy's villainy. 
Although the foot soldiers were generally kept in camp, Davis had 
every intention of carrying the fight to the enemy. Offered additional 
troops, he chose to wage the campaign with the units on hand and those 
due to arrive shortly. Within two days of the massacre of Thomas' com-
mand, two additional batteries of the Fourth arrived at Gillem's camp. 
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Captain John Mendenhall had brought his Battery G and Captain Henry C. 
Hasbrouck's Light Battery B from the Department of California. 32 Has-
brouck!s battery was mounted and equipped as cavalry, there being no 
need for a mounted artillery battery. 
With his foot soldiers recuperating physically and mentally, Davis 
decided to use his cavalry to scout for the enemy. He formed a three-
unit squadron with Light Battery B as the nucleus and Hasbrouck as the 
conunander. TWo troops of the First under Captain Jackson and Lieutenant 
Boutelle supported the battery. Davis was gambling that Hasbrouck's 
newly arrived battery, untainted by defeat, could find the Modocs and 
beat them. 
On May 9, Hasbrouck and his three units set out to patrol the area 
around an alkali lake southeast of the Stronghold. The Warm Springs 
Indians had reported the enemy near the small body of water which had 
the uncomplimentary name of Sorass Lake. Not wanting to fall into a 
Modoc trap lake Thomas, Hasbrouck's column took most of the day getting 
to the lake. However, there were no Indians at the lake when the patrol 
arrived late in the afternoon. 
With no enemy to fight, Hasbrouck turned his thoughts to other mat-
ters. The water in the lake was generally unfit for man or beast so 
Hasbrouck ordered his men to dig for water. After several hours of back-
breaking and unsuccessful effort, not to mention a liberal amount of pro-
fanity, the digging ceased. Hasbrouck concluded that he could not continue 
the search without water. He decided to send part of his command back 
to camp the following day. The other would. remain and continue the search. 
In posting his command for the night, Hasbrouck, for some reason, split 
Battery B from the two cavalry troops by a distance of about a mile. The 
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horses were turned loose with a herd guard which also acted as a picket 
1 . 33 1ne. Hasbrouck had not found the Modocs, but they certainly had 
found him. 
Early in the morning the brassy notes of First Call awoke the sol-•. 
diers but failed to rouse them from their bedrolls. A volley of lead 
from the Modoc riflemen, which punctuated the bugle call, achieved what 
the bugler had failed to do. Once again, the army had been surprised by 
a furtive, determined opponent. Almost instantly men began to fall and 
the spectre of another massacre gripped the hearts of those under fire. 
Another stampede was in the making. Receiving fire from the north 
and west, some of the cavalrymen fled to the lake. Many of those wound-
ed were hit in the back trying to find some measure of protection in the 
lake waters. Hasbrouck did not stand by and watch his command be cut to 
pieces. He immediately gathered his officers· and began issuing orders. 
Boutelle was dispatched to the artillery camp for assistance. Lieutenant 
Kyle was ordered to recover the stampeded mounts. Jackson and Lieutenant 
Henry Moss managed to form the shaken troopers into two skirmish lines. 
Hasbrouck fully intended to attack his enemy as he had been attacked. 
Not waiting for orders, some of the men initiated their own charge. 
Months of pent-up frustration was unleashed and the screaming, howling 
troopers charged the Modoc riflemen. Not wanting to be left behind, the 
officers sprinted to catch their spirited men. The first mad dash car-
ried the soldiers almost two hundred yards. Gaining a low ridge to their 
north, the men paused briefly and then repeated their frenzied rush to-
ward their antagonists. Charles Hardin, a trooper in the First, later 
recalled: "It was a beautiful charge with Troop B and G all moving to-
gether and as fine a man as ever lived of the Fourth Artillery leading. 1134 
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This time pandemonium reigned over the Modocs. 
For the first time in months the Modocs were confronted with a how-
ling mob which seemed intent upon annihilating them. Jack, wearing Canby' 
uniform, watched as his warriors first wavered and then finally broke. 
The yelling blue-coats just kept coming. To compound the chaos, the 
Warm Springs Indians had managed to get behind Jack's warriors. The 
cross-fire was too much and the Modocs fled faster than the Warm Springs 
and the troops could pursue. In fact, the Modocs literally ran over the 
scouts in their bid for safety. A small detachment of troopers who had 
caught their stampeded mounts were unable to overtake the fleeing 
d . 35 In ians. 
Hasbrouck finally recalled his men and took stock of his command. 
He found that eight of his troopers had been wounded, three mortally. 
Two Warm Springs Indins had been killed. The Modocs had suffered at 
least two killed and several wounded. More important, the troopers and 
scouts had managed to capture twenty-four pack animals that belonged to 
Jack's band. The animals bore the majority of the Modocs' ammunition and 
supplies. Knowing that his wounded required immediate attention and 
that his entire command was desparately short of water, Hasbrouck chose 
to break off the pursuit and return to Boyle's camp southeast of Tule 
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Lake. 
The battle at Sorass Lake was the decisive battle of the Modoc war. 
It was the army's first clear victory in the five months it had been in 
northern California. Davis reported that "The troops have had, all things 
considered, a very square fight and whipped the Modocs for the first 
. 1137 1 . . . time. Equa ly important, the victory removed the cloud which hung 
over the army in the lava beds. A sense of enthusiasm replaced one of 
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gloom or despair. In addition to rescuing morale from an emotional eel-
lar, the battle impressed the Modocs with the likelihood of their capture 
or death. Their confidence 1n Jack shaken, the band began to split up. 
The end of the campaign was 1n sight; 
After spending May 11 1n camp, Hasbrouck once again moved out in 
search of the enemy. At his suggestion, Davis ordered the cavalry column 
out to locate the Indians and the artillery and infantry to be prepared 
h . f. h 38 to support t em 1n any 1g t. Hasbrouck believed that the most likely 
area to search for the Modocs' sign was in the hills west of Sorass Lake. 
His group, now on foot as their horses were worn out, moved on this area 
from the east. Major Mason with three batteries of artillery and three 
companies of the Twenty-First Infantry approached the same point from 
the west. The hope was of course that the Modocs would be caught in the 
middle. None of the troop connnanders knew yet that Jack's band had split 
into at least two different groups. 
Hasbrouck's hunch on the Modocs' location was right and the con-
verging columns found the enemy atop the sand butte. Mason's men could 
see Modoc sentinels moving around on the crest of the 400 foot escarp-
ment. Finding their prey had been comparatively easy, but attacking them 
in such a naturally strong position would not be so easy. Both Mason 
and Hasbrouck knew that any attack would be costly in terms of casualities. 
They also knew that they lacked sufficient force to surround the new for-
tress and cut off any escape. Lacking cannons which could sweep the 
ridge, the two commanders decided to wait for additional troops with 
which they could seal off the new bastion. 39 
The troops of Mason and Hasbrouck had established positions south, 
north, and east of the butte, They hoped that additional units from 
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Gillem's camp would close the circle by sealing off any western escape 
route. Unfortunately, the Modocs moved before the troops got into posi-
tion. As' Jack watched the blue-coated soldiers slowly circle the base 
of his hill, he undoubtedly knew that he did not have enough warriors 
to fight them. With the defection of part of his group, his fighting 
force was effectively cut in half. That night.he led his people through 
40 the open western approach to the buttes. Once again the Modocs had 
become elusive foes which had to be found before they could be fought. 
Mason was the first to suspect that the quarry had alluded the 
pursuers. The only way, to find out for sure was to send in a patrol. 
A group of twenty-six men led by First Lieutenant J.B. Hazelton of 
Hasbrouck's battery volunteered for the hazardous task. That so many 
men volunteered for what could have been certain death well illustrated 
the reverse in morale and espirit caused by the Battle of Sorass Lake. 
Late in the afternoon, the patrol returned with the disappointing news 
that the lava fields and sand buttes were devoid of life. 41 The foot 
soldiers packed up and returned to the main camp. Hasbrouck, two bat-
teries, his own and Captain Field's Battery A, plus a few Warm Springs 
Indians resumed their search for the enemy. On Thursday, he concluded 
that the enemy had fled to the mountains west of Tule Lake. 42 
Davis once again reorganized his small army in an effort to locate 
his adversary. Two cavalry commands were to scour the lava fields for 
signs of the enemy. If they made contact and needed assistance, the 
foot soldiers would march to their relief. The tireless Hasbrouck led 
one of the squadrons. 
On May 18, at the head of his own battery and two cavalry troops, 
Hasbrouck once again cut the Indians' trail. This time the prey was west 
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of Van Bremer's ranch. Following a trail down a valley, Hasbrouck placed 
two dismounted units on the ridges borde~ing the valley and one mounted 
unit in the valley itself. The hunters were able to flush their quarry 
and a. running skirmish of from seven .to eight miles followed. Al though 
the warriors evaded his net, Hasbrouck was able ·to capture five Modoc 
women and five children. 43 For the first time, Hasbrouck, and ultimately 
Davis, had positive evidence that Captain Jack's group of fugitives had 
split into two or more bands. The ten Modocs that Hasbroucks'men had 
captured belonged to one of the splintered factions. 44 
Directing Captain Jackson to move the captives to Van Bremer's ranch, 
Hasbrouck and the remaining men continued their scout. When their efforts 
proved futile, Hasbrouck returned his foot-weary troopers to Fairchild's 
ranch. Two days later, the. artillery captain remounted his men and pre-
pared to move out and comb the hills and valleys west of the Stronghold. 
Before he had left camp, Hasbrouck received a message that the 
Modoc men might surrender if they were promised that they would not be 
summarily shot. He reluctantly consented to letting some of the captive 
women go into the hills with the promise that any who surrendered would 
be treated as prisoners of war. The gamgle worked. In a few days, 
Hooker Jim's band, consisting of about twenty-five Indians surrendered 
at Fairchild's ranch. Hasbrouck's continuous pursuit had driven Jim's 
followers to exhaustion, desperation, and ultimately surrender. 45 
Within two weeks, Jack and most of the fugitive Modocs were in the 
hands of Davis' soldiers. The capture of the remaining Indians was fa-
cilitated by using captured Modocs to track their compatriots .. With 
Jack's capture, one of the most frustrating and costly Indian campaigns 
in the army's history ended. Less than one hundred Indians had checked 
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a force ten times their numbers and had inflicted casualities far out 
of proportion to those they had suffered. 
* * * 
The artillery's service did not end with the capture of the last of 
the fugitives. The five batteries performed most of the guard duties in 
camp even though the infantry and cavalry outnumbered them two to one. 
Guarding the Indians was a particularly difficult task as the camp was 
soon crowded with spectators and curiosity seekers who harrassed the 
soldiers and annoyed the Indians. Batteries B and E were part of the 
contingent which escorted the captives to Fort Klamath, where their 
destinies were decided~ 6 The rest of the batteries remained in the lava 
beds, turning in equipment and supplies. 
The most welcomed part of any campaign to the soldier was going home. 
Throckmorton and Fields were luckier than their companion corrnnanders in 
that they returned to their stations much sooner than the other units. 
In the interest of thrift, Miller's Battery E and part of the infantry 
battalion were ordered to return to their home posts, approximately 600 
·1 f 47 mi es, on oot. Battery B would be the last unit home as it had to 
await the outcome of a military conunission which was to try the Modoc 
leaders. 
Davis had wanted to exercise a little hemp justice in the case of 
Captain Jack and certain of his followers. The names of those who had 
participated in the murders of Canby and Reverend Thomas were well known. 
However, Davis' summary justice was halted by orders from Washington. 
Ultimately, it was decided that a military commission would try six of the 
Modoc leaders. Jack and five of his cohorts were charged with the vio-
lation of the rules of war in that they murdered Canby and Thomas under 
129 
a flag of truce. All six were subsequently found guilty. Jack and three 
others were hung, but two were spared because they had helped locate 
their hiding companions. 
The rest of the Modocs were to be sent to Indian Territory. Battery 
B was given the mission of escorting them at least part of the way. On 
October 29, 1873, Hasbrouck signed over his prisoners to the commander 
of Fort McPherson, Nebraska. With that act, the artillery's participa-
tion in the Modoc war ended. They were the last members of the expedition 
to return to their families and a somewhat welcomed dose of garrison 
monotony. 
An analysis of the role of the artillery in the Modoc war can be 
broken into two parts. First the weapons, mortars and howitzers, and 
their effectiveness can be examined. Second, the performance of the units 
and their leaders can be scrutinized. Because the ordnance was generally 
manned and served by trained artillerymen, the Modoc war is a useful 
point of comparison with other campaigns where cannons were absent or 
served by non-artillery soldiers. 
In his analysis of the Modocs' positions prior to the first battle 
for the Stronghold, Colonel Wheaton saw the need for cannon. Even if 
the cannons could not kill the enemy, they might at least keep their heads 
down while his soldiers crossed the rocky ground. Wheaton's estimates 
were riduculed by those whose experiences with other tribes convinced them 
cannons a waste of time. This inconsistent attitude toward the value of 
artillery against Indians again illustrated the lack of a fundamental 
approach to Indian warfare. As it turned out, the fog which enveloped 
the battlefield during much of the attack did render the cannons worth-
less in supporting the ground forces. 
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Whether the guns would have been of value had visibility been 
acceptable is certainly open to question. Wheaton noted that Lieuten-
ant William Miller had drilled his gun crews to a high state of pro-
f . . 48 ic1ency. Proficiency at drill, however, meant that the men under-
stood and could perform the sequence of operations necessary to fire 
the cannon. It was generally conceded that the average soldier could 
load, aim and fire his individual weapon. The problem was that he 
could not hit what he was aiming at due to a woeful lack of practice. 
In the artillery of the nineteenth century, an accurate range estima-
tion, a fundamental understanding of ballistics, and a basic knowledge 
of the weapon were intrinsic elements in accurate artillery fire. In 
addition, practice with the cannon, as with the rifle, sharpened and 
refined the crew's expertise. Miller's crews might have understood 
gun drill, but they did not understand the technical employment of 
the guns. The make-shift crews might have wrecked havoc on the enemy's 
gun pits, but they were just as likely to spread the same havoc among 
their own troops. The effectiveness of the howitzers in the first 
battle for the Stronghold is an undeterminable point. 
The repulse that Wheaton suffered at the hands of Jack and his 
followers convinced the army commander that he needed more artillery 
and more men. More important, Wheaton realized that he needed a differ-
ent type of artillery than the one he had. Unfortunately, Wheaton was 
relieved before he was able to correct the mistakes he had made. Colo-
nel Alvan Gillem fell heir to the additional weapons and soldiers that 
Wheaton had requested. The only difference between Gillem's basic stra-
tegy and Wheaton's was that the howitzers went to the eastern side of the 
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Stronghold. It is very possible that Gillem made this shift at the re-
commendation of Bernard. Bernard may have wanted the guns on his side 
of the battlefield to prevent any possibility of a shell overshooting 
the Stronghold and landing in his lap. This indicates that Bernard un-
derstood little about howitzers or their capabilities. 
In the course of the second battle for the Stronghold, both mortars 
and howitzers were used when maneuvering ceased. There was some mortar 
firing when Miller tried to turn the Modocs' southern flank and link up 
with Mason's entrenched troops. The principal purpose of the artillery 
weapons was to harass and hopefully kill a few of the Indians during the 
night as the troops rested. Gillen did not want his adversary to spend 
a comfortable night contemplating the following day's activities. There 
can be no doubt that Thomas' mortars did create consternation and some 
casualities among the Stronghold's defenders, which is something the 
infantry and cavalry rifles had failed to do. Jack's inability to pro-
tect his people from those shells which landed in his camp forced him to 
abandon the Stronghold. 
Gillem was convinced that the guns and mortars had prevented a great 
many unnecessary casualities. In this conclusion he was joined by other 
officers. Captain James Biddle told the Chronicle's reporter that good 
artillery practice actually dislodged the Indians.49 Gillem was pleased 
with the performance of the guns and included them in his plans for fu-
ture operations. That Thomas' patrol was sent out to find new artillery 
positions prepatory to new movements substantiates this conclusion. 
After the second battle for the Stronghold, the campaign became one 
of search and destroy. In this type of warfare, especially when the num-
ber of Indians was small, the utility of cannons and mortars depreciated. 
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Any opinions Davis had concerning the practicality of packing his mor-
tars and howitzers around the lava beds are not known. The artillery 
weapons could have been used to good effect had Jack remained atop the 
sand buttes after the Battle of Sorass Lake. After that point, the guns 
were generally of little value to the pursuit columns. The firepower 
of the pursuing forces, notwithstanding accuracy, was far greater than 
that of their adversaries. 
A comparison of the effectiveness of the two artillery weapons used 
during the campaign also can be made. Both weapons could be transported 
on pack animals. 50 As the first phase of the war saw very little move-
ment, this capability was of no value. However, subsequent deployment 
of the guns after the Indians had fled the Stronghold would have been 
impossible on anything other than pack animals. Tne terrain of the lava 
beds precluded draft teams pulling wheeled artillery. 
Both weapons were smooth-bore.51 They were therefore inconsistent 
in terms of accuracy. The rifling of a gun imparts a stabilizing spin 
to the projectile. With some compensation the rifled gun would hit what 
it was pointed at. The chances of that happening for the smooth-bore 
weapons were somewhat remote. Seldom would two howitzer or mortar shells 
land in the same general spot even if they were fired with the same ele-
vation and powder charge. When Miller attempted to turn the Modocs' 
flank, he came close to being hit by his own mortars., By the second day, 
Thomas' gunners certainly had the range of the Stronghold. Any inaccura-
cies in firing were probably due to the weapon rather than the men who 
aimed and fired it. 
The mountain howitzer and the Coehorn mortar possessed the same 
range capabilities. The Coehorn, with the maximum powder charge could 
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achieve a range of 1,200 yards. The howitzer's range was about 100 yards 
short of that distance. 52 Both shells were detonated with time fuzes. 
Both weapons fired shell exclusively during the campaign. The howitzer 
could fire solid shot and canister, but these rounds were inappropriate 
due to the nature of the target and the firing ranges. 
There were some significant differences. The howitzer fired a shell 
weighing twelve pounds. The mortal shell was twice as heavy.53 The 
howitzer varied its range by changing the amount of propelling powder or 
aitering the elevation of the tube. The mortar fired at a fixed eleva-
tion of forty-five degrees. The different ranges were acquired by ad-
justing the amount of powder. The major difference, and the one most 
:important in the lava beds, was one of trajectory. 
The mountain howitzer fired a shell with a comparatively flat tra-
jectory. It possessed more arch than the path of the rifled shell, but 
it still lacked significant curvature. To inflict casualities, the howit-
zer shell had to explode either directly over the target as an airburst, 
or on the ground near the target as a ground burst. Because the Modocs 
were generally behind rock barriers, ia rlfle pits, or in caves, the 
ground burst had little effect. Thus, the airburst was the only way to 
wound or kill the Indians. In this case, the fuze had to be set so that 
the shell exploded as it passed over the enemy. Because the trajectory 
was so flat, the margin of error for the fuze setting was extremely small. 
The random shot-pattern for the smooth-bore cannon coupled with the need 
for a_ precise fuze setting made any casualities by shell fire a matter 
of chance. 
By comparison, the mortar had a much higher trajectory. The steeper 
angle of descent for the shell increased the possibility of the round 
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landing in the rifle pits or in the cave which served as Jack's head-
quarters. Observers reported that this did in fact hqppen on several 
occasions. Consequently, even a ground burst from the mortar had the 
capability of injuring 'the Modocs. The ~urved trajectory made the fuze 
:;;etting less critical. The shell, due to its steep descent, was "over-
head" for a longer period of time. Even if the shell did not explode 
in the air, it could still be deadly, as shown by the deaths of the two 
Indians who tried to disassemble one. A twenty-four pound bomb bouncing 
around inside a cave was every bit as devastating as an airburst at the 
mouth of the cave. It is clear that Wheaton realized this when he wrote 
Canby that he could take the Stronghold with "a free use of mortar bat-
teries. 11-'>4 
There was one major disadvantage to the use of cannons and mortars 
against Jack's band. The fragments from an artillery shell did not re-
spect gender or age. Artillery is an area-fire weapon. Anyone in the 
vicinity of the shell when it explodes is subject to injury. Some of 
the deaths and injuries among the Modoc women and children were probably 
caused by shellfire. Because Indian women and children were with the 
warriors through the duration of the campaign, their lives were in jeo-
pardy every time a cannon or mortar shell crossed the sky destined for 
the Stronghold. 
One final point can be made concerning ordnance material in the Modoc 
war. Artillery could have played an even more effective role against the 
Indians. A rifled howitzer, firing a shell which would detonate on im-
pact with the ground,would have been far more damaging to those who sought 
refuge in Jack's lava bastion. The rifling would have increased accuracy. 
With some adjustments, the trajectory of the howitzer would have provided 
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some chance of placing a round in the caves or at least on the protected 
side of the rock fortifications. The point detonating shell would have 
eliminated the problem of fuze setting. 
Unfortunately, the army did not possess a weapon of this type. It 
did possess the technology to produce such a weapon. The 3-inch Ordnance 
gun, a rifled gun, had been in the army's inventory since 1861. It fired 
f a shell with a point detonating fuze. Because its tube could be elevated 
more than the mountain howitzer's, it could fire a shell with a somewhat 
curved path. The major drawback to the weapon was weight. It weighed 
too much to be packed on animals. Even if the Ordnance Department did 
not have a weapon suitable for Indian warfare, they had the technical 
ability to produce one. UnfortunatelY, the Ordnance Department's pre-
occupation with coastal guns prevented it from developing cannons which 
would be effective even in the lava beds. 
The second major point of analysis concerning the artillery in the 
Modoc war deals with the men who repeatedly charged the enemy's rifles 
and the officers who led them. In all probability, artillery units were 
dispatched to the lava beds because there were no other available infan-
try or cavalry units. A large number of troops were serving with George 
Crook in Arizona. Some troops were required to monitor the discontented 
tribes of the Pacific northwest. Others were maintaining order in far-
off Alaska. Major General John Schofield, who commanded the Military 
Division of the Pacific, simply did not have sufficient infantry and 
cavalry units to go around. When Canby requested reinforcements after 
the first clash with the Modocs, Schofield had to turn to the Fourth 
Artillery Regiment. 
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Indian fighting was a form of battle for which neither enlisted men 
nor officers had train~d. The accepted tactical doctrine called for the 
artillery to counter enemy artillery, destroy his massed infantry and 
cavalry columns, and reduce his fortifications. Indian fighting was a 
far cry from this war of massed armies. In that respect, the doctrine 
of the army as a whole did not include battle with an unconventional 
~ . enemy, although the army had been fighting the native Americans for more 
than one hundred years. The gap between the realities of war in the West 
and the accepted doctrine of the army was greatest for the artillery. 
Garrison drill in no way prepared the men for scrambling over volcanic 
rock under Modoc rifle fire. In spite of the absence of any formal or 
informal training, the batteries generally fought well in the lava beds. 
In the second battle for the Stronghold, the batteries constituted 
a major portion of the western forces. Captain Marcus Miller commanded 
all of the foot troops for the duration of the three~day battle. Miller's 
task was an extremely difficult one. He had to direct five different 
units over difficult ground under enemy fire. To add to the obvious 
problems, the troopers were not too enthusiastic about the whole affair. 
The general lack of officers in all of the units further complicated 
Miller's job. When Lieutenant Eagan was wounded during the battle, Miller 
~ assigned Green's only staff officer, Second Lieutenant Sidney Taylor, 
Fourth Artillery, to command the company. The following day, Lieutenant 
Wright twisted his ankle and Taylor took over Wright's company as well. 
Despite the enemy and the complications which dogged his footsteps, 
Miller was able to advance his five units. In this, he was more success-
ful than any troop commander in the campaign. 
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Miller's success was attributable to two things. First instead of 
advancing as a skirmish line, he moved his men in small groups. This 
kept casualities low. The second reason is that Miller personally led 
his men. He usually placed himself where there was the most danger. 
When part of his battery was cut off on the second day, Miller joined 
the isolate4 detachment. He was able to bring out sixteen of the seven-
teen beseiged soldiers. The soldiers responded to officers who showed 
no reluctance in sharing the same perils that they had to face. Miller 
certainly was that type of officer. 
When the Modocs fled the Stronghold and pursuit became the order 
of the day, another artillery officer came to the forefront--Captain 
Henry Hasbrouck. Colonel Davis probably selected Hasbrouck's battery 
as a pursuit unit because the commander and his men were fresh, both 
physically and mentally. Hasbrouck justified this confidence first at 
Sorass Lake and in the subsequent skirmish west of Van Bremer's ranch. 
The only questionable aspect of Hasbrouck's service was the fact that 
he split his forces at Sorass Lake. In' dividing his command in hostile 
country, he was courting disaster. His repulse of the Modoc attack 
tended to overshadow what could have been a serious tactical mistake. 
Despite this one error, Hasbrouck was Davis' most energetic com-
mander. His constant searching prevented the Modocs from reconsolidat-
ing their bands after the defeat at Sorass Lake. Always on the move, 
the Modocs did not have the time to rejoin or plan their next effort. 
One account suggested that Hasbrouck was the first man the Modocs wanted 
to see after they surrendered. 55 He had hunted them and defeat~d them 
when the two groups finally met. Few commanders in the Modoc campaign 
could make a similiar claim. 
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Of course, one battery actually served as artillery during part 
of the campaign. The gunners of Battery A, under the supervision of 
Thomas, Howe, and Cranston, did considerable damage to the enemy and 
their lava refuge. The mortar and howitzer shells inflicted as many 
casualities as the rifle bullets of the infantry and cavalry. Chapin's 
gunners on the eastern side of the Stronghold probably would have been 
more effective had Mason shown any desire to press an attack on the enemy. 
It was sad that Thomas and his men were never able to enjoy the 
laurels that their serv~ce had justly earned. The obliteration of Bat-
teries A and Kin the Thomas-Wright massacre was the only blemish on the 
record of the Fourth Artillery in the Modoc war. The flight of some of 
the men, following the infantry's rout, was cowardice. The fact that 
the artillerymen were unaccustomed to Indian fighting did not justify 
their desertion of their fellow soldiers and leaders. A considerable 
number of soldiers, however, chose to remain with Thomas and the other 
officers. It was a gallant, but fatal decision. 
The batteries of the Fourth did a connnendable job in the Modoc war. 
To say that they performed as well as the infantry and cavalry, in itself, 
is not much of a complim~nt. However, they served as well as units which 
had combat experience against Indians, and that is a compliment. They 
had performed a variety of duties, such as cannoneers, infantrymen, 
cavalrymen, and even prison guards. their roles were so dive-cse because 
there was no accepted place for them in Indian service. In fact, no ser-
vice, infantry, cavalry, or artillery, possessed a clear definition of 
its duties in battle against an unconventional enemy. Every canipaign 
was directed aecording to the percepcio~ of the major field commander. 
The different plans and actions of Wheaton, Gillem, and Davis support 
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this idea. 
When the batteries of the Fourth returned to their coastal garrisons, 
there were many stories to tell. The Fourth Artillery had acquired a 
small group of Indian fighters. The Modoc war was their baptism into 
the conflict between the Indian and the white man. The men of the Fourth 
spent most of their time scrambling over a rugged landscape against a 
Q 
small, fortified enemy. However, the next campaign for these soldiers 
would have few similarities to the war in the lava beds. 
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CHAPTER VII 
THE NEZ PERCE CAMPAIGN: THE ROAD 
TO THE CLEARWATER 
Merriwether Lewis and William Clark encountered many diverse Indian 
tribes on their trek to the Pacific Northwest in 1803. They found one 
1 group to be particularly congenial, proud, and dependable. These people 
,, 
were a Shaha~tin tribe known as the Nez Perce. From the time of the Lewis 
and Clark expedition to today, the American people and government have 
been a part of the Nez Pere~ world. For many years after the first con-
tact, relations between the races were good. The Nez Perce provided a 
receptive audience for white missionaries. As long as white settlements 
were few in number and small in size, there was little conflict over the 
land. However, the discovery of gold in northern Idaho altered this 
peaceful co-existence. Competition for land and friction between two 
cultures eventually turned friendship into enmity. Ultimately, the Nez 
... 
Perce and the whites went to war in 1877. 
" The Nez Perce war of 1877 was one of the most fascinating Indian 
campaigns in American history. 
/ 
Under excellent leadership, the Nez Perce 
warriors severely handled American soldiers on more than one occasion. 
When the army grew too large to defeat, the Indians led army columns 
fifteen hundred miles before being subdued. The tribe's flight captured 





As with the Modoc war several years prior, the Nez Perce campaign 
is of particular importance to this study. A major portion of the pur-
suing column of General Oliver Otis Howard was comprised of artillery. 
These units performed a variety of services during the conflict. They 
guarded supply camps, served as infantry and cavalry, and manned the 
cannon Howard included in his·expedition. This multifaceted participa-
tion was due to the inadequate manpower resources of the frontier army. 
The prominent role that artillery weapons played in this campaign, when 
compared to other wars in which they were absent, further illustrated 
the absence of even a tentative tactical doctrine of Indian war. Even 
within the Nez Pere~ story the effectiveness of artillery varied due to 
the dissimiliar attitudes toward cannons in battle against the American 
Indian. 
The fertile soils of the Columbia River Vallev were known to explor-
ers many years before the first caravan of farmers arrived from the 
agricultural east. For many whose farms had been exhausted after 
years of constant use, the Pacific Northwest and particularly the Willam-
ette Valley were there for the taking. By the late 1840s, white-topped 
wagons with milk cows in tow were common seasonal sights along the Oregon 
Trail. For many years this farming immigration posed little threat to 
" the Nez Perce. Many of the easterners passed through the valleys of the 
Salmon and Clearwater Rivers bound for the Willamette. 
"" The real threat to Nez Perce tenure in the mountain valleys came in 
the early 1860s with the discovery of gold. As with the Sioux on the 
Great Plains, the Nez Pere~ were cursed with the discovery of the yellow 
ore on their land. The news of the discovery unleashed a stampede of 
adventurers, miners, bandits, and others of equal social value. This 
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was a different kind of immigrati.on. The opportunists came to the Nez 
/' 
Perce lands to dig for the precious metal. They would leave only when 
the mountaius had been washed away, a panful at a time, in the clear 
streams and rivers. The Indians could relate to the farmers, for many 
of the Nez Pere~ had been converted to Christianity and the farmers were 
often kindred spirit. For the miners, however, the gospel was found in 
the words of the miners' court, and salvation was loaded rifle. The 
struggle for the land became intense. 2 
Religion, which had been a force of assimilation, turned into a 
source of suspicion and distrust. 
, 
The Nez Perce, in 1831, actually sought 
missionaries to teach them about the white man's god. Missionaries in 
the personages of Henry Spalding and Marcus Whitman answered the call. 3 
By the mid-1840s, the religious zeal of some of the Indians. had soured. 
Spalding and his colleagues insisted that their converts adopt a sedentary 
livelihood, specifically farming. Horse racing, gambling, and annual 
buffalo hunts didnotfit the eastern picture of Christian life. Although 
some Indians made the conversion, others rejected both agriculture and 
the white man's god. The Cayuse War of 1848 and the Whitman massacre 
were largely a reaction to the efforts of the missionaries. 4 
Throughout the period of growing tensions, the government tried to 
prevent any serious hostilities through the vehicle of the treaty. Sue-
cessive treaties maintained the peace, but they also reduced the extent 
; 
of the Nez Perce domain. By 1863, some of the bands, those called the 
~ 
Lower Nez Perce, were tired of giving away land. During the negiotations 
for a new treaty, these bands walked out of the council meeting rather 
than cede more land to the whites. But the government designated head 
chief, Chief Lawyer, signed the agreement. Ironically, the lands ceded to 
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, 
the government belonged to the Lower Nez Perce, now called the Non-Treaty 
~ 
Nez Perce~ while the lands of Lawyer and the Upper Nez Perce were includ-
ed in the new reservation. 5 The government's contention that the lower 
bands were bound by a treaty they did not sign w2s the chief irritant 
between the races. 
After thirteen years of arguing over the disputed land, the Secretary 
of the Interior formed a commission to settle the matter. Three eastern 
businessmen and two army officers met with the recalcitrant bands in the 
fall of 1876. Chief Joseph and his brother, Ollokot, represented the 
bands who were still living on the disputed lands. In the course of the 
meetings, General Howard, who commanded the Department of the Columbia, 
generally sided with the Indians. The other military member of the com-
. , 
mission, Major H. Clay Woods also supported tne Nez Perce position. Wood 
~ 
had studied the matter thoroughly and determined that the government was 
wrong. 6 Despite Wood's findings, the commission decided that the non-
treaty bands had to leave their lands and move to the reservation. A re-
7 fusal would justify the use of force by the government. 
The following spring, Joseph and other leaders of the lower bands 
tried to change the decision of the commission. In a council with General 
Howard, they again maintained their just title to the land. Howard re-
versed his previous position and insisted that they move to the existing 
reservation. His patience with the non-Christian, non-treaty Indians was 
exhausted. 8 Faced with the alternative of war, the chiefs finally yielded 
to Howard's demands. Although Howard could have been magnaminous in 
allowing ample time to complete their move, he gave Joseph and the others 
only thirty days to reach the Lapwai reservation. 9 The rain swollen rivers 
of the region made this a virtually impossible task. 
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· The news of their pending move to the Lapwai agency brought sorrow, 
anxiety, and much bitterness to the camps of the non-treaty bands. Their 
land had been taken, and they had suffered legally and even physically 
at the hands of the whites. Despite this, they had resisted the urge for 
retaliation. For some young men, the move could not be made until cer-
. h. h d b . h d f . . . . . h 0 h . 1 d d d lO tain w ites a een punis e or past inJustices, w ic inc u e mur er. 
As the Indians prepared to move their villages, a few young warriors set 
out to dispense Indian justice where the white man's justice had failed. 
The murders they committed prompted the initial outbreak. The Indians 
fearing retaliation by the whites decided to flee. 
At noon on June 15, 1877, Howard received word of the first killings. 
He was at Fort Lapwai where he was waiting for the non-treaty Indians to 
come in. The news of the outbreak came in the form of two urgent pleas 
for help from the settlement of Mt. Idaho, sixty miles from the fort. 
The general immediately dispatched two troops of the First Cavalry, under 
Captain David Perry, to relieve the beseiged town. Perry and about one 
hundred men left the fort that evening. As he departed, Howard cautioned 
him against "getting whipped." Perry replied that there was no chance 
f h h . 11 o t at appening. .. 
While Perry's troopers were preparing for their trek, Howard notified 
/ 
his superior, Maj or General Irwin McDowell, that the Nez Perce were com-
mitting depredations. He added that Perry was being dispatched to the 
troubled area. Howard also alerted his own headquarters at Portland of 
12 the conditions in western Idaho. In the first messages to McDowell, 
Howard appeared confident that two troops of cavalry were sufficient to 
put down the small uprising. There was no request for additional troops 
or anything else which might indicate a protracted campaign. 13 
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Leaving Fort Lapwai at dusk, Perry and his command rode most of the 
night. At dawn the two troops halted about twenty miles from the Mt. 
Idaho community. After a brief rest, the soldiers, many of whom were 
recruits, were back in the saddle. By sundown the exhausted cavalry 
reached Grangerville in west central Idaho. Fearing the Indians might 
flee beyond the Salmon River, Perry pushed his worn-out animals and men 
on to the rim of White Bird Canyon. There the command practically col-
lapsed. A few hours later at dawn, Perry led his physically drained 
. h 14 troopers into t e canyon. 
Perry's unsuspecting soldiers rode into a hasty but effective Nez 
~ 
Perce ambush. A group of mounted warriors barred access to the village 
located further down the canyon. Other groups were posed on the flanks 
of the soldiers. Within minutes Perry was subjected to accurate and 
deadly fire from three sides. With his trumpeter among the first casuali-
ties, Perry had to rely on his voice and hand signals to deploy his scat-
tered command in the confusion of battle. 
When the firing began Perry tried to order the rear troop forward to 
form a skirmish line with his own unit. A group of volunteers who had 
joined Perry's column rode off to the left of Perry's men to gain a low 
ridge. Unable to consolidate his units, Perry found his position becoming 
desperate. Mounted warriors were able to ride beyond his flanks and fire 
on his men from behind. When the volunteers were unable to hold their 
ridge, Nez Perce'riflemen seized it and poured fire into the soldiers' 
ranks. Under a storm of bullets, many of the green recruits broke ranks 
and fled the battlefield. 
Perry began a slow retreat with his remaining men. The pressure of 
the advancing Indians converted this retreat into a mad, confusing stampede. 
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Ultimately, five troops of the First Cavalry would also join Howard's 
expedition against the malcontents. Other units were being directed to 
Boise City. Under the command of Major John Green, these troops were to 
intercept any movement of the Nez Perce toward the south. 
Howard di<i'not hesitate to include artillery weapons in his initial 
call for support. He directed his adjutant to request four mountain 
howitzers, and two 6-pounders, complete for field duty with plenty of 
ammunition. Later that day, Major Woods notified McDowell's headquarters 
that one field gun, one howitzer, and two gatling guns had been ordered 
from Vancouver Arsenal. Howard asked McDowell to equip the Boise troops 
with the lightest artillery or mortars. This request apparently miffed 
McDowell. In his reply two days later he said, "What artillery?" Ap-
parently all the ordnance from Benicia Arsenal, California, was dispat-
ched to Oregon. McDowell relented somewhat and said that he would in-
20 
quire as to the availability of mortars. 
It is clear from these and other messages that Howard was operating 
under two, ultimately mistaken, assumptions. First he expected the In-
dians to fortify themselves in the mountains, ala Modoc. He told Perry 
via courier: 
He (Joseph) expects to make his final stand about the mouth of 
Salmon between the Salmon and the Snake in some bluffs there 
and some narrow ravines and steep trails. Artillery alone will 
help us out of this.21 
To keep Joseph from leaving his current position and reaching this "st-
ronghold," Howard intended to reinforce Perry with two infantry companies, 
1 d h d . h . 22 a cava ry etac ment an a mountain owitzer. 
Howard's second misconception was that the campaign would be brief 
and not too difficult. He informed his headquarters that, we "shall col-
lect enough force to make sure work before pushing final Indian position." 
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Perry, Lieutenant William Parnell, and a handful of men fought a stubborn 
rear guard action for more than ten miles. The shattered command, in a 
dozen driblets, finally reconsolidated itself at Grangerville. 15 Dead 
and wounded troopers littered the trail from White Bird Canyon. 
Later tgat day, Howard received the news of the rout of Perry's com-
mand. A force of about seventy warriors had devastated the cavalry 
troops, killing more than one third and chasing the others thirteen -· 
·1 16 mi es. The news of the defeat was sent to McDowell on the following 
" day, and he notified Sherman on the nineteenth. 17 Corraling the Nez Perce 
would take more than two troops filled with green recruits. The outbreak 
was not a full-blown war. 
In Portland, Howard's headquarters began alerting units for move-
ment to Fort Lapwai. There were some troops already moving toward the 
northwest Pacific coast from Alaska. By 1877, the United States govern-
ment had decided to withdraw its military forces from Alaska. The ter-
ritory had been under occupation since its acquisition from Russia in 
1867. Sparce population and the lack of significant hostilities in the 
region convinced Washington that the troops there would be better used 
elsewhere. By June 16, the steamer California was enroute south with 
three batteries of the Fourth Artillery. Veterans of the Modoc war, 
Batteries A, G, and M, were redirected to Howard's temporary headquarters 
. 18 
at Lapwai. 
The Alaskan troops were only part of the force being directed to 
western Idaho. Captain Marcus P. Miller's Battery E, Fourth Artillery, 
from Fort Stevens, Oregon, and Captain George B. Rodney's Battery D from 
Fort Canby, Washington, were also dispatched to Howard. Three companies, 
19 B, E, and K, of the Twenty-First Infantry, were enroute from Wallula. 
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He told McDowell that he intended to make. short work of the Nez Perce. 
" 
Since the Nez Perce were not particularly known as fighters, Howard was 
confident that ae could subdue them with the appropriate number of troops 
and cannons. 
Howard failed.to understand that the Nez Perce" were not,the Modocs. 
The non-treaty bands possessed vast pony herds which they used on their 
i annual buffalo hunts to the plains. Their range of movement and mobility 
was more like the Sioux than the Modocs. Lacking experience in fighting 
Indians, Howard assembled a force appropriate for the type of war he was 
accustomed to-- a conventional war. The inclusion of foot troops in his 
plans fully illu'strated that Howard had no conception of the Nez Perce"s' 
ability to move. 
Irrespective of h±s optimistic predictions, Howard .was massing a 
considerable force for the coming campaign. McDowell reported to Sherman 
that the Nez Perce expedition would total 960 men. This included 617 
cavalrymen in ten troops, 177 infantrymen in six companies, and five 
. 24 
batteries totalling 166 men. Two other units, a cavalry troop and 
Hasbrouck's Light Battery B of the Fourth, were being alerted for move-
ment should Howard require them. 
Due to inadequate transportation, the process of amassing these units 
was agonizingly slow. Howard could not afford to await the arrival of 
all the units before moving to the rescue of Perry. At noon on June 22, 
Howard and those troops which had arrived at Fort Lapwai departed the 
·. post for Perry's battlefield. This contingent consisted of one battery 
of artillery, two cavalry troops, and five infantry companies. Howard's 
ordnance included a "mountain howitzer, old and worn, but 'fixed up'for 
25 the occasion" and two gatling guns. These troops actually constituted 
152 
the relief force Howard told McDowell he was sending to Perry four days 
earlier. 
In direct command of the troops was Captain Marcus P. Miller of the 
Fourth Artillery. Howard described him as "a graduate of West Point, 
class of 1856." He had "served with distinction" in the Rebellion and 
had "heightened his reputation by his brave work in the Modoc War." The 
artillery captain was of "middling. height, well knit for toughness, light 
beard and lightish hair- handsome forehead, somewhat arched, blue eyes 
and a pleasant speaking face." He was an officer "who takes a sincere 
pleasure in loyal duty. 11 26 
Although Howard's public statements indicated confidence, he warned 
Miller "to take special pains to guard against any surprise and to be 
particularly careful in approaching or passing the narrow ravines and 
steep trails. 11 27 Even though Howard expectted a quick campaign, he did 
not intend to fall into the same trap as Perry had. Perry's debacle 
and Howard's imprecise understanding of the earlier Modoc war created 
an unwarranted concern about exposing his men. 
The march to White Bird's Canyon and nearby Mt. Idaho was unevent-
ful. Howard, riding far in advance of his men, reached the settlement 
first. On June 24, at a burned out ranch later called Cottonwood House, 
Perry reported to the general. He related the specifics of the battle 
which destroyed his command and told Howard that the Indians were still 
in the area of the canyon. After Perry's report, Howard decided to re-
connoiter the canyon before crossing th~ Salmon River. This would give 
him an opportunaty to recover the bodies of Perry's fallen soldiers. 
Under Miller's immediate supervision, the small column reached the rim 
of the canyon on June 26. Heavy and continuous rains had made the march 
153 
almost impossible, but the units arrived ;,;ith e:iough daylight left to 
begin their search of the battlefield. 
Miller's foot troops searched the ground for the fallen soldiers 
while Howard and Perry watched from a nearby ridge. At the head of the 
,;1 
trail leading into the canyon, Captain Stephen Whipple stood watch wit~ 
.,, 
I 
his. cavalry troop and the three artillery pieces. With the enemy stil~·, 
i in the vicinity, Miller took the precaution of keepin?. skirmishers and , 
flankers out to avoid another ambush.28 The search parties were able 
to locate seventeen b.:>dies on the first day. Exposed to the elements 
I 
for ten days, the bodies were in an advanced stage of decomposition. 1 
Hasty graves were dug for those found, and by afternoon ':he grisly task 
' '. was abandoned. The search for the missing men was resumed the following , 
day with the results that most of the army 1 s .dead were located and given 'ii 
.\ 
at least a rudimentary burial. t 
While Miller's burial details were interring their fallen comrades, i\l 
I• 
I 
the Alaskan troops arrived in Howard's camp. The soldiers, under the 
command of Captain Charles B. Throckmorton, had taken more than three 
days to reach Howard from Fort Lapwai. They were delayed by the same 
weather which had made Howard's march so difficult. Howard was extreme-
ly upset that the new units had not joined his column earlier, and prompt-
i' j ly relieved Throckmorton of the command. The Alaskan contingent was 
added to Miller's command.29 
The fairness of Howard's action was doubtful. Throckmorton had 
taken slightly more time getting to the battlefield than had Howard. 
The Alaskan troops, fresh from garrison duty in an often inhospitable 
climate, were probably unused to marching fifteen miles a day or more. 
The torrential rains and the damnable mud did not make the journey any 
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easier. It was ironical, in light of subsequent events, that Howard 
relieved Throckmorton for moving too slow. 
His reconnaissance completed, Howard issued orders for crossing the 
Salmon River. Miller, in charge of all the foot troops, was instructed 
to secure the right bank of the river with skirmishers. He was also to 
position the artillery to cover the crossing. The cavalry would screen 
the movement and hopefully deceive the enemy.30 These directions had 
the distinct flavor of the Civil War. Indians rarely contested river 
crossings, choosing to outrun their adversaries rather than face them 
in a pitch battle. The American cavalry was seldom able to deceive the 
Indians about anything, especially the location and movement of troops. 
Clearly, Howard did not understand his opponent. 
While his men were arduously moving across the Salmon, Howard made 
one of the most serious blunders of the campaign. He ordered Captain 
Whipple to take his cavalry and a group of volunteers to the camp of 
Chief Looking Glass. The general suspected that Looking Glass, a non-
treaty chief, was aiding the fugitive bands. Whipple was ordered to 
arrest the chief and his people and take them to Grangerville. 
On the morning of July 1, the cavalrymen were ready to execute 
their orders. An initial attempt at talking the Indians into surrender-
ing evaporated when the citizens fired on the Indian village. After a 
brief skirmish, the Nez Perce fled, and theJr abandoned camp was burned 
by the soldiers.31 Whipple did not pursue the Indians, but chose to 
move his soldiers and citizens into camp at the nearby Cottonwood House. 
Looking Glass' warriors were not long in revenging the unprovoked assault 
on their people. Three days after the attack, they ambushed a detach-
ment of ten men from Whipple's troop and wiped them out.32 
155 
The army now had suffered two considerable setbacks. By compa:ri'ison, 
the forces o~ their adversary were not only intact, but now reinforced 
by Looking Glass' braves. There was growing talk that Howard was not 
equal to the task which had been assigned to him. So far he had failed 
te catch the fugitive Indians. McDowell, feeling that more troops might 
help his plodding subordinate,stripped his department of troops. He was 
able to dispatch three additional batteries, B, C, and L, and two infan-
try companies to Idaho.33 
By July 10, Howard had crossed the Clearwater River. With his 
scattered units now consolidated once again, Howard intended to move 
/ 
north along the Clearwater in hopes of locating the Nez Perce trail. 
It was possible that he could catch the Indians between his forces on 
the east bank of the river and a group of volunteers on the west side. 
He knew that Joseph and the other chiefs had brought their followers to 
this area, but Howard did not know exactly where the Indians were. 
From a camp on the south fork of the Clearwater, Howard's troops 
marched north on the morning of July 11. Captain Joel Trimble's cavalry 
troop was in the advance. Four batteries of the artillery,formed into 
a battalion under Miller, followed the cavalry. A pack train was next 
in the column while the infantry units brought the rear. Two howitzers 
served by crews from Battery E and two gatling guns with cavalry crews 
constituted the ordnance of the column.34 
After a five hour march the column halted. Trimble had seen Indian 
herders hurrying toward the river valley several hundred yards to the 
west. Riding to the bluffs of the river, Trimble saw the Nez Perce' camp 
in the valley below. Howard immediately ordered Miller to send the 
howitzers to a nearby bluff and fire on the camp. The shells from the 
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cannons fell short and only succeeded in alerting the Nez Perce to the 
presence of their pursuers.35 Like countless battles in the military 
history of man, two adversaries had joined battle on ground neither had 
chosen. 
Both sides. raced to gain the first advantage. The in:P;antry troops 
in the rear of the column and nearest the village immediately deployed 
as skirmishers. Rushing to the bluffs, they intended to descend to the 
river, cross it, and then attack the camp. Miller dispatched two of his 
batteries to reinforce the infantry's advance. One battery was designa-
ted to guard the pack train while the remaining unit held the line of 
march.36 
On the west bank of the river, the exploding shells created instant 
pandemonium. As women and children scurried for cover, the warriors 
stripped for battle, and grabbed rifles and ammunition belts. A group 
of about twenty crossed the river and scaled the steep bluffs. They were 
able to prevent the infantry from descending the bluffs and attacking 
the camp. Other groups of Indians also crossed the Clearwater and took 
up positions in ravines north· and south of the in~antry. Some mounted 
braves were able to circle the entire column and attack the pack train.37 
Seeing his forces flanked, Howard withdrew his howitzers to positions 
further south. He ordered Miller's batteries to protect the infantry's 
flanks and finally dismounted his cavalry. Howard began to bend his 
lines to keep the Nez Perce"from flanking him completely and attacking 
from the rear. Ultimately his battle line conformed to an ellipse with 
a slight oppening in the rear. Rodney's Battery D and Trimble's cavalry 
troop were able to defend the pack train until it could be moved into 




packers and capture a pack mule carrying shells for the howitzer. 38 
Amidst whizzing bullets and roaring cannons, units had to be repeatedly 
shifted to meet the movements of the Indians. 
Looking across the generally flat ground they occupied, Miller saw 
that the howitzers were in danger of being overrun. He quickly sent 
eleven men, under Lieutenant Charles Humphrey,to support the endangered 
cannons. Humphrey and his had to sprint 700 yards across open ground 
to reach the guns. 39 His small band made to the howitzers without suf-
fering a single casuality. Humphrey found that Lieutenant Harrison Otis, 
the battery commander, had returned to the pack train for more shells, 
having only canister. In his absence the infantry had withdrawn leaving 
the gun crew in an extremely exposed and dangerous position. Hauling the 
guns to the rear, Humphrey opened fire with canister on Indians who were 
firing from a deep ravine on their right flank. The canister decreased 
the fusilade of bullets coming from that location. 
Humphrey then reformed the available infantry and artillery to sup-
port the guns. Otis returned with a supply of shell and case shot and 
began shelling the Nez Perce riflemen. 4o Despite the cannonade, the 
Indians continued to press the guns. At one point, due to the intense 
enemy fire, Otis and his men had to load from under the guns. On one 
occasion, Private William S. Lcl1oy pulled the lanyard and blasted some 
Indians only forty feet from the muzzle. Undoubtedly, the sharpest 
fighting of the first day was on the southern flank where the cannons 
held the line. 
Tactica±ly, that part of the battlefield was no more important to 
either side than any other part of Howard's position. The intense Indian 
activity on the south shows that they considered Howard's cannon dangerous 
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and something which had to be silenced at all cost,. 
The position Howard chose to defend was a comparatively flat area 
bordered on the north and south by ravines, on the west by the river 
bluffs, and on the· east by gently rolling plains. The Nez Perce in the 
timbered ravines could easily rake the soldiers whose only concealment 
or cover was tall grass. Most of the army's casualities occurred under 
i:l 
t these conditions. Captain Eugene Bancroft, commanding Battery A, receiv-
ed a serious chest wound when he rose momentarily.to survey the battle-
field.42 Later Bancroft wrote his father that more had happened to him 
in the four weeks since he had left Alaska than in the entire four years 
of the Civil War.43 
Knowing that the pressure of the enemyrs fire must be relieved, 
Miller gathered every available soldier and charged the enemy's emplace-
ments. A reporter for the New York Herald described Miller's actions. 
While in this condition, with a few soldiers killed and several 
wounded, the hero of the battle showed himself in the person of 
Colonel Miller of the Fourth Artillery. It was this officer 
who ordered and conducted the first charge. being himself fore-
most in the line • . . The words Colonel Miller used were these: 
'Men, get up and go for them; if we don't do something they will 
kill us all.' At this every man in that part of the line 44 
sprang to his feet and all made one impetuous irrestible charge. 
A short time after the charge, the Indians counterattacked. Fortunately, 
Miller's hasty assault had given the soldiers time to entrench. Using 
their bayonets, the men were able to gain some shelter from the deadly 
fire of the Nez Perce". 45 As darkness approached, both sides ceased ma-
neuvering for new positions. When darkness came, the firing tapered off. 
It had been a grueling day for Howard's troops. The rains which had 
plagued the march to the Clearwater had given way to a blistering sun. 
The temperature on the treeless plateau exceeded one hundred degrees during 
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the height of the battle. Without water for most of the day, the troops 
suffered throughout the night. Some endured more than thirst. In 
Miller's battalion alone, six men were wounded while three had been 
killed. One man was listed as missing in action. He had gone for water 
and had failed to return.46 
During the battle of July 11, 1877, the Nez Perce/had fought the 
army to a standstill. Instead of the hit and run tactics whicµ typified 
Indian warfare, the warriors stood the charges of the troops and even 
counterattacked despite being outnumbered. The Nez Perce" fighting force 
numbered about 250 while Howard directed more than 400 men in the bat-
tle. 47 The Indians had made excellent use of the terrain to check the 
movements of the soldiers. What was even more significant was that when 
the sun rose on the next day, the Indians were still there and ready for 
another day's battle. 
Howard's first and most critical task on that second morning was to 
get water for his parched conunand. When Miller called his attention to 
a spring at the mouth of one of the ravines, the general ordered its 
capture. Rodney's battery and Perry's cavalry were assigned the task. 
Covered by Otis's howitzers, the mixed force secured the water hole with-
out resistance. 48 By 11:00.a.m. most of the men had been given at least 
a cursory breakfast and some coffee. The prospects for the rest of the 
day, in spite of the supply of water, did not seem promising. A second 
day of incessant skirmishing and sniping appeared probable. 
At this point, Miller approached Howard with a plan. He knew that 
continued skirmishing would only lead to a growing list of casualities. 
The artillery captain asked Howard for permission to lead a battalion-
strength movement on the enemy's flank. 49 The idea was to swing around 
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the left of the howitzers and attack the Indians' right flank. If suc-
cessful, the artillery batteries would be able to move on down the south-
ern ravine to the river. Howard approved and the attack was scheduled 
for the late afternoon. 
Massing the artillery batteries required their withdraw! from the 
skirmish line. Much of the early afternoon was spent moving the bat-
teries to the area of Howard's headquarters and redistributing the cavalry 
and infantry units to cover the gaps. It was a daring plan. If the 
Nez Perce attacked while the outer lines were so thin, they could roll 
up Howard's entire command. By 4:00 p.m. the shifting and adjusting was 
completed. Miller and his battalion were ready to go. 
At this moment a cloud of dust to the south served notice that others 
were approaching the battlefield.SO In time, it was decided that the dust 
belonged to Captain James Jackson's First Cavalry troop which was escor-
ting a large pack train. The cavalrymen were in considerable danger as 
the Indians had also seen the dust and were moving to intercept the pack 
train. Howard ordered Miller to take his battalion and bring the train 
safely into camp. With Batteries A, D, and G, Miller covered the three 
miles to Jackson's column before the Nez Pere/ could strike the small 
cavalry contingent. The artillerymen then screened the train as it slow-
ly moved to the safety of Howard's lines. When the cavalry passed through 
the entrenched troops, Miller realized that his battalion was on the 
enemy's flank. He wheeled his batteries into a battle line and charged.SI 
The warriors were surprised by the sudden assault on their flanks. 
They apparently thought that Miller's units would return to their ori-
ginal position at the center of the circle of troopers. Instead, a blue 
line of soldiers was scrambling toward them yelling and firing. Supported 
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by a gatling gun and a howitzer, Miller's units virtually merged with 
the Indians. The shooting was almost point blank. Miller, who had s.er-
ved with Sheridan's cavalry in the Civil War and in the lava beds, said 
that he had never seen such severe close skirmish fighting. 52 Ironical-
ly, only one· soldier fell in the inad rush on the Indian positions. The 
braves wavered and then broke. 
When the infantry and cavalry saw the enemy break, they unleashed 
their own charge on the fleeing Indians. The warriors were subjected 
to a withering fire from the gatlings and cannons as. they fled down 
the ravine. 53 The battle quickly degenerated into a foot race for the 
river below. At times Miller's men were so close to the enemy that they 
ran into their own cannon fire. Sensing victory, the men sprinted after 
the Indians. At one point, they requested a charge on a nearby ridge 
held by a few Indians. 54 • When it was approved, the screaming artillery-
men stormed the ridge. The defenders joined the other Indians who were 
trying to beat the soldiers to the river. 
When the batteries reached the water's edge, they clamored for per-
mission to cross and attack the Indian's village. Lieutenant Humphrey, 
who had taken over Battery A from the wounded Bancroft, held his men in 
check. He wanted specific orders from Miller before trying to ford the 
i river. 55 Humphrey never received that permission. The cavalry was se-
lected to pursue the fleeing enemy. 
Unfortunately, the cavalrymen could not fulfill the assignment. 
Their horses, worn and without water for twenty-four hours, lacked the 
strength for a vigorous chase. In addition, precious minutes were wasted 
as the troopers, who had fought on foot, rounded up their mounts. By the 
; 
time Perry crossed his cavalry, most of the Nez Perce were gone. Once 
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in the Indian camp, the cavalry commander halted his men instead of tak-
ing up the chase of the still disorganized Indians. Undoubtedly, Perry's 
memories of his confident march into White Bird Canyon caused him to pro-
ceed with more than a measure of caution. Frustrated at the hesitating 
movements of his cavalry~ Howard called off the pursuit. The cavalry 
was ordered to return and begin ferrying the other units across the· 
J river ,56 
By 7:30 that evening, Howard's tired army was on the western bank 
of the Clearwater.57 At this point, Howard still had enough'daylight to 
continue after the Indians. He might have gotten close enough to the 
/ 
Nez Perce to attack them the following morning. However, he chose to 
bivouac amid the ruins of the hastily abandoned camp. 
The two day engagement on the Clearwater! marked the turning point of 
the Nez Perce' campaign. 
,,, 
Heretofore, the Nez Perce had bested the soldiers 
thrown against them. They had mauled Perry's troops at White Bird Can-
yon and inflicted grievous casualities on the soldiers and volunteers 
at Cottonwood House. However, the warriors could not stand against the 
sustained charges and the cannonade of Howard's small army. Over confi-
dent due to their earlier victories, the Nez Pere/narrowly averted the 
capture of their camp. By the morning of the second day, the Indian camp 
ij had not prepared for movement. When Miller's three batteries fractured 
the Indians' line, the women and children fled leaving much behind. 
The Clearwater action also changed the nature of the campaign. Be-
fore the fight, the Indian fighting men never hesitated to give battle. 
Because of their large pony herds, they could have put many miles between 
them and the slow-moving soldiers. Instead, they stayed in the general 
vicinity of the Salmon and Clearwater Rivers for almost two weeks. After 
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the battle, Joseph, Looking Glass, and the other chiefs began their peo-
ple on a trek to the buffalo plains east of the mountains. Their object 
became survival and escape, not victory.58 Never again would Howard be 
able to deploy his entire comniand against the fugitive Nez ~erct. The 
subsequent battles were instances where other forces caught the fleeing 
Indians momentarialy off-guard. 
' 
The two-day engagement corrected at least one misconception on 
Howard's part. The tenacity of the Indians and their willingness to 
fight surprised him. Originally, he expected a short,simple campaign. 
The reverses which Perry and Whipple suffered apparently did not impress 
him. His losses at the Clearwater, eleven killed and twenty-threewound-
ed,. clearly indicated tlhat the subjugation of the non-treaty bands would 
not be easy. Howard had to hedge on his eari'ier remark to "make short 
work" of the hostiles. After the battle, he wrote McDowell that he would 
"push him (Joseph) a little further on this line, either to defeat him 
utterly or to secure the country against his return. 1159 
Howard's mountain howitzers played a very important role in the 
victory on the Clearwater River. The guns opened the affray when they 
fired on the enemy camp from the eastern bluffs. The fact that the shells 
fell short can be attributed to Howard. He personally selected their 
firing positions.60 The stubby little cannons simply could not reach 
the Nez Perce' village. 
t 
However, the guns became more effective as the battle progressed. 
After the first cannonade, Otis shifted his pieces further south and was 
able to range the lodges on the western bank of the river. He was also 
./ 
able to provide defensive fire when the Nez Perce warriors began flanking 
Howard's troops. Canister from the guns kept the Indians from breaching 
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the exposed lines of the southern flank. Quick action on t1lf part of 
the gunners prevented Howard's own command post from being overrun. 
In a short time, the guns became the focal point for the warriors' 
offensive efforts. The cannons could slay the Indians and destroy their 
camp far quicker than the rifles of the soldiers. The Indians' respect 
for the power of the guns can be seen in the'ir concerted efforts to take 
or at least silence the cannons. Those who manned the pieces came in for 
more than their share of Nez Perc/'bullets. Two of the three artillery-
men killed on the first day were serving the guns. Batteries E and A, 
the units either serving the guns or protecting a flank, claimed all of 
the casualities except one. 
The importance of the cannons was simply that they equalized the 
killing power of the two sides. The average soldier was a notoriously 
poor marksman. Lacking practice, he often hit his target only by accident. 
That criticism could not be made of the Nez Perce"': The warriors could 
perforate anything which was exposed to their fire. Cannon fire, in its 
explosive force and fragmentation,madeup for the inaccuracies of the 
individual soldier. With canister and exploding shell, getting close 
to the target was good enough. 
A weapon, be it a rifle or a cannon, is only as good as the men us-
ing it. The potency of the small mountain guns was dependent on the 
crews. The gun crews comprised of artillerymen knew how to use their 
weapon to good advantage. Artillerymen traditionally have an affinity 
for the guns they take into battle. That bond precluded deserting the 
guns. When Humphrey dashed across the battlefield to support the southern 
flank, he found that the infantry had withdrawn in the face of intense 
fire. The cannoneers, however, were still with their exposed gun. By 
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comparison, a cavalry crew abandoned their gatling gun when the Indians 
counter-attacked late on the first day. Humphrey and his versatile band 
of men assumed the mission of pulling the deserted gun to the rear. 
The large majority of artillerymen fought as infantry during the 
two day battle. Their contribution to the ultimate victory was no less 
important than their brethren on the guns. Through most of the first 
day, they and some infantry held the southern portion of Howard's posi-
tion. This was the hottest part of the battlefield in terms of flying 
bullets. The major contribution of the artillery battalion, however, 
came on the second day of battle. 
It must be remembered that Howard chose Miller's battalion to make 
the crucial charge on the enemy's flank, not the cavalry or the infantry. 
In spite of the accuracy and volume of enemy fire, the men made a spiri-
ted assault on the Indian positions. There was no reference in any 
official or unofficial report which suggests that the men held back 
or refused to advance. It should also be credited to the soldiers of 
the batteries that they made their attack,after rescuing Jackson's pack 
train, without readjusting their line. There was certainly no repetition 
of the disaster which befell Captain Evan Thomas' command four years 
earlier in the lava beds. At the Clearwater, the men performed admir-
ably and on two occasions even sought further battle with the enemy. 
A large measure of the soldiers' performance can be explained by 
the fact that they were well led. As with the Modoc war, Captain Marcus 
Miller displayed the talents of an excellent combat commander. His quick 
action on the afternoon of the eleventh probably averted a collapse on 
the southern portion of the army's line. His charge later that after-
noon gained enough time for the men to entrench. Miller's attack on the 
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twelfth was the best tactical maneuver of the battle and possibly the 
campaign. Miller certainly benefitted from having capable subordinate 
commanders. 
Captain Rodney and his battery, along with Trimble's troop: kept 
Howard's supply train from falling into the hands of the Indians. Bat-
tery D, again in conjunction with cavalry, captured the important water 
springs on ·the morning of the twelfth. During the artillery battalion's 
charge that afternoon, Rodney and his men outflanked some warriors try-
ing to get behind Miller's advancing line. 
Lieutenant Charles Humphrey was certainly one of the brightest stars 
of the Clearwater fight. He connnanded Miller's Battery E while Miller 
directed the battalion. His timely support of Otis' howitzers probably 
saved them from being captured by the Indians. He volunteered to go for-
ward and bring back the gatling gun which the cavalry had deserted. His 
determination and leadership on July 11 earned him the Congressional 
Medal of Honor. 
Second Lieutenant Harrison G. Otis, the young officer who directed 
the guns, exhibited remarkable fortitude during the battle. His cannon-
eers might not have withstood the Indians' fire had Otis wavered. Miller 
remarked that Otis endured more personal danger than any other man in 
the command. Otis' behavior might have surprised those who considered 
him a green lieutenant. The fact was that Otis was a veteran of the 
Sioux war. He was with Colonel Ranald Mackenzie's Fourth Cavalry in the 
attack on Dull Knife's camp on Powder River. 61 
This analysis of the artillery's participation is not meant to 
depreciate the actions of the infantry and cavalry during the Clearwater 
fight. Miller's soldiers could not have defeated the Nez Perce'braves 
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without the other units. However, Indian fighting was the normally 
expected job of infantry and cavalry. The daily maintenance of coastal 
fortifications and gun drill with heavy coastal ordnance in no way pre-
pared these batteries to encounter hostile Indians. The performance of 
the batteries is so laudatory because their daily routine was so alien 
compared to the conditions of the Clearwater battlefield. 
According to the army's doctrine, the artillery was to destroy enemy 
artillery and fortifications. The artillery's role in Indian warfare 
was never defined because the army considered each campaign to be an 
interruption of the daily routine. With no formally adopted approach to 
Indian fighting, the army fought each campaign as if there would be no 
others. Under these conditions, the artillery played a multitude of roles. 
The battle of the Clearwater was the high point of the campaign for 
the batteries of the Fourth. There would be other battles, but the ar-
tillerymen would not participate. Their fate would be to march along the 
Nez Perce~trail while others tried to intercept the fleeing Indians. 
Other conunands, however, would carry cannon into their encounters with 
the warriors of the non-treaty bands. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
THE NEZ PERCE CAMPAIGN: 
THE LONG TREK TO THE 
BEAR PAW MOUNTAINS 
After the battle of the Clearwater, the nature of the Nez Perce"' 
campaign changed. The Indian leaders, led primarily by Looking Glass, 
decided to leave their traditional homes. They would travel east toward 
their traditional allies, the Crow. If for some reason the Crow could 
not or would not join their struggle against the whites, they would 
journey north into Canada. The Sioux had taken refuge in Canada the 
year before. For many, such as Joseph, the thought of leaving their 
homes, possibly forever, was too bitter to contemplate. In spite of 
his pleas, the council had decreed that the bands would go to the land 
. 1 east of the Bitterroot Mountains. 
In contrast, Howard made few momentous decisions in the hours after 
the battle. The fatigued general was relishing his success. His victory 
had checked much of the criticism and gossip about his ability to beat 
the Indians. Now the newspapers and, more important, one of McDowell's 
aides praised his determination. Captain Birney B. Keeler, an officer 
sent by McDowell to observe Howard's actions, reported that "nothing 
can match the vigor of General Howard's pursuit. 112 Later, .. the captain 
maintained that the significance of the victory was not fully disclosed 
in Howard's dispatch. 3 The "praying general's" star certainly shone 
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brighter as a result of the two day engagement. 
For several days after crossing the Clearwater, Howard tried to 
/ 
determine where the Nez Perce would go. The Indians had fled to the 
west after the battle. This suggested that they might be returning to 
the Wallowa Valley. However, the non-treaty bands turned north a short 
distance from their abandoned camp and recrossed the Clearwater at the 
Kamiah sub-agency. On the fifteenth, Howard, some cavalry, plus Otis' 
howitzers caught up with the fleeing hostiles. 
The skirmish which followed was something of a repeat of the fight-
ing of July 11. The main Indian camp had already forded the river be-
fore the soldiers could reach them. The most Howard and his small force 
could do was to fire into the village. Bringing up the gatling and a 
howitzer, the soldiers began shelling the camp. Because Howard made 
no effort to cross, the Indians simply moved their belongings out of 
4 artillery range. 
Failing to catch his enemy for a second time, Howard resorted to 
deception. He moved his small force to the west away from the river 
and the Indians. When he was out of sighti he turned the men north. He 
hoped to cross the Clearwater downstream and get behind the Indians. 
Miller, in charge of the rest of the expedition, would ferry the foot 
troops across the river at the agency. Captain Throckmorton would fol-
low Miller to Kamiah, but not cross the river. He would garrison the 
agency and prevent the Indians from back-tracking on their trail.s 
Howard was forced to change these plans when word reached him that the 
Nez Perce" might want to surrender. 
When Howard was told that Chief Joseph wanted to end the fighting, 
the general returned to Kamiah. He sent a message to the Nez Perce/ 
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chief saying that he and his people would be treated with justice if 
they surrendered. He also promised that a military court would investi-
gate their actions and their complaints. In effect, however, the sur-
render would have to be unconditional. If Chief Joseph chose to accept 
these terms, he could surrender to Captain Miller. 6 
In mentioning a court, Howard might have exceeded his authority as 
a department commander. A civilian commission had settled the fate of 
./ 
the Non-Treaty Nez Perce and a review of its decisions by a military 
court would undoubtedly cause some furor. To prevent this, Howard sent 
a dispatch to McDowell informing him that the hostiles might surrender. 
In his message Howard told McDowell he and others believed that Looking 
Glass was the principle force behind the Indians' movements after the 
Clearwater fight. Joseph and other chiefs were being pressured into 
remaining on the warpath. 7 For once Howard had accurate information. 
Unfortunately for both sides, the surrender never materialized. Some 
Indians did give themselves up, but the bulk of the bands continued 
their eastward journey. 
The rumor of a surrender caused a change in plans for the expedi-
tion. Instead of two crossings, all of Howard's units forded the river 
at the Kamiah agency. As the foot troops made camp, Major Mason struck 
out with a cavalry force to locate the retreating Indians. On July 17, 
he intercepted the Nez Perce;and had a short crisp fight with the band's 
rear guard. Instead of continuing the fight or at least shadowing the 
8 moving camp, Mason returned to Howard's main encampment. The only 
/ 
benefit gained by his sortie was the knowledge that the Nez Perce were 
definitely headed east across the Lolo Trail. 
Despite this intelligence, Howard remained in his camp for more 
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than a week. While his soldiers found ways to occupy their time, the 
one-arm general pondered his next move. The idleness of so many soldiers 
angered McDowell. The division corrnnander had stripped every department 
in his corrnnand in order to provide sufficient forces for Howard. Now 
those soldiers were sitting instead of marching. In mid-July McDowell 
felt that he needed at least some of the troops more than his subordi-
nate. 
In the surrnner of 1877, the eastern third of the country was wracked 
by labor strikes. Railroad workers walked off their jobs and closed 
down thousands of miles of track. The strikers often resorted to vio-
lence to keep the railroads from operating without them. When local 
authorities failed to control the rioting laborers, President Rutherford 
B. Hayes ordered out Federal troops. Artillery batteries from forts 
along the eastern seaboard marched to Pennsylvania and West Virginia. 
Indeed, the artillery regiments on the East and Gulf coast furnished 
most of the troops used to restore order. The West coast was not immune 
to labor unrest. 9 
In the West, the railroads were not the primary point of controversy. 
Cheap labor from the Asian countries kept wages extremely low to the 
disgust and anger of the white population. The riots in California had 
a racial basis as much as an economic one. For whatever reason, the 
cities of San Francisco and Los Angeles convulsed in riots. When the 
local authorities and militia proved unwilling or unable to control the 
mobs, the people sought help from McDowell. The general considered the 
unrest to be a sympathetic response to the communistic plots in the east 
and was determined to put them down, 10 To do that he needed troops. 
On July 23, Lieutenant Joseph Sladen, one of Howard's staff officers 
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at the Portland headquarters, sent an urgent message to the commander at 
Fort Boise. In the telegram he directed that officer to send the fastest 
possible messenger to overtake Major John Green's column. Green was to 
send Hasbrouck's Light Battery B back to San Francisco. The following 
day, Sladen informed Howard that the labor turmoil was responsible for 
Hasbrouck 1 s recall. McDowell cabled Howard directly to return Batteries 
11 
C and L to California. These three units had been stationed in San 
Francisco prior to being ordered to Idaho. McDowell undoubtedly wanted 
units which had been stationed in San Francisco. 
The change of orders created some hardship to the batteries ordered 
to return to California. Hasbrouck's battery arrived in Boise City on 
the 17th of July after a two hundred and seventy mile march from Winne-
mucca.12 Along with Green's column the batt~ry had covered another 
eighty miles before the recall order reached them. Hasbrouck's men 
reached Boise City on the 31st after marching three hundred and fifty 
miles without a day's rest. They still had almost three hundred miles 
to march to reach the rail station at Winnemucca. The San Francisco 
Chronicle reported that 
His men are all well, and hope that the object for which they 
are ordered to return may bring them as much business as the 
prospect they had before them in Idaho.13 
Hasbrouck's battery probably would have seen little action, especially 
14 
mounted as they were on old worn-out artillery draft horses. The 
same, however, could not be said for Batteries C and L. 
Under Captains Harry Cushing and Edward Fields, the batteries al-
ready had joined Howard's expedition. When orders for their return 
arrived, the two units reluctantly began preparations for the trip back 
to San Francisco. 15 However, Howard wanted to retain the units. He 
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felt their presence was critical to the success of his small army. 
McDowell grumbled but relented. He believed that at best Howard's move-
ments would only be a military promenade. The division commander warned 
his subordinate that he would have to justify the remark that the loss 
f th t . t ld . d . th d . t . 16 o e wo uni s wou Jeopar 1ze e expe i ion. 
Stung by insinuations in the press and from his superiors that he 
could not catch the hostiles, Howard began his long delayed pursuit. 
His new plan provided for three columns. The right column, commanded 
by himself, would follow the Indian'strail. The column would include 
the artillery and infantry battalions, and a cavalry squadron. The left 
column, commanded by Colonel Frank Wheaton, would move to northern Idaho 
to prevent other Indians from supporting the fugitive Nez Perce': A re-
serve column under Major John Green would patrol the area of the Salmon 
and Clearwater Rivers. Green's troops would keep any hostiles from 
. 17 
backtracking to their old haunts. 
/ Howard's plan effectively sealed western Idaho from the Nez Perce 
who were headed east. However, the long delay in beginning the pursuit 
made the likelihood of catching the non-treaty bands remote at best. 
Although most of the soldiers were eager for a fight, many knew that 
another Clearwater was unlikely. Captain Jenkins A. FitzGerald reflected 
this skepticism in a letter to his wife. He wrote: 
••• I don't think we shall see a hostile. I said to Colonel 
(Captain) Miller, "Colonel, what are we going to do over 
there?" He replied, "Oh, we will have a big mountain picnic 
with no Indians to bother us. 11 18 
/ 
Howard's troopers would not come to grips with the Nez Perce but others 
would. 
When Howard concluded that Joseph was taking his people to the 
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Buffalo Plains, he asked McDowell and Sherman to have troops east of the 
Bitterroot Mountains intercept them. Sherman ordered General Sheridan 
to give every assistance possible to Howard. Sheridan was also informed 
that Howard had been instructed to disregard department and divisional 
boundaries and pursue the hostiles to the end. Sheridan, in turn, di-
rected General Alfred Terry, commanding the Department of the Dakotas, 
to cooperate with Howard. 19 Toward that end, Colonel John Gibbon, one 
of Terry's subordinate commanders, began to gather troops east of the 
Lo lo Trail. By the fifth of August, Gibbon had amassed a force of about 
two hundred fighters. This number included one hundred and fifty sol-
diers and forty-five volunteers. On the eighth, Gibbon's scouts found 
Joseph's camp in the basin of the Big Hole River. 
Shortly before midnight on August 8, Gibbon and his small force 
moved out for a dawn attack on the hostiles' camp. His tiny group total-
led one hundred and eighty-two men. Gibbon did have a mountain howitzer 
with him, but he left it with his wagons several miles from the Indian 
village. Gibbon did not want the noise of the gun's wheels to alert 
the enemy inadvertently. By dawn, the soldiers had reached the village 
without being detected. In a short time they were ready to charge. 
A Nez Perce' warrior walking to the pony herd in the early morning 
light stumbled upon the anxious troops. Before he could alarm his 
people, a volley of gunfire snuffed out his life. Those shots caused 
an eruption of fire all along Gibbon's line. Caught completely by sur-
prise, pandemonium reigned over the Indian lodges as Gibbon's soldiers 
rushed forward. There was no organized resistance. The camp's inhabi-
tants scattered pell~ell, seeking any protection from the soldiers' bul-
lets, Many women and children, caught in the crossfire between soldier 
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and warrior, never made it out of the camp. Within twenty minutes, the 
spirited troops were standing among the enemy's abandoned lodges. 21 
Gibbon's stay in the camp was brief. The war chiefs quickly sum-
moned their braves with the purpose of retaking their village. Like a 
, 
grizzly bear abruptly awaken from a sleep, the Nez Perce braves counter-
attacked with a vengeance. Efforts to destroy the camp and its contents 
had to be abandoned as the Colonel was forced to order a retreat. In-
censed at the attack on their women and children, the warriors forced 
the soldiers out of the camp and across the creek from which the attack 
had been launched. 
The infantry commander was finally able to rally his hard pressed 
troops on a wooded hill about a mile from the village. There he ordered 
his men to entrench and conserve their ammunition. Gibbon knew that his 
position was critical. He had suffered many casualties in the attack, 
and the accuracy of the Nez Perce' rifles was increasing that number 
every minute. Howard was too far away for any assistance, and the small 
party he had left with his wagons would be of no help whatsoever. They 
were probably under attack themselves. The only option available to 
the wounded Colonel was to wait and hope that his small band could turn 
22 away any attack. 
Shortly after the infantrymen rallied on the wooded knoll, they 
heard two cannon shells explode nearby. The howitzer crew, two ser-
geants, a corporal, four enlisted men, and a guide had arrived on the 
scene. The Indians, however, had taken steps to prevent the cannon from 
reaching the beseiged soldiers. The two shells fired from the small 
brass cannon were defensive fire against attacking Indians. The struggle 
between the small crew and their enemy did not last long. Instead of 
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continuing to fire the cannon, the crew took up their rifles and tried 
to defend themselves. Knowing that their lives were in danger, two pri-
vates abandoned the gun and their comrades. 
Seeing that their position was hopeless, the sergeants pushed the 
two hundred pound gun off its carriage and fled to the brush. A colored 
servant, the guide, and the driver of the draft team managed to join 
them in the bushes and avoid detection by the Indians. The corporal, 
however, was killed defending the gun. 
When the Indians reached the abandoned gun, they further disabled 
it by taking off the wheels. They hid these in some brush at the base 
of the hill. The carriage was pushed over an embankment. Gibbon knew 
that the gun had been taken when he heard no more firing from that di-
rection. For some time he was plagued by the uncomfortable thought 
that the Indians might turn the gun on his soldiers. 23 
By afternoon the fighting was reduced to intermittent sniping. 
Indian and soldier marksmen spent the rest of the day trying to pick 
each other off. By evening the firing died altogether. Darkness allowed 
Gibbon to dispatch couriers to nearby Deer Lodge with a preliminary re-
port of the battle and a request for aid. Without medical supplies, 
food, or water, the men on the small knoll suffered, especially the 
wounded. Casualties would become fatalities unless some sort of help 
arrived soon. To increase his chances of rescue, Gibbon also sent a 
messenger to Howard, who was somewhere in the Bitterroot Valley. 
At noon on the following day, the small handful of warriors who 
had kept the soldiers pinned down rode off to rejoin their village. 
Gibbon then sent a few of his men to find his wagons. In a short time 
the wagons, which had not been attacked by the Indians, arrived at the 
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fortified knoll. The exhausted soldiers now had food and water, but 
the wounded still suffered from a lack of medical supplies. Some sol-
diers tried to comfort the injured while others began burying the dead. 
Help was still twenty-four hours away for the wounded. 24 
Howard learned of Gibbon's fight from a few volunteers who had de-
serted during the battle. The general immediately set forth with twenty 
men for the battlefield. He reached it on the morning of August 11. 
Mason was directed to move forward as fast as possible with his cavalry 
and the surgeons. Mason then sent messengers to the infantry column 
two days behind. 25 
Mason's couriers reported to Captain Miller, who was in charge of 
all the foot troops in Howard's absence. The message instructed Miller 
to load Humphrey's battery and Captain James Wells' company of infantry 
into wagons and send them forward at once. The two units were to be 
assigned additional men so that each had at least twenty-five troopers. 
Miller was instructed to go into camp with the rest of the column where 
the message reached him. 26 Undoubtedly, Mason, skeptical of the value 
/ 
of the cavalry, wanted foot soldiers with him in case the Nez Perce were 
cornered. 
On August 12, Mason's surgeons arrived at the Big Hole battlefield 
and began tending the wounded. Mason and the cavalry arrived later 
that day. The doctors had their work cut out for them. Gibbon listed 
sixty men as killed or wounded. This included seven officers and fifty-
h 1 . d 27 t ree en iste men. In addition, nine volunteers were either killed 
or wounded during the battle. The Indian casualties were more difficult 
to determine. 
Accounts of the Indian wounded and killed vary greatly. The number 
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of warriors killed ranged from fifteen to thirty-three. Caught in the 
crossfire in the camp, the casualties among the women and children were 
considerably greater. The estimates of slain non-combatants range from 
fifty to seventy.28 If the battle of Big Hole was an Indian victory, it 
was a pyrrhic success. Virtually every lodge was in mourning due to the 
loss of a family member. During the first night of seige on the knoll, 
the wail of sorrow from the camp was clearly audible to the troopers. 
The battle can hardly be claimed as a victory for the army. Corre-
spondent Thomas Sutherland concluded that "Looking at this fight impar-
tially, General Gibbon got worsted. 1129 Gibbon, usually a competent com-
mander, mishandled the battle on two points. He should not have attacked 
Joseph's bands in the first place. When Howard sent messages east of 
the Bitterroot, he asked that the area comma~ders delay the Indians un-
til he could catch up. He possessed a force which had fought the hos-
tiles and had beaten them. Gibbon's approach to the village was unde-
tected. He could easily have shadowed the village or better yet, 
blocked its movement to the east. There were indications that the 
Indians would have spent several days in the Big Hole basin had not 
Gibbon attacked them. 30 Again this would have allowed Howard to bring 
up his forces and, together with Gibbon, could have ended the campaign 
at that point. As it was, Gibbon's brash attack cost him heavy casual-
ties without stopping the Indians' flight. 
Gibbon's use of artillery was the second facet of the battle which 
he botched. Even though he had only one gun, Gibbon could have used it 
to advantage had he not violated a fundamental principle of nineteenth 
century warfare. Artillery must be supported by cavalry or infantry 
when in close contact with the enemy. Twenty-four years earlier, 
Captain John Gibbon, in his book, The Artillerist's Manual wrote: 
Artillery cannot defend itself when hard pressed, and should 
always be sustained by either infantry or cavalry. The propo-
sition made to arm the cannoneers with small arms, such as re-
volvers, short rifles, etc., is calculated to do more harm 
than good. They should be taught to look upon their gun as 
their proper arm of defense ••• Let the rifles be given to the 
infantry, and the sabres and revolvers to the cavalry; guard 
the artillery with these arms (cavalry and infantry), and 
teach them (the artillery) that their salvation is sticking 
to their pieces.31 , 
183 
In allowing eight men to bring the gun forward independently at dawn, 
Gibbon implied that these men could both serve the gun and support it 
with small arms fire. That was impossible. 
Gibbon should not have left the brass gun behind when he and his 
men set out for the Indian camp on the night of the eighth. With his 
wagons left behind, two of the draft animals certainly could have been 
spared to pack the mountain howitzer. The wooded knoll would have been 
an excellent position from which the gun could have supported the attack. 
As it was, Gibbon lost the gun and its explosive potential, a corporal 
was killed, and several men were wounded for nothing. Indeed;there was 
some possibility the Indians could have turned the cannon on the en-
trenched soldiers. The Big Hole easily could have become another Little 
Bighorn. 
Howard spent a day and two nights at Gibbon's battlefield. His 
surgeons treated the wounded as well as they could and prepared them 
for movement to Deer Lodge. When the wounded left the battlefield, 
Howard resumed his pursuit. Gibbon was able to attach a company to 
/ 
Howard's command to reinforce the general in case the Nez Perce attacked 
h . 32 im. Tle general reached Bannock City five days after the Big Hole 
fight, but his main column was many miles behind. Humphrey's battery 
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and Wells' company, called forward by Mason, were able to reach the 
advance party by August 15. 
At Camas Meadows, about twenty-five miles northeast of the Camas 
stage station, Howard cut the Nez Pere/' trail. His advance party had 
travelled parallel and a little to the north of the fleeing Indians. 
This allowed him to make up much of the distance separating his soldiers 
from the Indians. 
/ 
Howard wanted either to get close to the Nez Perce 
or., better yet, to get in front of them. He planned to fight a defensive 
battle with his advanced cavalry squadron while the infantry column 
closed the distance. When Miller's troops arrived, he would go on the 
offensive. While the cavalry and Howard shadowed the Indians, Mason 
sent repeated messages urging Miller to move as fast as possible. 34 
When Howard reached the Camas prairie, he found that his quarry 
was only sixteen miles away. Mason and the other officers suggested 
that the exhausted men and animals be given a night's rest. They could 
attack the Indian camp in the morning. Howard reluctantly agreed to 
their suggestions. However, when morning came, it was Howard's camp 
which was attacked. 
,, 
In the pre-dawn darkness, Nez Perce braves infiltrated Howard's 
sentry posts and picket lines. Their primary purpose was to cut the 
ropes holding the soldiers' horses and mules. Another group of mounted 
Indians would stampede the animals, leaving the troopers afoot. The 
possibility existed for a major attack of the then strangled party. A 
sentry's challenge and a warrior's accidental rifle shot alerted the 
camp to the Indians' presence. In the melee which followed,the Nez 
.,,,. 
Perce were able to stampede almost two hundred horses and mules. For-
tunately for the army, not all of the retaining ropes had been cut. 
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Hastily gathering his troopers, Major George Sanford dashed off in 
pursuit of the Indians and the captive animals. Sanford was able to 
catch up with the Indians and retrieve a few of the mules in a running 
skirmish. During the fight Captain Randolph Norwood's troop was tempo-
rarily cut off when Sanford ordered the other troops back to camp. A 
relief column of foot soldiers led by Howard prevented any serious losses 
when it came to Norwood's rescue. 35 The principal reason for the Indian 
attack was to delay Howard's pursuit. 36 Their dawn raid more than sue-
ceeded in this respect. 
With his pack mules gone, Howard lost most of the mobility which 
had allowed him to close the gap on the fleeing Indians. Instead of 
pushing his cavalry the remaining distance to the Indians' camp, Howard 
returned to his camp, tended his casualties, ,and waited for his infantry 
to join him. The Camas Meadows skirmish confirmed in many minds the 
utter worthlessness of the cavalry. The mounted soldiers had been badly 
mauled at White Bird Canyon. Under Perry, they had been unable to pur-
sue the Indians after the fighting on the Clearwater. Now, they had 
been surprised and had lost most of their pack animals. Some officers 
considered the cavalry troops with the expedition to be a disgrace to 
the service. 37 
When notified of the fight on Camas Meadows, Miller put his foot 
soldiers in wagons and hurried them to Howard's camp. The artillery 
captain and his men covered forty-six miles in a single move and arrived 
38 
at Howard's position in the afternoon. That march was one of the few 
bright spots in the campaign. Few cavalry units could move forty miles 
or more in a single day. With the arrival of the foot soldiers, the 
expedition was united once more. However, it had lost a full day's march 
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to its illusive opponents. After Camas Meadows, Howard's soldiers 
would never again be within effective striking distance of the Nez 
/ 
Perce. Fortunately for the army, other units were being posted to in-
tercept the fugitive Indians. 
After Sheridan learned of the Camas Meadows skirmish, he began po-
sitioning units to intercept the fleeing Indians. Colonel Samuel Stur-
gis and six troops of his Seventh Cavalry took station on Clark's Fork 
of the Yellowstone. Colonel Wesley Merritt with nine troops of the 
Fifth Cavalry at his disposal could cover any movement south into 
Wyoming. Major Verling Hart and five troops of the Fifth Cavalry were 
/ 
at the head of the Tongue River in case the Nez Perce went as far west 
as the Big Horn Mountains. Sheridan felt that Sturgis was best situated 
to meet the hostiles when they crossed the Absaroka Mountains. 39 
While Sheridan was moving his units, Howard stopped his. At Heart's 
Lake, east of the Camas battlefield, Howard's column halted. The men 
and horses were physically worn out. The surgeons reported that thirty 
men were unfit for duty due to simple exhaustion. With their uniforms 
in rags and their shoes showing the wear of a thousand mile march, the 
men could not go any further without a rest and a refitting. Complying 
with the requests of his battalion commanders, Howard halted the column 
for several days. 40 He knew that Sturgis' cavalry and other units were 
/ 
west of the Yellowstone Park. This put the fugitive Nez Perce in be-
tween eastern and western armies. 
By the first week of September, the Indians were clear of the 
Yellowstone Park. Behind them, they left a trail of dead miners, trap-
pers, and tourists. Even though the park had been in existence only 
five years, sightseers were conunon by the summer of 1877. Some who 
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came to the park while the Nez Perce were traversing it saw more than 
geysers and bears. For some, an encounter with the hostiles was fatal. 
Wanting to avoid detection at all costs, the warriors were not hesitant 
to kill any who might tell of their presence. 
When the Indians emerged from the park area, they were confronted 
with the Absaroka Mountains. Their scouts learned that Sturgis' Seventh 
cavalry blocked the Clark Fork pass through which they must travel. Be-
hind them, Howard's revitalized soldiers once again had taken up the 
chase. The fugitives' only hope was to trick Sturgis into abandoning 
the pass. To do this the main Indian camp veered to the south after 
reaching the bend in Clark's Fork. They then circled around Dead Indian 
hill, and screened by high bluffs and timber, returned to the pass. 
Sturgis knew of no passage through the mountains south of Clark's 
Fork. However, when his scouts confirmed the southerly movement of the 
Indians, the colonel felt compelled to move. It was possible that the 
Indians could find some unknown passageway and avoid his troopers. 
Mounting his conunand, the colonel moved out along the eastern side of the 
Absarokas. He travelled more than twenty miles before he learned that 
he had been deceived. By the time he returned to his original position, 
he found that Howard's troops were also in front of him. 41 
After a bone-grinding twenty mile ride, Sturgis overtook Howard's 
advance party. Because Howard was the ranking officer, he incorporated 
the Seventh into his expedition. The cavalry colonel, incensed at the 
/ 
Indians' trickery, was determined to repay the Nez Perce for the humili-
ation he felt. He suggested to Howard that the Seventh make forced 
marches of fifty to sixty miles a day for several days. At this rate 
he could overtake the fleeing Indians in a few days. Recognizing that 
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Sturgis' mounts were fresher than his own jaded stock, Howard approved 
the plan. He added Captain Charles Bendire's troop of the First Cavalry 
d · t • h . . t d 42 an Otis mountain owitzers to Sturgis comman • 
Two days after leaving Howard, Sturgis' troopers finally caught up 
/ 
with the Nez Perce. The scene of battle was a river valley north of 
the junction of the Yellowstone River and Clark's Fork. The valley it-
self was surrounded by steep cliffs several hundred feet high. The 
north fork of Canyon Creek, which flows into the valley, contained a 
causeway which 1ed to the prairie expanses of the Buffalo plains. This 
/ 
was the avenue of retreat the Nez Perce intended to use. 
After riding several miles on the morning of September 13, Sturgis' 
column made contact with the Indians' rear guard. The colonel inunedi-
ately ordered Major Lewis Merrill's battalion to attack the Indians on 
a direct line. Merrill's soldiers were reinforced by the troopers of 
the First. Otis' guns also went with this wing of Sturgis' conunand. 
Captain Fredrick Benteen's battalion swung off to the left almost at 
right angles to the other unit. Benteen was trying to head several 
gullies and beat the fleeing Indians to the causeway leading to the 
plains. 43 
/ 
The Nez Perce rear guard tried to slow Merrill's attack and give 
their camp time to escape up Canyon Creek. Taking positions high on the 
bluffs, Indian marksmen compelled the major to dismount his men and 
attack on foot. This effectively cancelled any possibility of Merrill's 
men forming a junction with Benteen's troops. Indeed,Merrill's progress 
was so slow under intense fire that he provided no support whatsoever to 
44 the flanking movement. 
Benteen and his men knew that the first group to reach the exit 
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canyon would win the day. However, as they approached the prize, they 
received a hail of bullets from the canyon walls. 
/ 
The Nez Perce advance 
guard had beaten them to the canyon. The rain of bullets increased as 
the Indians stampeded through the gap. With no support from the .other 
battalion, Benteen could not stop the .flow of Indians and their ponies 
into the canyon. 45 
At this point,Otis' Howitzer was brought to the front. His gunners 
immediately began shelling the retreating enemy. His efforts brought 
mixed reviews. Ultimately, Merrill's battalion regained their mounts 
and moved forward to Benteen's assistance. By that time the Indians 
had passed up the canyon. The horses of the command, drained by a sixty 
mile march in two day's time, could not be urged on. 46 Sturgis sounded 
recall and began looking after those who had fallen under the Indians' 
rifles. The companies of the Seventh spent the night in the vicinity 
of the battlefield. 
On the following morning,some effort was made to continue the pur-
suit. Crow scouts, attached to Sturgis' column, succeeded in capturing 
_,, 
several hundred ponies from the retreating Nez Perce. Although this 
did affect the hostiles' ability to move, the jaded cavalry mounts could 
not be made to move any faster than a walk. In the fighting in Canyon 
Creek, Sturgis suffered fourteen casualties, three of them killed. The 
number of Nez Pere:- reported killed ranged from six to twenty-one. 47 
The value of Otis' participation in the battle is a point of debate. 
S. G. Fisher, a civilian scout for Sturgis, maintained that the gun was 
of no value. The highly excited Otis posted his gun, contrary to 
Fisher's advice, in a ravine, which rendered it useless. 48 Sturgis' 
·report stated that "In spite of energetic efforts of Otis, the officer 
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was unable to make the gun available as the animals were totally worn 
out. 1149 These statements were contradicted by Lieutenant Theodore 
Goldin of Benteen's battalion. Goldin said that Otis' gun was pushed 
well out to the front of the lines, opened on the enemy, and did con-
siderable damage. 50 
The disparity of evaluations was probably due to personal perspec-
tives. Fisher's account of a highly excitable Otis is hard to accept 
at face value. It is difficult to believe that an officer who had 
fought the Sioux, maintained his guns under extreme danger at the Clear-
water, and stood the skirmish at Camas Meadow would lose control in 
such a mobile engagement as Canyon Creek. Fisher's accuracy is also 
suspect because he reported that Otis had two guns. Sturgis and Goldin 
both stated that one of Otis' guns was lost ~n crossing the Yellowstone. 
With less understanding of artillery than the average soldier, Fisher's 
remarks have little value. 
It is the discrepancy between Sturgis and Goldin which is harder 
to resolve. Again perspective is probably the answer. Sturgis, wanting 
a large volume of accurate artillery fire, would probably depreciate 
anything less. Goldin, on the other hand, would probably overstate any-
thing Otis accomplished. The cavalry lieutenant knew that the cannon 
possessed much more power than the carbines of his troopers. 
As he had only one gun, Otis' role in the battle is hard to assess. 
With exhausted pack mules~he would have been unable to move his gun 
around the field to maximize its effectiveness. The exhausted condition 
of the ammunition mules would have contributed to the lieutenant's prob-
lems. The significance of Otis' actions on Canyon Creek, taken in the 




The major excuse for not taking artillery with pursuing columns ~n 
the American west was that they could not keep up. The argument ran 
I 
I 51 
that the gun slowed the movements of the cavalry trdops. Otis' mere 
presenc.e at Canyon Creek shows the remarkable mobilit:y of pack artillery. 
The mountain guns had been a part of the Nez Perce' campaign from its in-
·' ception. Whenever Howard and his cavalry went ahead of the foot sol-
diers, Otis' guns and gunners normally went along. Otis' s~all battery 
had maintained its place along side the cavalry over some or the most 
rugged terrain on the North American continent. The lieutenant's men 
and animals also had kept pace with t:,he rapid march of Sturgis' troopers 
to Canyon Creek. The performance of Otis' small band invalidated the 
idea that guns could not keep up with wide-ranging cavalry columns. 
The fighting on Canyon Creek, like so many of the previous engage-
ments, settled nothing. 
,,. 
The Nez Perce Indians were still in flight,and 
the army was still obliged to dog their trail. Knowing that Sturgis 
might not stop the hostiles, Howard searched for other troops to check 
I 
' the movement of the fugitive Indians toward the north. On September 12, 
he sent a messenger to Colonel Nelson Appleton Miles in hopes that Miles 
could block the path of the fleeing Indians. 52 
When Howard joined Sturgis at the Canyon Creek battlefield, he knew 
/ 
that neither his men nor Sturgis' command could overtake the Nez Perce. 
He also knew that Miles needed time to gather his forces and move them 
into a position between the Indians and the Canadian border: After 
consultation with Sturgis, Howard decided to slow the pace of his pur-
suit. He felt that the Indians would then slow the speed of their 
movements. Hopefully this would buy enough time for Miles to take the 
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When Miles received Howard's request for help, the young infantry 
colonel lost little time gathering his troops. His command would include 
six companies of his own Fifth Infantry regiment, three troops of the 
Second Cavalry, and another three troops of the Seventh Cavalry. These 
units would be supported by a Napoleon gun and a Hotchkiss Mountain Gun. 
By noon of September 18, Miles and his men were on the move. 54 
The Napoleon gun rumbling along with Miles' troopers had undoubtedly 
seen many campaigns before this one. Adopted in 1856, the French-de-
signed cannon was a favorite of many who had fought in the Civil War. 
The small Hotchkiss gun, however, was an experiment. During the previous 
year, Miles had asked the Ordnance Department for a small steel gun to 
accompany troops in the west. Miles believed that the brass mountain 
gun was obsolete. In reply to the request, the Ordnance Department 
purchased the Hotchkiss gun and sent it to the Department of the Dakotas 
f . 56 or testing. Miles was impressed with the small, breech-loading, steel 
gun. Its exceptional accuracy more than offset its small caliber of 
1.65 inches. Miles concluded that it was the best cannon for fighting 
56 Indians that the country had. 
From his cantonment on Tongue River, Miles marched west north-west. 
He intended striking the hostiles before they arrived at Cow Island, 
at the junction of the Musselshell and the Missouri Rivers. Miles' 
soldiers were able to make excellent time on the march. The infantry 
companies were mounted on Indian ponies captured during the Sioux cam-
paign. In seven days marching, the column reached the mouth of the 
Musselshell and finally the Missouri. Even with hard marching, Miles 
found that the Nez Pere: already had crossed the Missouri River. 57 
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Miles inunediately turned his column north. 
Instead of following directly on the Indians' trail, Miles kept 
his units to the east. The Little Rockies and, to an extent, the Bear 
Paw Mountains screened his movements from Indian observers. The ter-
rain, the weather, and possibly providence allowed his troops to approach 
.,,. 
the Nez Perce encampment in the .Bear Paws undetected. 
Forty miles from Canada, the Nez Perce'had stopped to rest their 
weary animals and exhausted people. Howard 1 s men were many miles behind., 
and the chiefs saw little need in pushing their people so hard. The idea 
to halt was principally Looking Glass'. It had been at his insistence 
that the bands had stopped in the Big Hole basin. The attack by Gibbon 
had removed him from any position of influence. By the end of September, 
sufficient time had passed and his words once again carried strength. 
The bands had made camp in a bend of Snake Creek. The first warning the 
villagers had of the soldiers' arrival was the thunder of hooves as the 
cavalry charged the camp. 58 
In attacking the enemy's lodges, Miles divided his forces into three 
wings. One detachment swung to the west of the camp in an attempt to 
disperse the pony herd. Captain Owen Hale's battalion of the Seventh 
attacked the southern flank of the camp. Ultimately, this battalion 
would shift to the east and attempt a charge on the Indians from that 
direction. Captain Simon Snyder's mounted infantry moved directly on 
the camp from the south, following Hales' battalion. 
/ 
Caught by surprise, the Nez Perce's response was disjointed. Some 
warriors were able to mount a portion of the women and children. They 
then escorted this group beyond the reach of the soldiers. Other war-
riors herded the remaining non-combatants into the shelter of cullees 
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that ·traversed their camp. Yet other warriors grabbed their weapons and 
met the charge of the cavalry with a wall of fire. 59 
Hale's advancing Seventh was riddled with small arms fire. The 
initial fusilade prompted Hale to shift his attack to the east. Troopers 
mounted and dismounted scurried to follow their officers and return the 
Nez Perce' fire at the same time. Within minutes the effective strength 
of the battalion Jf the Seventh had·been reduced by half. Hale and 
Lieutenant Jonathan Biddle were among the first officers to fall mortally 
wounded in the battle. In a short time, Captains Myles Moylan and Edward 
Godfrey were also casualties. Non-commissioned officers were also tar-
gets for Nez Percebullets. All of the troop first sergeants were 
killed in the initial part of the battle. Apparently the warriors paid 
. 1 . . 1 d h" . . 60 particu ar attention to anyone in a ea ers ip position. 
While the troopers of Hale's battalion were struggling on the east-
ern side of the village, Snyder's mounted infantry moved up from the 
south. Dismounting and then firing from prone positions, the infantry 
could fire on those braves who were sweeping the Seventh ranks. The 
long rifles of the soldiers finally forced the Indians back into the 
camp proper. The attempt at cutting off the pony herd had been partially 
successful, and the Indians in the camp were now without any means of 
61 escape. 
The heavy casualties he had suffered in the first hour of the bat-
tle convinced Miles to discard any thoughts of storming the camp. He 
/ 
decided to beseige those Nez Perce who had not been able to flee in the 
first minutes of the fight. At this point Miles brought up his Hotchkiss 
gun. Unfortunately, the gun was deployed too close to the front lines. 
The gun crew immediately came under enemy fire and had to abandon the 
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gun for a time. Later, it was withdrawn a short distance and began firing 
into the camp. Its fire was generally ineffective due to its flat tra-
jectory. In many instances the gunners were unable to depress the tube 
enough to shell the braves' rifle pits. By the end of the day, the two 
sides gradually tapered off their firing. When darkness came, thought 
turned from fighting to keeping warm in the cold October night. 62 
On the follo~ing morning, a sporadic snipingcharacterized much of 
the battle. Miles added to his firepower by bringing up the Napoleon 
gun. At first the gun had little more success in hurting the entrenched 
Indians than the steel breech-loader. The Napoleon gun possessed a 
trajectory much like that of the steel mountain gun. However, the gun 
crew remedied that somewhat by digging a hole and lowering the trail into 
it. In this configuration, the gun became something of a mortar. The 
gunners were then able to lob shells into the ravines and rifle pits 
which had sheltered the Indians. Several Indians, including women and 
children, were killed when the exploding shells caved in their temporary 
shelters. 63 
In many respects the battle in the Bear Paw Mountains ended on the 
second day. For the next three days, between sporadic shelling, Miles 
tried to talk the Indians into surrendering. Escape was unlikely at 
best, and Howard's soldiers were within a few days march of the battle-
field. Miles had dispatched a courier asking for assistance on the 
first day of battle. 
With many of their leaders dead, the decision to fight or surrender 
was difficult to make. Many warriors wanted to continue the fight. 
Emissaries had been sent to Canada asking the Sioux to come to their 
aid. 64 However, continued existence meant more casualties both from 
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the soldiers' big guns and the freezing nights. When Howard arrived at 
,., 
Miles' headquarters with an advanced party, the Nez Perce leaders knew 
their fate was sealed. Howard's army could keep the Sioux away even if 
they did leave Canada to help them. After six grim days, Joseph sur-
rendered his rifle and his people. 
The credit for cornering the illusive Nez Perce~certainly belongs 
to Miles. However, the ultimate victory over the non-treaty bands was 
not the exclusive property of the young colonel from Tongue River. The 
Indians had inflicted as many casualties as they had sustained. Miles 
lost twenty-three officers and men and had another forty-five wounded. 
Twenty-five Nez Peret' died on the battlefield, most on the first day. 
. 65 Miles reported forty-six wounded Indians. Miles had enough force to 
hold the Indians, but it was the proximity of Howard's column which 
compelled the Nez Perce'to surrender. 
When Joseph surrendered~Howard 1 s column was only twenty-five miles 
from Snake Creek. Miles' request for assistance had prompted Howard to 
load his artillery and infantry battalions on a steamer and head down 
the Missouri. Sturgis' cavalry was with the foot troops. Sanford's 
spent First cavalry had been sent home. Therefore,an additional three 
hundred soldiers were within a day's march of the battle. The veterans 
from Idaho undoubtedly would have relished an assault on an enemy that 
they had been chasing for fifteen hundred miles. The cold, hungry, and 
exhausted warriors could not stand against the new army. 
Miles' success on Snake Creek was due to two factors. Firs~ he had 
a comparatively fresh command. His troops were in the field less than 
two weeks before their battle. His command was also fresh in spirit. 
They had not trudged hundreds of miles only to see their foe elude them. 
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Miles' second advantage was size. His attacking force was slightly 
smaller than Howard's had been at the Clearwater. 
.... 
The Nez Perce, due 
to the losses at the Big Hole and Canyon Creek, were weaker than when 
they had fought in Idaho. Had Gibbon marshalled a striking force equal 
in strength to Miles', the Big Hole battle might very well have been 
the last battle of the campaign. The same can be said for Sturgis' 
efforts at Canyon Creek. 
Miles' cannons were an important, but not decisive, ingredient in 
his victory. The Hotchkiss gun did little damage on the first day of 
battle. The Napoleon gun, once converted to a howitze~was more effec-
tive. The twelve pound shell was six times heavier than that of the 
steel mountain gun. As with other cannon in other battles, the weapons 
represented a threat to the Indians that they could not assail. The 
warriors could not seize Miles' guns as they had Gibbon's two months 
before. Properly supported,the twelve pounder caused casualties with 
little exposure or risk to the soldiers. In all probability, however, 
Miles could have won the battle without them. 
Artillerymen and cannoµs were a conspicuous part of the campaign 
. h / against t e Nez Perce. Both men and weapons at one time or another 
provided a key to the few successes which the army enjoyed. Certainly 
the importance of both were far out of proportion to their numbers. 
The beginning of the campaign witnessed the largest massing of 
cannons and machine guns in the Indian wars. At one time, Howard had 
no less than six cannons, of varying calibers, a battery of mortars, 
and several gatling guns at his disposal. 
.,; 
The Nez Perce at one time 
or another were under fire from mountain howitzers, gatling guns, a 
steel breech-loading gun, and a Napoleon gun. As the Army had no 
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fundamental guidelines for Indian fighting expeditions, ttoward, out of 
civil war habit, incorporated cannon into his column. Although Howard 
began the campaign with this arsenal, he ultimately came to depend on 
the packable, brass, mountain gun. 
The effectiveness of these cannons varied according to who employed 
them. At the Clearwater, Marcus Miller's gunners repulsed the Indians' 
/ 
attack more than once. Some of th.e Nez Perce later claimed that without 
the cannons the Clearwater might have been another White Bird Canyon, 
but on a larger scale. The big guns alone drove back the pressing 
warriors. 62 By comparison, the gatling guns were of little value. They 
were too heavy to accompany the column across rugged terrain. However, 
the timidity of their cavalry crews was the main source of their inef-
fectiveness. 
At the Big Hole, Gibbon's mountain howitzer was captured too soon 
in the battle to do any good, Gibbon's failure to provide adequate 
support to the gun enabled the Indians to overwhelm the small crew. Had 
the gun been properly supported, it could have relieved some of the 
66 ~ pressure on the infantry on the wooded knoll. The Nez Perce experi-
ence with the cannons at the Clearwater might have made them less ag-
gressive in their response to the dawn attack. 
At Canyon Creek, Otis made every effort to shell the fleeing 
Indians. The condition of his pack animals cancelled the battlefield 
mobility he needed so desperately. The cannon certainly could have 
cleared the bluffs of Nez Perce" riflemen. This might have allowed 
Benteen's battalion to block the escape exit from the valley. At 
Canyon Creek, as with Big Hole, there was simply not enough artillery. 
The guns at the Clearwater equalized the fighting power of the soldiers 
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and the Indians. The single gun of Gibbon and Sturgis was not enough to 
; 
neutralize the superior fire power of the Nez Perce. 
The cannon used by Miles were important in that they augmented the 
fire of his badly battered command. Both the Napoleon gun and the steel 
Hotchkiss had sufficient range to shell the Indians' positions without 
endangering the gunners. Miles' gunners handled their pieces well with 
one exception. On the first day the Hotchkiss gun came too close to 
the enemy, and the crew suffered as a result. With a range approaching 
sixteen hundred yards, there was no reason for the gun to be within 
,,, 
rifle range of the Nez Perce. 
It is unfortunate that the distribution for the small steel gun 
had not included Howard's Department of the Columbia. Because it was 
a breech-loading gun, the Hotchkiss had a higher rate of fire than the 
old muzzle-loaders. It was also more accurate due to the rifling in 
the barrel. The Napoleon gun and mountain howitzer were smooth-bore 
cannons. The lighter weight of the Hotchkiss shell, about two pounds, 
would have allowed the pack animals to carry more ammunition. 
For the artillery units, Otis' battery being the exception, the 
climax of the campaign was the battle of the Clearwater. After that 
; 
their task was to hound the Nez Perce for more than a thousand miles. 
Indeed, the artillerymen marched more than fifteen hundred miles in 
three and one-half months. This constituted one of the longest pursuits 
in American military history. 
For many of the men who trudged along the Nez Perce' trail, this 
was their second campaign against the American Indian. Batteries A, E, 
G, and M were veterans of the exasperating Modoc war four years earlier. 
Some of these batteries had also been involved in minor skirmishing with 
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some of the Indians in Alaska. 
.,, 
For the other units, the Nez Perce war 
was their baptism into Indian fighting. All of these units acquitted 
themselves well, in spite of the fact that they were used to a garrison 
life totally alien to the frontier. 
Several artillery officers deserve special praise for their actions 
in the campaign. As noted, Marcus Miller directed the crucial attack 
at the Clearwater. After the campaign became one of pursuit, Miller 
.was placed in command of all the foot troops in Howard's absence, which 
was most of the time. At one point, the artillery captain commanded 
seven artillery batteries and eight infantry companies, a regimental-
size force. In his supplementary report of the campaign, Howard singled 
Miller out for special mention. Howard recommended Miller for a brevet 
for special gallantry at the Clearwater. The general stated that Miller 
was "equal to any service or command the government may devolve on 
h . ,.67 im. 
There were of course other artillery officers who served with dis-
tinction during the three and one-half month campaign. Lieutenant 
Charles Humphrey eventually received .the Congressional Medal of Honor 
for his heroism at the Clearwater. Captain Harry Cushing received spe-
cial commendation from Howard for his initiative in supplying the pur-
suit column in spite of conflicting orders and considerable danger. 
Certainly Lieutenant Otis, who saw more actual fighting than any other 
officer, can not be omitted. It is ironic that Otis left the service 
only a few years after Joseph surrendered to Miles. 
,,,,. 
In their futile bid for freedom, the Nez Perce encountered almost 
two thousand troops from ten separate commands. Encumbered by women 
and children, the warriors of Looking Glass, Ollokot, Joseph, and White 
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bird, lost only two of the six engagements they had with the army. The 
campaign was certainly one of the most fascinating in the history of 
the Indian wars. Ultimately, however, the power of the government, ex-
pressed in its soldiers, compelled them to surrender. Most of those 
who survived the hardships of the journey and death in battle would 
never again see their own homeland. 
Of the more than two thousand soldiers who participated in the Nez 
/ 
Perce war of 1877, the artillery certainly constituted a small portion. 
The soldiers of the batteries, in many cases, were a part of the cam-
paign from its beginnings in western Idaho to its ending in northern 
Montana. Their assignments during the campaign were occasioned more by 
need than by any understanding of their role in irregular warfare. It 
would not be unfair to the other units to say that a large measure of 
the army's success in the war was due to the men from the Fourth Regiment 
of Artillery. They had proven themselves effective in battle. When 
fighting between the races erupted a year later in northern Nevada, 
many of the same men would once again go to war. In many respects, the 
coming conflict with the Bannocks of.Idaho and Nevada would be very fa-
miliar to the artillery with the regular army in the west. 
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CHAPTER IX 
THE BANNOCK WAR 
/ 
For many of the men who had marched along the Nez Perce trail, the 
winter of 1877-1878 was a time to rest and recuperate. Clothing and 
equipment which had been worn out was mended or in many cases replaced. 
The following spring brought both a time of routine and training. 
Field maneuvers were becoming popular in European armies and the Pacific 
coast troops were in stride with the military times. In May, a combined 
force of artillery and cavalry staged a mock attack on a fortified posi-
1 
tion held by two infantry companies. Ironically,the artillery batteries 
performed as infantry during the exercise. The spectacle was interesting 
and entertaining. Less than a month later, many of these same units 
would be ordered eastward to fight Indians. Their eriemies, the Bannocks, 
/ 
had been allies during a part of the Nez Perce campaign. 
It was during that campaign that tension between the Bannocks and 
the whites reached the danger point. The civilian and military authori-
ties had kept many of the neighboring tribes in tight reign. The agents 
and soldiers wanted to prevent any sympathetic outbreaks or overt sup-
/ 
port for the non-treaty Nez Perce. Rigid control was especially the 
case on the Bannock and Paiute reservations in northern Nevada, .southern 
Oregon, and southern Idaho. The Indians were incensed at the suspicion 
of their agents because a group of Bannock scouts were working for 
Howard. However galling the close supervision of the agents was to the 
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reservation warriors, it was not the principal cause of animosity between 
.. the two races. 
For centuries Indians of the northern rockies and the Pacific 
northwest journeyed to the Camas Prairies of southern Idaho and northern 
Oregon. The camas roots were an integral part of the diet of many of 
the Indians of the region. The camas meadows in southern Idaho had been 
verbally promised to the Bannocks in a treaty signed in 1868. Unfortu-
nately, a clerical error identified the region as the Kansas Prairie in-
stead of the Camas Prairie. The Bannocks had claimed the ground ever 
since and had become restless when ranchers moved their stock onto the 
prairies for grazing. 2 
/ 
This irritation coupled with the Nez Perce outbreak created a 
milieu in which a mere incident cohld ignite an Indian war. In Augus~ 
1877, a Bannock warrior armed with a Winchester and fortified with con-
siderable whiskey attacked a couple of teamsters, seriously wounding 
them both. The attack might have been in retaliation for the rape of 
an Indian girl by two unidentified white men several months earlier. 
During the arrest of the Indian a short time later, a cattle hand named 
Alexander Rhoden was shot and killed. An Indian named Tambiago was 
3 arrested for the murder of Rhoden. 
The arrest of Tambiago and the death of Rhoden caused considerable 
excitement among the Bannock on the Fort Hall Indian reservation in 
southern Idaho. Agent w. H. Danielson, fearing a violent reaction to 
the arrest of the brave, asked for military aid. A militia unit re-
sponded to the request by seizing two Bannock villages. Fifty-three 
braves, about two score weapons, and three hundred ponies were taken 
into custody. Ultimately, the warriors were released and the ponies 
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were returned. 4 The authorities, however, did. not give back the weapons. 
The summary behavior of the militia and the conviction and pending 
execution of Tambiago for murder brought matters to a head. Many 
Bannocks, especially those led by Buffalo Horn, the same chief who had 
scouted for Howard, took up arms. Peaceful co-existence had been tried 
and had been found wanting. In May, the Bannocks began ordering ranchers 
off of the Camas Prairie on threat of death. They also sent runners to 
the equally disaffected Paiutes asking for concerted action against the 
whites. 5 Less than two weeks later General Oliver Otis Howard, the 
nearest department commander, received confirmation that the Bannock 
had broken out. 6 
/ 
As with the Nez Perce hostilities the year before, army units from 
across the far west were alerted for movement to the troubled region. 
Once again soldiers of the 4th Artillery regiment marched to fight the 
American Indian. Many of the units ordered to join•Howard had served 
under the one-arm general against Joseph's warriors. In many respects, 
" the Bannock war was similar to the previous Nez Perce campaign. The 
campaign would be one of pursuit across hundreds of miles of wilderness. 
Several battles would be fought, but the final victory would be achieved 
by exhausting the quarry. Finall~ the Bannock campaign was another 
conflict in which the artillery played an important role. 
Throughout the late winter and spring, Howard had watched the de-
velopments among the Bannocks and Paiutes. The Fort Hall reservation, 
where many of the discontented Bannocks lived, was actually outside 
Howard's jurisdiction. Affairs at the reservation were properly the 
responsibility of General George Crook's Department of the Platte. How-
ever, if hostilities broke out, soldiers from Howard's department and 
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the other Pacific commands were in a far better position to fight the 
Indians. Crook 1 s troops were too far away, and logistical support .. 
across the mountains would have been a nightmare. Realizing the direc-
tion in which the growing friction between the races was headed, Howard 
began moving troops toward Idaho, 
The closest troops to the troubled area were the troopers of Cap-
tain Reuben F. Bernard's Troop G. 1st Cavalry. Howard placed a great 
deal of faith in the abilities of Bernard, who was a seasoned commander 
with many campaigns under his belt. On the first of June, Bernard's 
troops, under orders from Howard, began patrolling the camas grounds, 
They found King Hill station abandoned and partially destroyed. From 
that point Bernard followed a path of destruction which marked the 
Indian's trail. On the third, Bernard found Glenn's ferry cut loose 
from its moorings. After crossing the river, they found a number of 
burned freight wagons and the bodies of two teamsters. 7 Bernard's dis-
coveries provided conclusive proof that the Bannocks were on the warpath. 
As Bernard followed the Indian trail toward the Snake River to the 
west, Howard began moving into the field. The commander of the Depart-
ment of the Columbia informed his superior, General Irwin McDowell, that 
he wanted five hundred soldiers to throw against the hostiles.8 .Howard 
believed that many of the problems of the Nez Pere/ campaign could be 
attributed to an insufficient number of soldiers. Therefore, he wanted 
to concentrate an adequate force before he moved against the malcon-
9 
tents. From such posts as Fort Canby, the Presidios at San Francisco, 
Vancouver, and Bidwell, units moved to join Howard's expedition. 
In the opening phase of the campaign, Howard had five distinct 
groups of soldiers entering his sphere of operations. Bernard was 
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already in the field and marching along the Indians' trail. Major Joseph 
Stewart of the 4th Artillery was moving south from the Columbia river 
with two artillery batteries and five companies of the 21st Infantry. 
Major George Sanford and several troops of the 1st Cavalry were west of 
Boise, Idaho. Two more artillery batteries, H and K, were enroute to 
Winnemucca, Nevada with an ultimate destination of Camp McDermitt. 
Finally, Captain Harry Egbert's five.companies of the 12th Infantry were 
also heading for Camp McDermitt from their post in northern California.lo 
Howard's marching instructions for these units was based on a belief 
that the hostiles were still on the Camas Prairie. He intended moving 
his columns to the east and forcing the Indians back onto the Fort Hall 
reservation. Hopefully Crook could have some troops available at that 
place to ensnare the renegades. If for some reason the Bannocks and 
their fellow hostiles the Paiutes continued to move to the east, Howard 
was fully prepared to follow in spite of departmental boundaries. 11 He 
had done this very thing the year before in his long pursuit of Joseph's 
people. However, when Howard finally joined Bernard's cavalry on the 
twelfth,he realized that his carefully laid plans would have to be 
scrapped. 
In Bernard's report to his commander, he indicated that the Bannocks 
and some Paiutes were in fact moving to the west instead of to the east. 
Bernard had learned of a skirmish between Buffalo Horn's band and some 
civilians near South Mountain in western Idaho. The story of the fight 
f . d h B d h d s·1 c· h · · h 12 was con irme w en ernar reac e i ver ity on t e nint • Every 
bit of information Bernard received indicated that the Bannocks, minus 
Buffalo Horn who was killed in the skirmish, were moving west. That 
theory was confirmed shortly after Howard arrived in the cavalry camp. 
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One of the Paiutes travelling with the renegade Bannocks was chief 
Winnemucca. The old chief and many others of his tribe wanted no part 
of a war with the whites. However, Oytes, a Paiute medicine man, and 
Egan, the Paiute war chief, were generally in control of the assembled 
bands. Winnemucca's refusal to lead the warriors therefore placed his 
life in jeopardy. Ultimately, Winnemucca and other Paiutes escaped the 
hostile camp through the efforts of his daughter Sarah. After securing 
her father's release, Sarah rode nearly two hundred miles to inform 
Howard of the renegades' intentions. 13 
Now privy to new information, Howard changed his plans. He sent 
his wide spread units to stein's Mountains fifty miles west of Sheep's 
Ranch. In issuing the new orders,Howard reorganized the troops he had 
on hand. Howard created three pursuit columns. The right column was 
composed of Major Stewart's two artillery batteries and the five infan-
try companies. Bernard's cavalry were designated the left column. 
Colonel Cuvier Grover,with Sanford's command enroute to Fort Hall, was 
ordered to reverse their course and were designated as the center 
column. 14 
This new game plan caused a considerable amount of hardship and 
irritation to some of the units involved. For Stewart's foot soldiers, 
these instructions constituted the third change of direction in less 
than a week. At the beginning of the campaign,Stewart's destination 
was Boise City. Two days later, Stewart received instructions from 
Howard to take the most direct route to Sheep's Ranch. Three days later, 
orders directed the artillery major to Steins Mountain. These confusing 
changes of directions did nothing to help the already strained relations 
between the general and the major. 15 
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Stewart had problems covering the dusty roads of Oregon as fast as 
his superior wanted or expected. Howard, miffed at the slow progress 
of the column, only three miles on one day, ordered the men placed in 
wagons in an effort to speed their arrival. He chided Stewart with the 
remark that his mission was to move men not supplies. Stewart defended 
his slow progress by claiming that his men were exhausted and had to 
16 
stop and rest. Howard's experiences in the spasmodic chase of Joseph 
had not lessened the demands he placed on his subordinate commanders. 17 
In addition to the three pursuit columns, other units were entering 
the field in an attempt to head off the fleeing Indians. Captain Charles 
Throckmorton 1 s battery and Captain George Burton's company of the 21st 
Infantry were ordered to report to Colonel Frank Wheaton at Wallula. 
Ultimately, Throckmorton and the units attached to him were given the 
responsibility of patrolling the Columbia and watching for any unrest 
among the Indians of southern Washington. Captain Marcus Miller, who 
had played a prominent role in the early part of the Nez Perce~ campaign, 
also joined the effort against the hostiles in Oregon. Miller's battery, 
along with Captain Henry Hasbrouck's Light Battery B and a detachment 
from Battery F, moved to Winnemucca in June. Miller's small command 
was to escort supplies to Howard's pursuit columns. 18 
Throckmorton's tiny command was struck by a small tragedy before 
they were even close to the combat zone. On the boat trip down the 
Columbia, one of Throckmorton's men, probably intoxicated, fell over-
board. In doing so he pulled another man into the water with him. A 
third soldier dove into the river in a futile attempt to rescue his 
comrades. All three drowned. 19 The artillery had suffered three fatali-
ties before the first shot was fired between Indian and soldier. 
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In eastern Oregon, Howard was having problems of his own. He des-
perately wanted one of his columns to make contact with the Bannocks. 
However, no amount of desire could move his men any faster than the 
primitive Oregon roads would permit. Administrative matters complicated 
the tactical situation. On the sixteenth,he left Bernard's units and 
moved toward Malheur City. Enroute,he joined Stewart's column. On the 
twenty-third Howard's column entered the Malheur agen~y. He .found the 
agency to be in shambles. This complicated his plans to establish a 
supply point at the agency. Finally, he detached Major Stewart and one 
company of infantry to reorganize the agency and prepare it as a supply 
20 depot. Captain George Rodney of the 4th replaced Stewart as the column 
commander and immediately put his men on the march. However,the dis-
tinction of drawing first blood fell to Bernard's cavalrymen. 
Upon leaving Howard, Bernard's troopers embarked on an incredible 
ride. In slightly less than seven days, the troopers of the 1st covered 
one hundred and ninety miles. Their route lay across Barren Valley, 
through the mountains to Harney Lake and finally to Silver Creek. At a 
point about forty-five miles west of Camp Harney, Bernard's advance troop 
found the Indians' camp. 
Leaving Captain Stephen Whipple's troop with his pack train, Bernard 
moved out with the rest of his cavalry. One mile from the village, he put 
his units into a column of troops. When they were only a few hundred 
yards from the camp,the troopers drew their pistols and charged. Three 
successive waves of mounted soldiers swept through the village. Their 
surprise was complete. The force of Bernard's assault had the effect of 
driving the Indians to a high rocky bluff which overlooked the village. 
Seeing that he could not dislodge his enemy from the heights without 
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severe losses, Bernard ordered his men to withdraw. 
The troops dismounted and began moving back out of the village. 
All the while they kept up a vigorous exchange of fire with the Bannocks 
and Paiutes. Bernard finally reformed. his men on a rocky ridge near the 
right of the camp. At this point, pistols were holstered and the 
troopers began using their carbines. During the fight., Whipple had sue-
ceeded in bringing up the pack train and replenished the soldiers' ex-
hausted cartridge belts. 
At mid-day the Indians gave up any hope of re-capturing their vil-
lage and withdrew. The exhausted troopers then moved into the forsaken 
village. After taking what they could use from the camp in the way of 
·supplies, the soldiers destroyed the camp. Bernard then moved his tired 
but victorious soldiers three miles and went into camp at a spot known 
21 as old Camp Curry. 
In the battle on Silver Creek Bernard had two hundred and twenty-
six officers and men. This included four cavalry troops, sixteen civil-
ian scouts and a small pack train. His losses were four men killed and 
five wounded. In addition,nine cavalry horses were killed and six others 
wounded. 22 The casualties on the Indian side were unknown. However, 
the Indians probably suffered few casualties. After Bernard's troops 
swept through the camp, the Indians were able to take up strong defensive 
positions. These positions would have kept their losses to a minimum. 
Bernard's fight was inconclusive. Neither side had sustained seri-
ous casualties. More important, the Indians were able to leave the 
battlefield without being pursued by the cavalry. Bernard's exhausted 
23 
mounts simply could not be urged to move. Lacking adequate forage 
and water, the animals were simply played out. This was only one of 
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countless instances in which the large cavalry horse lacked the endurance 
of the smaller Indian mount. Furthermore it is a case of a battle in 
which artillery could have materially affected the outcome. 
The utility of artillery in this battle is based on two points. 
First, artillery weapons could have been carried to the scene of the 
engagement. The trail to Silver Creek was not difficult enough to pre-
vent Bernard from moving a two wheel horse wagon with his pack train. 
If a horse wagon could traverse the Bannock's trail, wheeled artillery 
could have. A mountain howitzer or light steel gun certainly would not 
have weighed more than a loaded two-wheel wagon. The second point deals 
with the nature of the battle and the battlefield. 
In his report of the fight, Bernard stated that a slough and a cliff 
of rocks prevented his men from closing with the hostiles. His troops 
would have been slaughtered attacking an enemy they could not reach. A 
mountain howitzer or steel gun such as the Hotchkiss gun certainly could 
have shelled the Indians. The cannons, especially the accurate Hotch-
kiss, could have inflicted casualties without needlessly exposing the 
soldiers. Because the Hotchkiss was a breech-loading cannon, it could 
have attained a high enough rate of fire to assist a ground attack. 
The Indians could not have delivered an effective fire against the 
attacking.soldiers without exposing themselves to the cannons. However, 
Bernard had no artillery, even though the ordnance, at least the moun-
tain howitzer, was available to him. 
When Howard was informed of Bernard's fight, he moved quickly to 
reinforce the cavalry captain. Other than Captain Evan Miles' two 
companies at Camp Harney, the nearest troops were the foot soldiers of 
Rodney's command. Howard ordered Rodney to proceed to Camp Curry 
216 
without delay. Howard, riding well ahead of his soldiers as was his 
custom, arrived in Bernard's camp on the twenty-fifth. The foot troops, 
riding in wagons, joined the following day. 24 
After a lengthy discussion with the cavalry commander, Howard de-
cided that his· adversaries had once again changed direction. The 
Bannocks, Paiutes, some Klamaths, and a few Columbia River Indians were 
moving north. This new change of direction had ominous possibilities. 
If the hostiles made contact with the discontented Indians of southern 
Washington, the entire Pacific northwest would convulse in an Indian 
war. That junction had to be prevented at all costs. To accomplish 
this, Howard once again reorganized his resources. 
Bernard and Miles, now commanding the foot troops, were to cooperate 
in a direct pursuit of the Indians. Other troops would be moved to the 
line of the Columbia River to intercept the enemy. Still other units 
would patrol the region around Baker City to prevent the hostiles from 
turning east. 25 Hopefully,someone would make contact with the renegades 
and hold them long enough for the other units to move up and settle the 
matter. Howard's only problem was to find enough troops to meet all of 
his requirements. The Baker City facet of the expedition could be man-
aged by Sanford's cavalry. Troops to patrol the many miles of the 
Columbia River Valley were not so easy to obtain. 
Many of the troops assigned to the expedition were far to the rear 
of the fleeing Bannocks and Paiutes. Sanford was near Baker City. 
Miller and Hasbrouck's batteries were at Winnemucca. The most that these 
batteries could do was escort supply trains first to Camp McDermitt and 
then Baker City. Stewart and his attached infantry company had moved 
to Camp Harney to ease the fear among the soldiers' dependents still at 
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that post. Throckmorton's small conunand was the onty force available 
to intercept the hostiles as they emerged from John Day Valley. However, 
the three understrength units Throckmorton controlled simply were not 
enough to cover all the crossings of the Columbia. 
Realizing the need for additional forces along the Columbia, 
Howard's staff in Portland scurried to find any means to patrol the 
twists and bend of the river. Captain John A. Kress, one of Howard's 
Ordnance officers, came up with a partial solution to the dilemma. With 
ten Ordnance soldiers, ten men of the 21st Infantry, a howitzer, and a 
26 
gatling gun, Kress converted a river steamer into a gun boat. With 
this vessel, Kress could patrol the crossing points of the river much 
easier than troops marching along the banks. Kress' idea would bear 
fruit in a short time. 
As Howard's soldiers continued to press the Indians, settlements 
in the Columbia River Valley became increasingly concerned for their 
welfare. Most of the small hamlets were fortified in one manner or 
another in anticipation of what everyone knew was an imminent Indian 
attack. Urgent pleas for assistance from these scattered settlements 
reached military commanders in every corner of the territory. At times, 
these hysterical alarms from panic-stricken settlers caused extensive 
trouble, as many soldiers soon learned. 
One of these life-or-death calls for help found Captain 
Throckmorton's small group. Throckmorton and his soldiers had been 
ordered to move from Walla Walla to wallula via steamer. His mission 
was to prevent any Indians from crossing the river. When he reached 
Wallula, he was ordered to return to Walla Walla and then march to 
Pendleton, Oregon. Indians had been seen in the area and the citizenry 
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had issued a call for help. At Walla Walla, Throckmorton found the citi-
zens excited and apprehensive. He left that town and made an arduous 
night march to Pendleton arriving at four o'clock in the morning. 
In the small Oregon town pandemonium reigned supreme. Throckmorton 
reported that he had "witnessed stampedes but never anything to equal 
the terror of the citizens of.this section." No.two people gave the 
artillery captain the same information concerning the whereabouts of 
the hostiles. Trying to restore some measure of order and establish 
defensive works was impossible. Just as he would get the citizens 
calmed down and organized, a new courier would arrive and pandemonium 
would break out afresh. 27 Exasperated, he finally gave up. He did 
manage to send scouts out in an effort to locate the illusive renegades. 
On the sixth of July, Throckmorton learned that a group of citizens 
had taken it upon themselves to find and whip the Indians. The army 
certainly was having little success. With Batteries A and M, Company E 
of the 21st Infantry, and William Winters troop of the 1st Cavalry, he 
set out to investigate a report of a battle. His soldiers met the sur-
viving citizens about four miles from the battlefield. After rendering 
what medical aid he could, Throckmorton decided to return to Pendleton. 
Ironically, some reports of the skirmish replaced the decimated citizen 
army with Throckmorton's own command. Howard's headquarters at Portland 
relayed an unofficial account of the battle to McDowell's headquarters 
at San Francisco. In that account,Throckmorton's men had been repulsed 
by the Indians with loss, though the number of Indians killed exceeded 
h . 1 . 28 is own casua ties. Fortunately,this erroneous report was corrected 
by events within forty-eight hours. 
By the end of the first week of July, Howard and his columns had 
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reached the Camas Prairie in northern Oregon. On the seventh, 
Throckmorton met Howard and Bernard at a spot south of Pendleton named 
Pilot Rock. 29 Howard decided to split his expedition in an attempt to 
cover two routes which the Bannocks might take. Throckmorton with A 
and M of the 4th, C of the 21st, and ten volunteers were directed·to 
Butter Creek. The artillery captain was to watch the crossings of the 
Columbia at the point where the creek junctioned with the river. Seven 
companies of cavalry, with Bernard in tactical command,were to move 
along the high ground between Butter Creek and Birch Creek. Due to the 
incompetence of a civilian guide, Throckmorton emerged from the creek 
nine miles from his intended destination. The error was of little actual 
importance as it was Bernard's troops who found the enemy. 
Only a few miles from Pilot Rock, Bernard's advance guard observed 
Indians in the rocky heights before them. The cavalry captain deployed 
his men on line and began moving over the foothills which separated him 
from his adversary.· The soldiers came under fire when they reached the 
base of the hill the Indians occupied. Keeping his troopers in the 
saddle, Bernard charged the heights. Soldiers and their horses scram-
bled, stumbled, and fell on the side of the rock hill. Undaunted, they 
recovered their footing and continued the ascent, firing as they climbed. 
As the cavalry scaled the rocks in the face of enemy fire, a detached 
gatling gun began firing on the enemy. 
Throughout the battle, Howard observed, leaving the direction of 
the attack to the experienced Bernard. His point of observation during 
the battle was the gatling gun position. The gun crew was doing every-
thing possible to bring fire on the Indians. Although they had enough 
range, they could not elevate the gun high enough to sweep the high 
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ground. Consequently, the gatling expended considerable ammunition and 
made ample noise with little result. 
In spite of the difficult ground and the ineffective support from 
the gatling gun, Bernard's troopers managed to seize the crest of the 
hill. They found, to their chagrin, that the Bannocks had retreated to 
still higher ground a short distance away. After a brief rest for the 
winded horses, the troopers renewed their charge. Declining to come to 
close combat with the soldiers, the Indians fled from the battlefield 
h h h · f h h f h ·d 30 t roug t e pine orest to t e sout east o t e ri ge. Once again the 
jaded government horses could not be forced to follow the flight of the 
Indians. For a second time in the campaign,Howard's men had found the 
enemy, fought and beat him, but failed to make the final capture. 
The same problem which hampered the gatling gun might have neutral-
ized any artillery Howard could have employed. The mountain howitzer 
and the Hotchkiss gun were limited to only a few degrees of elevation. 
The three-inch Ordnance gun was the only weapon in the army's inventory 
which could have fired on the enemy's lofty positions. Unfortunately, 
the three-inch gun was far too heavy to be pulled over the rocky and 
often steep mountain trails. For light artillery, such as the mountain 
howitzer or Hotchkiss gun, to have been used, one of two things had to 
happen. First the guns would have had to be re-positioned. A new posi-
tion on higher ground might have allowed the gun crew to bring the 
Indians under fire. Second, the guns could have been altered to give 
them a higher elevation. In the battle of Apache Pass in 1864, a how-
itzer crew hacked off part of the trail of the gun, thus allowing greater 
elevation. In the battle of the Bear Paws in 1877, Miles' gun crew dug 
a trench and lowered the trail of their Napoleon gun into it, giving it 
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a higher elevation. An imaginative gun crew might have used one of these 
means to bring shell fire onto the Indians. However, without some 
adjustment, artillery probably would have been of little value. 
Although the Bannocks and Pai~tes had escaped Bernard's troopers, 
Howard's general disposition of units insured another engagement. 
Throckmorton was northwest of the Birch Creek battlefield ready to move 
along the Columbia. Captain Kress' gunboat was plying the water of the 
river watching for any crossings by the. hostiles. Major George Sanford 
and his troopers were in the Grande Ronde Valley to the east. He could 
block any efforts by the renegades to move into the old Nez Perce"hunting 
grounds. Captain Evan Miles with two battalions of foot troops was 
posted in the camas meadows to the south. Ultimately,two of the commands 
mentioned eventually made contact with the fleeing Indians. 
On the same day that B.ernard 1 s troopers were fighting on Birch 
Creek, Kress' gunboat found an Indian encampment on the south bank of 
the Columbia. In all probability it was the village of the.warriors 
fighting the cavalry to the south. The Ordnance captain immediately 
opened fire with his howitzer and gatling gun. For the most part, the 
Indians fled to the south away from the river. A few stout-hearted 
warriors tried to force a pony herd of several hundred across the river. 
Kress' gunners prevented most from crossing, but a few made it to the 
north bank. Kress' prompt water~borne attack not only managed to thwart 
the crossing of a large number of Indians, but destroyed a considerable 
amount of camp equipment in the process. 31 The gunboat's attack had 
damaged the camp, but Evan Miles foot soldiers were able to bring the 
Indian fighting men to battle. 
After Birch Creek, Howard dispatched a troop of cavalry under 
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Captain Charles Bendire with a message to Miles. The infantry captain 
had the option of continuing the pursuit on any promising trail or join-
ing Howard. Miles opted for continuing the chase. Bendire found Miles 
on the Pendleton road, and after deciding to retain his independence, 
Miles continued up the road toward the Umatilla agency. In the early 
morning hours of the thirteenth, Miles' column was three miles from the 
reservation. At that point the Indian agent N. A. Cornyer joined the 
column. He informed Miles that the hostiles were threatening the agency 
and those Indians who had chosen to remain at peace. 32 Miles irranediately 
moved his tired troops the remaining distance and went into camp on the 
agency grounds. 33 
After a few hours rest, the men were awakened and they began pre-
paring breakfast. Their repast was rudely interrupted by the approach 
of a large number of Bannocks and Paiutes. The hostiles had been joined 
during the night by about fifty agency Indians, and the group obviously 
intended to raze the agency buildings and steal supplies. The discour-
teousness of the Indians irritated the hungry soldiers,who were quickly 
formed in line of battle. 
Miles placed Captain Rodney's two-battery battalion on a line facing 
south. The infantry were placed on Rodney's right,and their line curved 
so that the far right unit faced west. Captain Bendire's cavalry was 
posted to the extreme left of Rodney's batteries. A small reserve 
guarded the wagons and pack mules which were placed in a protected ra-
vine. Miles placed two howitzers near the left center of his line, 
supported by companies G and H of the 21st Infantry. 
Shortly after the soldiers formed their skirmish lines, the Indians 
opened a desultory fire from long range. The soldiers responded with 
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sporadic sniping. As the Bannocks, much like their soldier opponents, 
were not noted for their marksmanship, there were few casualties. This 
senseless waste of ammunition consumed several hours. 
By early afternoon, Miles and his men were tired of the meaningless 
exchange of fire. He ordered Rodney's two batteries to sweep the ravine 
which faced their part of the line. To do this, the artillery first 
moved by the right flank to the east. He then ordered his men to swing 
around one hundred and eighty degrees and charge into the depression. 
As Rodney's soldiers plunged into the ravine, Miles ordered the remainder 
of the line to advance. This sudden change in the nature of the battle 
caught the Indians by surprise. They began falling back before the 
charging troopers. In a short time, Indian resistance ended completely 
and the Bannocks and Paiutes fled. 
Encouraged by their success, the soldiers chased their opponents 
over the rocky ground west of the agency. After covering about three 
miles, Miles halted his troopers. His men, with scant rest and even 
less to eat, had reached the limit of their endurance. Miles decided 
to camp where his men had stopped in their chase of the hostiles. He 
planned to resume the venture on the following morning. However, Agent 
Cornyer persuaded Miles to change his mind. The agent pleaded with Miles 
to return to the agency as there were rumors that the Bannocks would re-
turn and burn it to the ground. Reluctantly,Miles consented. The weary 
soldiers slowly moved back to the agency, arriving shortly before mid-
. h 34 nig t. 
When Miles assumed the responsibility of protecting the agency, he 
effectively gave up any chance for a march on the hostiles. He did, 
however, sanction an attempt by some of the reservation Umatillas to 
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strike the fleeing Bannocks and Paiutes. The Umatillas had not taken 
part in the battle of the thirteenth. They sat on a nearby hillside 
and watched the spectacle much like the Roman spectators in the Coliseum. 
Milei rout of the Bannocks and Paiutes prompted the Umatillas to declare 
their support for the soldiers. The Umatillas achieved some measure of 
success in their subsequent sortie against the hostiles. In addition 
to recapturing some stock, they managed to kill Egan, the war chief of 
35 the renegades. 
The battle of the Umatilla agency was the last significant clash 
between the hostile Bannocks and Paiutes and the army. Until Rodney 
initiated his assault on the ravine, the battle was largely an ineffec-
tual exchange of poor marksmanship. The battle does pose intriguing 
questions with respect to artillery. Miles had two howitzers with him. 
They were placed within the infantry's line of operations. Why did he 
put them there? Why did he not use them? Rodney's batteries should 
have had the howitzers. If center of his defensive line was the most 
critical point, then Rodney should have been placed at that point. Even 
the proudest infantryman or cavalryman would admit that artillerymen 
knew how to serve and employ the guns better than they. In Miles' re-
port there was little mention of the guns and no explanation why they 
were not used. The twelve-pounders certainly could have discouraged 
the Indians from anything more than few furtive pot-shots. Consequently, 
the Umatilla fight, like the fight on Silver Creek, must be classified 
as a missed opportunity. It was another instance in which properly 
served cannons could have altered the course of the battle. 
After the battle with Miles' troops, the hostile bands fragmented. 
The death of Egan at the hand of the Umatillas created a vacuum of 
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leadership. Oytes, the medicine man, lacked the ability and prestige 
to lead the young men in battle. With this last major clash between the 
two sides, the campaign became a series of running skirmishes with the 
widely scattered remnants of the hostile camp. 
Some of the Indians moved toward the Grande Ronde Valley and the 
Wallowa Valley. Sanford's troops skirmished with these fugitives on 
the fifteenth. Others turned south backtracking on the trail which had 
led them to the Columbia. Lieutenant Colonel James Forsyth, now in 
command of Bernard's units, had a brisk running skirmish with this group 
.in a canyon on the John Day River. Wherever the Indians went, Howard 
was intent on running them to ground. His cavalry would follow any 
trail, no matter how small. The infantry and artillery would move to 
the various reservations. There they could scout the surrounding area, 
be in a position to support any cavalry engagement, and finally receive 
those hostile Indians tired of their flight. 
Throckmorton took charge of affairs at the Umatilla agency. His 
duties often placed him on the middle ground between the Indians and 
the whites. On one occasion,a group of whites from Pendleton killed 
an Indian within a mile of the agency and stole almost five hundred 
horses. Throckmorton went into Pendleton and "after a great deal of 
abuse on the part of the thieves" succeeded in getting most of the 
horses back. 36 He also had a warrant issued for the murderer of the 
Indian. The local citizens had helped the culprit escape, and 
Throckmorton doubted that the local deputy U.S. marshal would ever serve 
the warrant. 37 
On another occasion~Throckmorton investigated the killing of a 
white citizen named George Coggan. Three Indians were arrested and 
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charged with the murder. Throckmorton acted as defense council and sue-
ceeded in obtaining their release. He ultimately gathered sufficient 
evidence to indict six agency Indians for the crime. Three were found 
guilty and subsequently hanged. 
The disparity between the justice meted out for the whites and that 
administered to the Indians disturbed the captain. On one hand,. a white 
had killed and had blatantly defied punishment. When the Indians killed, 
every effort was made to insure the strictest justice. The fact of guilt 
or innocence was of little consequence. Throckmorton failed to see how· 
the Indians could ever trust and accept a system of laws so obviously 
· d. d · t h 38 preJU ice agains t em. 
While Throckmorton was trying to maintain some semblance of order 
on the Umatilla agency, Captain Marcus Miller was directing matters at 
the Malheur agency. Miller, with his own Battery E and two cavalry 
troops, had problems of a different sort. Hostile groups were still in 
the vicinity of the reservation. Never idle, the artillery captain had 
his cavalry troops in constant motion trying to find the hiding Indians. 
Often accompanying his patrols, Miller scoured the trails leading into 
Stein's Mountain, a favorite refuge of the Bannocks and Paiutes. 
On August the fourth, his efforts were rewarded. Two Indians ap-
proached Miller's outpost under a white flag. They told Miller that 
they wanted to surrender. He promised them that they would be treated 
as prisoners of war. Two days later, twenty-seven warriors and seventy-
two women and children surrendered at the agency. On the twelfth, Oytes 
with seventeen warriors and fifty-seven women and children also surren-
dered to Miller. Eighty-two more surrendered the following day. There 
would be other isolated skirmishes with isolated groups, but the Bannock 
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war was effectively over by the first of September. 39 
In the course of the Bannock campaign, artillery weapons for the 
most part were not used. Kress' use of his howitzer against the hostiles 
on the Columbia river was the single notable exception. A gatling was 
used by Bernard's cavalry, but gatlings are not a part of the ordnance 
studied in this work. The only explanation for the absence of cannons 
in the various phases of the campaign was personal inclination or dis-
inclination. The guns were available. Vancouver and Benicia Arsenals 
could have provided ample cannon and ammunition. In addition to this, 
most posts possessed at least one gun for morning reveille and evening 
retreat ceremonies. The mountain howitzer or steel gun, if one were 
available, certainly could have been packed on mules over the rugged 
terrain of Oregon. However, the various commanders decided to omit 
cannon from their list of campaign essentials. 
The explosive force of cannon fire could have materially affected 
all of the major engagements of the campaign. The guns could have pro-
vided covering fire which would have enabled Bernard's men to storm the 
Indians' positions on Silver Creek. As it occurred, the battle was an 
even draw. Cannon fire certainly would have had more effect than that 
of the gatlings on Birch Creek. This is assuming that the limitation 
of elevation could have been overcome. Even partially accurate shell-
fire would have prevented the ineffective and wasteful exchange between 
the soldiers and Indians at the Umatilla agency. Miles' cannons could 
have supported Rodney's flanking action in the same way they had Miller's 
maneuvers at the battle of the Clearwater. 
After the Umatilla fight, cannons would have been of questionable 
value. In the skirmishes which characterized the last days of the 
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campaign, rough terrain often separated the army from the Indians when 
the two met. Cannons could have immediately opened on the enemy while 
the cavalry occupied the terrain separating the two sides. However, 
the small size of the Indian bands might have made artillery inefficient 
in terms of cost and effort. The guns would have required pack animals 
for their transport and the movement of their ammunition. The animals 
and their forage were expensive. Because the cavalry could outgun the 
small bands, the power of the cannons would not have been critical to 
achieve victory. 
Some officers recognized the utility of cannon against the Bannocks 
and the Paiutes. Major L. s. Babbit, one of Howard's Ordnance officers, 
considered the mountain howitzer a practical weapon for Indian fighting. 
Carried on pack animals, it could go anywhere cavalry or infantry could 
go. However, Babbit felt that better cannons could be found. He sug-
gested a light steel gun which could be transported by mule be adopted 
for frontier service. In effect, the major was describing the Hotchkiss 
gun. Babbit did recognize one problem with using artillery against the 
Indians. Much of the ammunition in storage in the various arsenals 
across the country was of Civil War vintage. A large quantity of this 
ammunition was unserviceable. He often found cartridge bags so rotten 
that the ammunition literally fell apart when taken over rough terrain. 
Because of the huge stockpiles of ammunition left over from the war, 
serviceable ammunition could fortunately be found to replace that which 
was deteriorating. 40 
Although artillery weapons were little used in the_ campaign, artil-
lery units saw extensive service in the summer expedition against the 
hostiles. Much of that service was routine, demanding, with little 
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recognition. Rodney's two batteries were the only company-sized artil-
lery organizations which fought the Indian. Of the seven complete 
batteries and a portion of an eighth, all but two spent their time guard-
ing agenc'ies, escorting supply trains, and patrolling countless mountain 
and desert trails. It was necessary but agonizingly boring duty. 
Artillery captains Miller and Throckmorton spent a large part of 
the campaign tending the Malheur and Umatilla agencies. This added an 
administrative responsibility to their already complicated military 
duties. Consequently, artillery units and officers were decisively 
involved in every facet of the campaign. Batteries D and G, under 
Rodney met the Bannocks and Paiutes in battle. Batteries E, M, and a 
portion of F spent much of their time supervising the agencies. Light 
Battery B, and Batteries H and K, spent most of the campaign escorting 
supplies or marching from one trouble spot to another. The experience 
of the last two batteries well illustrated the fact that in Indian 
fighting more time was spent marching than fighting. 
The two batteries initially took the field on June 12. 41 They 
were at Camp McDermitt on July 1, when Captain Miller arrived. When 
the hostiles turned north to the. Columbia River the two batteries were 
ordered to return to San Francisco as quickly as possible. That re-
quired a forced march from McDermitt to the railhead at Winnemucca and 
a long train ride to San Francisco. On the coast they joined Major 
Mizner's two companies of the 21st Infantry. Mizner took his command 
first to Portland and then down river to Umatilla by steamer. The four 
units then patrolled the region until the end of the hostilities. 42 
Captains John Egan and Franklin Smith had moved their batteries from one 
side of the battleground to the other via a long circuitous route. All 
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that effort went unrewarded by a confrontation with the enemy. 
Although Indian fighting was beyond the normal scope of their du-
ties, many of the batteries of the 4th had developed a certain espirit 
as Indian fighters. Three Indian campaigns in a five year period brought 
a sense of professional worth. Even though they generally fought and 
marched as infantry instead of artillery, they were functioning as sol-
diers. They met their country's enemies in combat, the principal mis-
sion of all men of arms. Countless months of drilling in fortifications 
never threatened by enemy ships sapped the enthusiasm of even the most 
spirited man. The Indian campaigns gave them the opportunity to fulfill 
their roles as soldiers. 
, 
Compared to the Nez Perce war and the expeditions of the plains, 
the Bannock campaign was certainly of a lesser magnitude. However, even 
the most insignificant skirmish between the races warrants citation as 
they represented a milieu which characterized the American West for two 
hundred years. The Bannock war certainly merits more study than the 
superficial works which are available today. 
In a similar way, the participation of the artillery must be recog-
nized as an integral part of the campaign. The men who marched from the 
coastal forts of California, Oregon, and Washington were a major part of 
Howard's expedition. They supervised Indian reservations, established 
and maintained supply depots, and marched hundreds of miles in search 
of the enemy. The fact that other units met the hostiles in battle 
can only be explained as the fates of war. 
By the early 1880s, the major Indian wars were over. However, one 
final campaign remained. The last clash between the Army and the 
American Indian occurred in a region well known to both sides, the 
z3i 
Northern Plains. The protagonists, the Sioux and the 7th Cavalry, knew 
each other well. However, this time the 7th was supported by cannon. 
The absence of artillery in the Bannock war exists in sharp contrast to 
the performance of artillerymen and their guns in the last Indian cam-
paign. 
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CHAPTER X 
THE LAST CAMPAIGN 
By 1889, the Indian wars of the American West were mostly memories. 
Some of the first battles between the races fought after the Civil War 
were more than twenty years in the past. The Wagon Box fight and Custer's 
Washita were now only stories to be told to young soldiers around camp-
fires. However, one final chapter remained in the story of the conflict 
between the white man and the red man--the Sioux uprising of 1890. The 
army's efforts in the Dakotas in 1890 were different than previous con-
frontations with the Indian. The major objective of the soldiers was to 
prevent an outbreak rather than seek the Indian in battle after hostili-
ties had begun. It was hoped that a show of force along with attempts 
to keep the various bands apart would prevent a conflagration. Unfortu-
nately, allefforts to avoid conflict were futile. 
The Sioux campaign was also unique in that artillery units were 
equipped and actually served as cannon batteries. Light artillery batter-
ies had not marched in an Indian campaign on the plains for more than 
twenty years. Artillerymen who had exchanged rifle shots with the 
American Indian normally did so as infantrymen or cavalrymen. Of the 
two light batteries which were sent to the Dakotas, one played a signifi-
cant role 1n the two engagements which occurred during the campaign. This 
chapter will focus primarily on the actions of this battery. Many histor-
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ians who have written of the last Sioux war have inaccurately portrayed 
the artillery. It is indeed ironic that the role of the cannons and the 
cannoneers in the west is generally overlooked, and when they are discussed, 
the narrative is distorted. 
In the fall of 1889, eleven Sioux from the Dakota reservations 
journeyed to Nevada to investigate the story of an Indian Messiah. The 
Messiah, a Paiute named Wovoka, claimed to be a chosen messenger from God. 
His doctrine proclaimed the return of the buffalo and of long deceased 
Indians to a land devoid of white men. The Sioux emissaries eagerly 
accepted this message and upon their return to the Dakotas spread it among 
their respective bands. Hunger due to inadequate rations and frustration 
due to broken promises created a fertile ground for the message of Wovoka. 
There was one significant modification of the Sioux version of the 
Messiah's gospel. The inevitable demise of the white man would be a 
violent one, according to the Sioux, and not the peaceful withdrawal 
which Wovoka had described. 1 
The intensity with which the Sioux adopted the Messiah's movement 
and the furor with which they danced the Ghost Dance alarmed the various 
Indian agents on the reservations. The coming Indian millenium and the 
inevitable disappearance of the whites made some of the Sioux less than 
receptive to the guidance of their white guardians. By the fall of 1890, 
the agents' control over the reservations was deteriorating. Soon the 
Ghost Dancers were openly disregarding the agents' directives and defying 
the Indian police. In November, the agent at the Cheyenne River agency 
reported that the Sioux were armed and that an outbreak was inevitable. 
Agent E.B. Reynolds reported similar information from the Rosebud agency. 
However, tension appeared greatest at the Pine Ridge agency in south-
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west South Dakota. This was unfortunate as agent D.F. Royer, a recent 
appointment of the new Republican administration, had been at the agency 
only a short time. Although he was inexperienced, Royer knew that the 
situation at Pine Ridge was quickly getting out of . control. Special 
Indian Agent James Cooper, who had been sent to Pine Ridge to investigate 
the distrubance, concurred that an outbreak was a distinct probability. 2 
On November 14, 1890, the Interior Department asked the War Depart-
ment to prevent the Sioux from leaving the reservation. The Secretary of 
War in turn directed the Commanding General of the Army, Major General 
John Schofield, to prevent an outbreak. Schofield considered the situa-
tion to be critical. There would be tremendous loss of life if the 
Sioux broke into a general uprising. If other tribes joined them, the 
whole army would not be able to contain the wave of devastation which 
ld h 1 . 3 wou sweep t e p ains. Schofield moved quickly to thwart such an event. 
Within a week, Army units began moving toward the Sioux reservations. 
Ultimately, half of the cavalry and infantry regiments in the Regular 
Army and two light artillery batteries marched to the northern plains. 
Once in the region of the Dakotas, the massive concentrations of 
troops came under the control of Major General Nelson A. Miles. A 
veteran Indian fighter, Miles commanded the Division of the Missouri, 
formerly the Military Division of the Missouri. Miles major subordinates 
in the troubled area were Brigadier Generals John Brooke and Thomas Ruger. 
Although the affected reservations belonged to Ruger, the closest 
troops were those of Brooke's Department of the Platte. Brooke, at 
Miles direction, took personal charge of the troops converging on the 
Pine Ridge reservation. Miles ultimately left his headquarters in 
Chicago and took charge of all the units on the northern plains. Miles' 
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principal objective was to "anticipate the movement of the hostile Indians 
and arrest or overpower them in detail before they had time to concentrate 
4 
in one large body." 
During the latter part of November, Schofield began identifying those 
units destined for service in the Dakotas. In light of subsequent events, 
the most important orders for movement went to Fort Riley, Kansas. Bri-
gadier General Wesley Merritt alerted the Seventh Cavalry to prepare for 
movement to the north. The same orders reached Battery E of the First 
Artillery and Battery F of the Fourth Artillery. Miles wanted cannons 
in addition to cavalry and infantry. 5 
In most of his campaigns against the American Indian, General Miles 
used some form of artillery. He understood and appreciated the effective-
ness of artillery, particularly the little Hotchkiss mountain gun. For 
the coming campaign, Miles planned to have at least one mountain gun with 
every squadron in the field. Artillerymen would man the guns instead of 
detached infantrymen or cavalrymen. 6 The three light batteries at Fort 
Riley could provide gun detachments for as many as twelve squadrons. 
Miles problem was finding enough mountain guns. 
The Fort Riley batteries had recently acquired the new 3.2 inch steel 
field gun. Prior to this they used old Civil War - era 3 inch rifles 
which had been re-bored to accomodate the 3.2 inch ammunition. Unfortu-
nately,the new steel rifles were heavy, too heavy to keep up with the 
fast moving squadrons which Miles planned to use to intercept the roving 
Sioux bands. However, there were only two of the much lighter mountain 
guns in Brooke's department, and only another twelve in Miles' entire 
command. Consequently, Miles requested and received guns from Rock 
Island Arsenal in Illinois, Benicia Arsenal in California, and Fort 
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Monroe in Virginia. 7 The artillery would use the light mountain guns and 
not the heavier but more powerful field guns. 
In the early morning hours of November 24, the Seventh Cavalry reg1-
ment entrained at Fort Riley for Pine Ridge. Captain Allyn Capton's 
Battery E, First Artillery was attached to the Seventh for the move. 
Captain George Bridges Rodney's Battery F, Fourth Artillery was also 
going north. Rodney's unit was destined for Ruger's Department of 
Dakota. Half of Battery F was being sent to Fort Snelling, Minnesota. 
8 The other half was ordered to Fort Meade. Although both batteries took 
their new rifled field guns, neither took ammunition. Schofield subsequent-
9 ly ordered one thousand shells to be sent to Miles for guns. Counting the 
Hotchkiss guns, the 3.2 inch rifles, and the ammunition ordered for 
these weapons, more artillery was massed for the Sioux campaign of 1890 
than any other expedition 1n the history of the Indian wars. 
The troop train carrying the Seventh and Battery E pulled into 
Rushville, Nebraska, in the early morning hours of November 26. Much of 
the morning and part of the afternoon was spent unloading troops and 
supplies. Evening found the command in camp on White Clay Creek about 
ten miles from Rushville. A march of fifteen miles the following day 
brought the soldiers to Pine Ridge. 10 Their arrival swelled the ranks 
of the troops which Brooke would use to control the restless Sioux. 11 
In addition to surrounding the affected reservations with a cordon 
of soldiers, Miles wanted to arrest those Indian leaders who were inciting 
their followers to break out. Principal among this group were Little 
Wound of the Oglalla, Four Strike of the Brule~ Big Foot of the Minnecon-
jou, and especially the Hunkpapa's aging leader, Sitting Bull. Ultimately, 
Little Wound and Two Strike were persuaded by Brooke to come in to Pine 
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Ridge. However, an attempt by Indian police to arrest Sitting Bull ended in 
disaster. A dozenindians, including six Indian policemen and Sitting Bull; 
died in a chaotic but brief exchange of gunfire at Sitting Bull's lodgings 
on Grand River. The great chief's death subsequently complicated the 
capture of Big Foot. 
The Minneconjou band of Sioux were located on the bank of the Cheyenne 
River near the Cheyenne River agency. The news of Sitting Bull's death 
created a sense of anxiety and apprehension. Matters were made worse 
with the arrival of a cavalry detachment under Lieutenant Colonel E.V. 
Sumner. After a talk with Sumner, Big Foot agreed to accompany him to the 
agency. On the night of December 23, Big Foot changed his mind and 
quietly led his people out of their camp. At daylight an embarrassed 
Sumner ale.rted Miles that the Minneconjou had fled. 12 
The escape infuriated Miles. He quickly dispatched columns to pre-
vent the fugitives from reaching the Sioux stronghold in the badlands 
north of Pine Ridge. Major Guy Henry's battalion of the Ninth Cavalry left 
Pine Ridge on Christmas Day. The buffalo soldiers were to patrol the White 
Clay Creek area. Three days later, Major Samuel Whitside and a battalion 
of the Seventh also left the agency in search of the elusive Indians. 
Artillery detachments, as per Miles instructions, accompanied both de-
tachments. 
When Henry's troopers left the agency, they took a detachment of 
Battery E with them. Lieutenant John Hayden commanded the Hotchkiss gun 
crew with the Ninth. Lieutenant Harry Hawthorne commanded the two gun crews 
which rode out with Whitside's battalion. The balance of Battery E, 
under Capron, remained at the agency. They would move out if the second 
battalion of the Seventh were required to take the field. 13 
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Whitside's troopers, after only one day's search, found Big Foot's 
band near Porcupine Butte. After a few tense moments, Big Foot agreed 
to allow the soldiers to escort his band to a camp on Wounded Knee Creek 
about twelve miles northeast of Pine Ridge. During the night the rest 
of the Seventh, under the command of Colonel James Forsyth, and Capron's 
two guns joined Whitside. Forsyth intended to disarm the warriors the 
following day. Brooke informed Forsyth before his departure that if the 
Indians resisted, the Seventh was to destroy them. 14 
On the morning of December 29, the various unit commanders positioned 
their troops around the Indian village. Their mission was to disarm the 
Indians and prevent another escape. Then Forsyth summoned all of the 
braves to a council on the north side. of the village. Forming them in 
a semicircle, the Colonel informed them that their weapons would have to 
be surrendered. This caused considerable discussion and some movement 
from the circle to the village and vice versa. Forsyth redeployed two 
troops of cavalry between the council and village to stop this movement. 
Capron and his men watched the proceedings from a hill a short distance 
to the north-west. During the night their guns had been trained on the 
village. Now Capron ordered his gunners to re-sight their weapons on 
the assembled warriors. 
Forsyth's order to surrender the weapons met with little success. 
Only a few obsolete, worn-out rifles were brought forward. The cavalry 
colonel then ordered a search of the village. Combing through the lodges, 
amidst the loud protest of the women, soldiers found another forty weapons. 
Forsyth finally concluded that the braves themselves would have to be 
physically searched. 
This last action intensified the anxiety among the warriors. As the 
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first braves stepped forward to be searched, a medicine man rose and 
began dancing. He criticized the warriors for allowing the soldiers to 
dominate them. He told them to resist, for their sacred ghost shirts 
would keep the soldiers' guns from harming them. Forsyth, exasperated 
at this harangue, ordered two soldiers to silence the man. A scuffle 
resulted, and the medicine man's rifle went off. Immediately, a group of 
warriors cast off their blankets, raised their rifles and fired. The 
soldiers, some not more than twenty feetaway, returned the point-blank 
fire. 
With these first volleys between the Indians and the soldiers, the 
immediate area became enveloped in a haze of smoke and dust. Both sides 
merged in a desperate struggle at close quarters. Knives and clubs be-
came effective tools of death. The Indian bullets were doubly destruc-
tive. Those that failed to strike a soldier passed into the village 
where the warien and children were fleeing ·from their tipis. 
On the high ground to the northwest, Capron held his fire. He knew 
that shell fire at that time would be fatal to friend as well as to foe. 
He directed one nervous gunner to remove the friction primer from his 
gun lest an inadvertant shell be sent into the confused, tangled mass of 
bodies below the hill. When the Indians finally broke through the line 
of K Troop and the remnants of B and K troop withdrew to the cavalry 
camp, the battery began firing by platoon. 15 
Capton opened fire with his two guns on a group of Indians fleeing 
southwest along the agency road. Hawthorne's platoon engaged the warriors 
who had fled to the village and were firing at the cavalry from there. As 
the fighting continued, the warriors, now mixed with the women and 
children, scattered to the west, south and east. Consequently,the dis-
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tances between the battery and some of the fleeing clusters of Indians 
16 
approached two thousand yards. 
As Capron fired at any group of Indians firing at the cavalry, Haw-
thorne shelled the ravine south of the Indian village. The warriors who 
had taken refuge there were pouring a galling fire on the troopers. For 
the most part, this group was safe from the mountain guns. Because of the 
extremely flat trajectory of the guns, few shells landed in the ravine. 
Some landed uncomfortably close to A and I troops who were located south 
f h . 17 o t e ravine. Those shells that did hit in the ravine spent most of 
their fragmentation on the far bank. 
Hawthrone saw that it would be necessary to take a gun closer to the 
ravine. In the process of moving one of his two guns, he was struck by 
a bullet which shattered his watch, driving parts of the mechanism into 
his body. Command of the gun then fell to a twenty-one year old Corporal, 
Paul H. Weinert. With one of his men carrying the wounded Hawthrone to 
safety, Weinert and the other crewman maneuvered the gun into the mouth 
of the ravine. Although their clothes and the gun were riddled with 
bullets, the two artillerymen persisted and eventually the firing from 
18 the ravine ceased. 
While the gunners fired on pockets of resistance, the troopers chased 
the scattering Indians. Miles' and Brooke's instructions forbade an 
escape, and Forsyth tried to round up the fleeing Sioux. One detachment 
of troopers ran into an unexpected obstacle. When the firing began, some 
of the Indians at Pine Ridge mounted their ponies and rode toward the 
sound of battle. They inadvertantly intercepted one of the detachments 
searching the foothills for fugitives. A brisk exchange of gun fire 
19 forced the troopers to beat a hasty retreat to the main body. 
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In the space of an hour the fighting was over. By the early after-
noon a tragic, somber silence prevailed at Wounded Knee Creek. Stretcher-
bearers criss-crossed the battlefield searching for those who were injured, 
Indian and white. The Seventh, especially B and K troop, bore the brunt 
of the soldier casualities. Three officers and more than sixty men were 
killed or wounded in the flight. Hawthrone was the only artilleryman 
seriously injured. Corporal Weinert and Private Geogre Green miraculously 
escaped injury amidst the flying lead in the ravine. 
Big Foot's band suffered staggering losses. Eighty-five warriors 
died either on the battlefield or later of wounds they received during 
their struggle with the soldiers. Tragically, sixty-eight women and 
children perished as a result of the fighting. Forsyth managed to evacu-
ate twenty-nine wounded Indians to medical facilities at Pine Ridge. 
Seven of these died, primarily because the wounded Indians refused to 
20 be treated by the army surgeons. 
Forsyth led his battered command away from the battlefield in the 
early afternoon. His casualities and the Indian wounded required 
immediate medical attention. He was also aware that the Indians at 
Pine Ridge might sally forth and attack his crippled command. Low on 
ammunition and medical supplies, the troops could only sustain more 
casualities. It was dark when the Seventh trudged into the agency. 
Their reception committee consisted only of the infantry guarding the 
buildings. Most of the Indians had fled. 
The battle on Wounded Knee Creek seemed to insure the very thing the 
army had hoped to prevent, an Indian uprising. Many of the bands at 
Pine Ridge fled to the stronghold when news of the fighting reached 
them. On other reservations, Indians solemnly weighed the consequences 
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of an all-out war on the whites. Some refused to take up the rifle, 
while others demanded some degree of revenge for the women and children 
cut down by the pony soldiers. Sensing the last possibility, the troops 
at Pine Ridge dug trenches in anticipation of a massive retaliatory 
attack by the enraged Sioux. 
A verification of the impending clash came the next day when a supply 
train belonging to the Ninth Cavalry was attacked near the agency. Troops 
from the Seventh and the Ninth rode to the rescue of their comrades. For 
Henry's black cavalrymen, the effort was almost more than they could 
handle. They had marched more than fifty miles the previous day in res-
ponse to the news of the fighting between the Sioux and the Seventh. 
21 Consequently, the horses and the men who rode them were worn out. 
Later the same morning, Brooke noticed smoke in the direction of the 
Catholic mission five miles north of the agency. Brooke feared that the 
Indians might be venting their revenge on the missionaries. Consequently, 
he dispatched the Seventh to rescue the mission if it was in fact under 
22 
attack. Without even pausing to eat a meager breakfast, Forsyth's 
troopers took to the saddle for the second time 1n as many hours. Initially, 
Forsyth directed Henry battalion to accompany him. He changed his mind 
when Henry asked to remain behind due to the jaded condition of his 
men and horses. 
After a short ride, Forsyth, all eight troops of the Seventh, and 
Capron's battery reached the mission. Although the mission itself was 
not under attack, three adjacent log buildings were ablaze. A small 
band of Sioux had fired the buildings earlier that morning and then 
fled down the valley in which the mission was situated. At this point, 
Forsyth decided to return to the agency. However, he changed his mind 
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when his scouts reported firing down the valley. Thinking that other 
army units might be engaged with the hostiles, Forsyth pushed his troopers 
in the direction of the firing. A short distance past the mission, Whitside's 
battalion made contact with a group of braves numbering between fifty and 
seventy. A charge by the troopers routed the Indians from the{r posi-
23 
tions on the high ground bordering the valley. . 
Forsyth did not want to pursu~ the Indians. He knew that Brooke did 
. h d' 24 not want to excite t e In ians. The approach of a cavalry column, Forsyth 
reasoned, could drive the Indians further away from the reservation. There-
fore, he began to withdraw his regiment from the valley. The retrograde 
had only begun when the Indians began a long-distance fire for the hills 
bordering the valley. Forsyth was forced to deploy his men in a difficult 
effort to clear the distant hills of the harassing braves. However, he 
continued to move in the direction of the agency, using one battalion to 
cover the withdrawal of the other. 
Convinced that the Indians still on the reservation would move to 
block his path of retreat, Forsyth dispatched a courier with orders for 
Henry to join him at once. It cook the buffalo soldiers more than thirty 
minutes to cover the five miles separating Forsyth from Pine Ridge. 
Upon reaching the scene, Henry deployed his men and Hayden's mountain 
gun on a ridge dominating Forsyth's line of retreat. The boom of Hay-
den's Hotchkiss gun and the arrival of more pony soldiers prompted the 
warriors to give up their efforts to surround Forsyth's men. With the 
Indians returning to their villages, the soldiers took up the march to 
P . .d 2s ine Ri ge. 
The fighting at Drexel's Mission was a skirmish by comparison with 




Two soldiers, one an officer, were killed and only six were wounded.-
The Indian casualities, if any, were unknown. Its significance to the 
Sioux campaign of 1890 was that it was the last clash between the Indians 
and the soldiers. A combination of diplomacy and subtle military pressure 
finally forced the fugitive Indians to their agencies. 
By the second week of January, 1891, the Sioux campaign, the last 
campaign of the Indian wars, was over. After a grand review, held mostly 
for the benefit of General Miles, the regiments and separate units began 
the return trip to their home posts. On January 24, Capron's battery, 
along with the Seventh Cavalry, boarded a train at Rushville for the re-
turn trip to Fort Riley. Although the fighting was over, the campaign in 
the Dakotas had one final tragic consequence for Battery E. Enroute to 
Kansas, the troop train on which the battery was riding collided with a 
passenger train. One sergeant was killed and another enlisted man from 
B . . d 27 attery E was inJure . 
The campaign of 1890 was different from previous attempts to subdue 
the American Indian in two respects. First, the major field commander, 
General Miles, amassed a considerable amount of artillery. Miles' arsenal 
included rifled steel field guns, light mountain guns, and gatling guns. 
Where possible, artillery detachments served the guns instead of details 
from infantry or cavalry units. Second, the army's initial plan was to 
prevent hostilities by keeping the tribes separate. A display of 
superior force was intended to convince the isolated bands that resistance 
was futile. 
Within the framework of this second point, there is some question 
as to the need for artillery at the first confrontation on Wounded Knee 
Creek. Forsyth's orders, primarily, were to disarm the Indians and then 
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take them to a railhead for movement to Omaha. He had more than four 
hundred troops to accomplish this task. This gave him a four-to-one 
superiority over the braves of Big Foot's band. There was little chance 
that Big Foot's band could best the Seventh in battle. Capron's battery, 
therefore, went to Wounded Knee Creek to prevent a battle, not to fight 
one. 
Undoubtedly, Forsyth wanted the mountain guns present to dispel any 
notion of escape the Indians might have. Resistance to the four hundred 
troopers surrounding the camp and to the guns on the hill would be 
suicide. The presence of Battery E and the troop dispositions clearly 
show that Forsyth's object was to disarm the Indians and prevent flight. 
Unfortunately, Forsyth reasoned as a man not caught up in the fervor of the 
Ghost Dance. The warriors took up the gauntlet with the assurance that 
their ghost shirts would protect them from the soldier~ rifles and 
cannons. Therefore, misconceptions on both sides caused the battle and 
the tragedy of Wounded Knee. 
Once the fighting began, the guns of Captain Capron became tools of 
war, and not tools of intimidation. When Capron saw that the troops were 
no longer mingled with the Indians, he opened fire. The guns were effec-
tive in engaging Indian positions which the cavalrymen could not physically 
attack. The accuracy of the mountain gun allowed the gunners to fire on 
targets more than a mile away. Indeed the gunners could cover more ground 
in a shorter time than the Seventh's troopers. 
The nature of the battle, however, made casualities among the women 
and children inevitable. It was impossible to distinguish men from 
women, as both were wrapped in heavy winter clothing. Children mixed 
with the adults often caught those bullets meant for the braves. This 
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explains the losses among women and to a degree children far better than 
the notion that the troopers and the artillerymen intentionally fired 
at non-combatants. 
Father Francis Kraft, a witness and casuality of the battle,testified: 
It is possible that by this fire (the cannon fire) some 
women and children were killed. If so, the killing was 
unavoidable as the soldiers could hardly have distinguished 
them from the men amo28 whom they were who were firing 
backward as they ran. 
Capron admitted that his guns probably caused injuries among the non-
combatants. He, like Kraft,, maintained· that it was impossible to avoid 
h . . h 29 itting t em. Even if the braves could have been distinguished from 
the others, it would have been equally impossible to fire at them without 
inflicting casualities among those around them. Flying shrapnel from 
exploding shells does not discriminate in bringing pain or death. Capron's 
gunners undoubtedly wounded or killed non-combatants, but it was an 
unfortunate circumstance of their firing on an enemy, which was their 
duty as soldiers. 
By contrast, the role of the artillery at Drexel's Mission was ob-
scure at best. Forsyth made no mention of the battery in his initial 
report or his subsequent statements. However, Henry singled out Hayden 
for praise. Hayden's gun "drove the Indians from the ravines and houses 
and scattered many collecting groups." According to Henry, each shot 
was followed by cheers which completely demoralized the Indians. 30 
Ironically, Forsyth made no mention of Hayden's actions in his report. 
Forsyth's silence on Capron's activities might be due to the perception 
he had of the skirmish. 
General Miles severely censured Forsyth for the Drexel's Mission 
fight. Miles maintained that Forsyth was surrounded and the Seventh 
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was saved only by the timely arrival of the Ninth. Forsyth contended that 
his men were never in serious danger. He insisted that the Seventh was 
successfully withdrawing down the valley with no major pressure from the 
d . 31 In ians. If Miles' analysis was correct, Forsyth's predicament said 
little for Capron's guns. His mountain guns should have been more than 
able to sweep the ridges and therefore cover the withdrawal. If Forsyth 
could have been believed, then his silence concerning the guns is under-
standable. There would be no reason to comment on the effectiveness of 
the guns if the skirmish was of little consequence. The true value of 
the artillery at Drexel's Mission will largely remain unknown. 
The last part of the examination of the artillery in the final 
Sioux campaign concerns certain gross inaccuracies in the standard por-
trayal of Wounded Knee. The fighting between the Seventh and Big Foot's 
band and the tragic loss of Indian lives has come to epitomize the general 
injustice done to the American Indian. The death and injury of many women 
and children has been used to characterize the army's actions in the 
Indian wars as a malicious effort to exterminate the red man. The des-
truction credited to the cannons has often been cited to support this 
last point. Generally, the guns are portrayed as firing almost fifty rounds 
a minute and therefore obliterating the field of battle. 32 In reality, 
the battery was physically incapable of the first point and doubtfully 
successful on the second. 
With respect to the battery's volume of fire, the first point of 
doubt rests on the characteristics of the gun. The Hotchkiss gun, designed 
in the 1870's, had no true recoil system. Therefore, it did not have a 
mechanism which absorbed the recoil from firing and returned the gun to 
the initial firing position. This meant that every time the weapon was 
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fired, the gun and carriage move backward. 
Capron testified after the battle that his first targets were approxi-
mately three hundred yards from his position. 33 At such a range the tube 
of the weapon would have been at zero degrees elevation or less. The recoil 
from firing and the resulting backward movement would be greatest when the 
tube was in this position. During firing trials conducted in 1885, the gun 
34 
recoiled eighteen feet at an elevation of three degrees. Therefore, 
firing the gun without returning it to a primary firing or aiming posi-
tion would have resulted in the battery's gradual withdrawal from the 
field of battle. Repositioning the weapon along with loading and sight-
ing took time -- too much time for the battery to achieve anything approach-
. f'f d . 35 ing i ty roun s a minute. 
A second consideration which cast doubts on the high rat2 of fire 
concerned the amount of ammunition available at Wounded Knee. Colonel 
Forsyth, 0verall commander of troops, estimated that the most intense 
f h b 1 1 d . 36 part o t e att e aste twenty minutes. The entire battle lasted 
less than an hour. If the battery had fired fifty rounds a minute, it 
would have expended almost one thousand rounds in twenty minutes. There 
is no reason to assume that Capron carried this much ammunition with him 
to Wounded Knee. Capron's understanding of the battery's role in the 
coming operation would have reflected the attitude of the s~nior commander. 
As Forsyth did not anticipate trouble, it was doubtful that Capron would 
have carried more than the normal ammunition load, which was approximately 
four hundred rounds. 37 Accepting this number of shells as the maximum 
Capron would have, and the claimed rate of fire, the guns would have 




A realistic estimate of the battery's volume of fire has been diffi-
cult to ascertain, for there was no mention of the total number of rounds 
fired in any battle account. Many variables, such as the battery's state 
of training, the condition of the guns, and the location of the ammunition 
mules, would affect the volume of fire. It must also be remembered that 
cannons were limited in their rate of fire due to the heat generated 
within the weapon. Modern cannons. are restricted to ten rounds a minute 
for the first three minutes and three rounds a minute thereafter. 39 A 
consistently high volume of fire could damage or even destroy the gun. 
If a reasonable volume of fire was needed to complete an accurate pic-
ture of the fighting at Wounded Knee, then a total of from eight to 
twelve rounda a minute would have been used. This is speculative, but 
it is based an understanding of what both the men and the guns could 
and could not do in battle. 
The second major point of contention with the standard intrepretation 
concerned the destructiveness of the guns. Aside from the obvious 
difference made by accepting a reasonable rate of fire, the caliber of 
the gun should be considered. Most accounts of the battle accurately 
describe the mountain gun as being of 1.65 inches in caliber and firing 
a shell weighing slightly more than two pounds. However, authors have 
failed to provide any appreciation of the effectiveness or destructive 
capability of the shell. The bursting charge of the shell contained 
only 1. 76 ounces of powder. The impacting shell, including the bursting 
charge, weighed alittle more than one pound. 40 The total explosive 
force of the shell would be less than that of a modern hand grenade. 
It is therefore difficult to accept that the first volley of the battery 
(four shells) inflicted half of the total Indian casualities as has been 
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1 . 41 c aimed. It is not argued that the guns on the hill did not inflict 
casualities. It is argued that the gunners of Capron's battery did not 
obliterate the village and decimate the Indians with a hurricane of 
shells coming at the rate of fifty a minute. 
Four days after Christmas, 1890, on a cold windswept field in 
South Dakota, Battery E, First Artillery opened fire in support of the 
Seventh Cavalry. Any Indian who fired at the troopers brought himself 
to the attention of the gunners on the hill. Minutes later he received 
fire from the small mountain guns. The exploding Hotchkiss shells 
brought injury and death to the Indians, combatant and non-combatant 
alike. The only way the battery could have avoided hurting women and 
children would have been to remain silent, letting the burden of battle 
rest solely on the cavalrymen. As soldiers, the artillerymen could not 
do this. Wounded Knee was not an act of revenge on the part of Capron's 
men any more than it was for Forsyth's Seventh. It was combat with an 
enemy often barely visible. For the soldiers of Battery E, Wounded 
Knee was neither a point of honor nor a point of shame. 
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CHAPTER XI 
THE ARTILLERY IN THE WEST 
In the days that followed the fall of the Confederacy the Regular 
Army was given an almost insurmountable task. A portion of the army was 
to apply a punitive reconstruction to a restive but conqaered South. The 
remaining regiments were to protect the iiation; s citizens not only from 
foreign attack but alsu from the tribes of the West. Its strength re-
duced .to a mere handful, its equipment outdated, the army labored under 
both burdens. The end of Reconstruction brought no relief. The stirrings 
of social unrest in the east and far west mandated the presence of an 
organized force to preseiirve federal law. That portion of the army in the 
west faced the greatest challenge. 
The small garrisons of the West were ordered to protect settlements 
scattered across several thousand miles of western landscape. Railroad 
and wagon road construction parties also clamored for security. The army 
faced a diverse, complex set of cultures in the western tribes they were 
to control. The Indians of the west often possessed a mobility and a 
knowledge of the West which the army could not match. Hindered by a 
laggard communications system and a logistics nightmare, th= army found 
little success in even catching the elusive tribes. The absence of a 
tactical doctrine for Indian fighting made success in battle uncertain 
even when the army managed to catch its adversary. 
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A major limitation to the frontier army was the lack of manpower. 
Frontier garrisons frequently had to be reinforced when major hostilities 
erupted between the races. Quite often the troops moving to support the 
western posts were artillerymen. Generally, artillery was considered un-
suited for Indian warfare. The accepted role for artillery limited it 
to conflicts between organized, national armies. Cannon fire was consid-
ered appropriate for massed formations, seldom for small groups, and never 
for individuals. In addition, the mounted batteries were armed with wea-
pons, the Napoleon and Rodman guns, considered too heavy for frontier 
service. Therefore, the batteries which went west and fought the Indian 
normally did so ai::; infantry or cavalry. The presence and role of artil-
lery units was the prerogative of the major army commander. Lacking a 
tactical doctrine which specified artillery duties, the batteries' roles 
varied from campaign to campaign. 
Those who omitted artillery from the Indian service robbed the wes-
tern commands of a valuable resource. Subsequent events disproved most 
of the "limitations" attributed to organized artillery units. Although 
some cannons were too heavy for mountains and plains, there were guns 
light enough to accompany the fastest column. The march of Otis' battery 
in the Nez Peret war proved that pack artillery was durable and mobile. 
Otis' men and guns kept pace with the cavalry across truly forbidding 
ground. Many of the major expeditions in the 1860s and 1870s were sup-
plied by wagon trains. Wheeled cannons certainly moved as fast and as 
easily as four-wheeled freight wagons. 
In battle against small bands of Indians, artillery probably did 
constitute overkill. However, the Indian army which confronted Crook at 
the Rosebud and destroyed Custer at the Little Big Horn was not small. 
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On several notable occasions, Indians either attacked an expedition or 
column or stood to face it in battle. The Rosebud was certainly an exam-
ple of the former, and the Clearwater an example of the latter. In many 
of the major battles, the army actually fought on the defensive. Miles' 
actions at Cedar Creek and Wolf Mountain more than prove the value of 
artillery in defense against attacking Indians. 
However, cannons at western posts usually performed the critical 
task of signalling the beginning and the end of the work day. The con-
dition of the guns normally suffered due to simple neglect. Make-shift 
crews of infantry and cavalry served the weapons when they chanced to 
take the field. Disaster uften resulted from the crew's attempts to use 
a weapon they did not unJerstaud. The fully of the Big Hole howitzer 
fully illustrated this. When temporary gun crews were effective, such as 
at Soldier's Creek, it was often due to the fact that they were comprised 
of ex-artillerymen. 
Infrequently,trained artillerymen manned the guns against the Indians. 
The results were destructive to the Indian. Thomas' mortars converted 
Captain Jack's Stronghold into a death trap. Jack fled his refuge rather 
than endure an evil he could not defend against. Humphrey's guns kept 
/ 
the Nez Perce from routing Howard's line at the Clearwater. Capron's 
Hotchkiss guns disproved the invulnerability of the Ghost Shirts on the 
frozen ground of Wounded Knee. There might have been more instances such 
these had the army adopted a flexible doctrine and resources suitable to 
the conditions and adversaries it faced in the West. 
Even when doctrinal myopia converted batteries into infantry compan-
ies and cavalry troops, artillerymen served well. Captain Marcus Miller 
; 
commanded admirably during the Modoc, Nez Perce, and Bannock campaigns. 
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He was twice brevetted for gallantry in action against the Indians. 
Captain Henry Hasbrouck's men hounded Captain Jack's band until the ma-
jority surrendered to him. He, too, was brevetted for meritorous conduct 
and gallantry in action. Lieutenants Hawthorne and Humphrey were award-
ed the Congressional Medal of Honor for heroism at Wounded Knee and the 
Clearwater battles respectively. 
For artillery regiments after the Civil War, routine was typified 
by monotonous drill at a coastal fortification with the infrequent firing 
of an obsolete cannon. With no serious threat of invasion, coastal gar-
risons became a mobile constabulary. For these men danger came more 
often from desperate criminals or enraged mobs, rather than Indians. 
Western duty was a diversion, a demanding and sometimes disastrous change 
in pastime. Their service in that capacity, however, deserves notice 
and accolade. The hardships and perils faced by the man called from the 
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